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Q’iij Metaphysics: Vico’s Theologia Indorum and the
Gods, Ancestors, and Idols of the 16th Century K’ichee’ Mayas

by

Phillip Salazar
B.A. Writing Major, Latin Minor, Houston Baptist University
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Abstract
Domingo de Vico completed the Theologia Indorum, a K’iche’ Christian manuscript, in
Guatemala in 1554. In the manuscript, Vico distinguishes between the idols, ancestors, and gods
of the K’iche’s. This paper shows that Vico believed the idols to be inanimate objects, ancestors
to be the older generations that have passed away, and gods to be demons. This paper then
develops a theory of animist ontology for the K’iche’s. Using that ontological theory, this paper
argues that, for the K’iche’s, their idols and gods were indistinguishable and that their ancestors
were still alive, present, and active among them.
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Introduction
K’iche’ is the most widely spoken indigenous language in North America and currently
boasts around two million speakers. While many K’iche’ speakers have migrated to countries
such as the United States, they predominantly live in Guatemala’s highlands. Christenson
describes the region as “some of the most beautiful country in the world, dominated by a range
of high mountains, volcanoes, and steep-walled plateaus, wrapped in green pine forest, and
watered by numerous rivers and waterfalls” (2007:26). For the purposes of this thesis, I will
borrow Sparks’ (2010) definitions of Maya and K’iche’. Thus in this paper, Maya can either refer
to (1) a distinct linguistic macrofamily or (2) indigenous speech communities who mostly dwell
in present-day Guatemala and Yucatán and who speak a language within that family. K’iche’
meanwhile can either refer to (1) a specific language within the K’iche’an Branch of the Mayan
language family or (2) the speech communities in Guatemala’s highlands who speak K’iche’.
The purpose of this section is to provide context to the Theologia Indorum, which is the
subject of this study. Due to the relatively obscure status of both the manuscript and its author,
Domingo de Vico, the introduction covers various areas pertinent to understanding the
manuscript. The primary sources for this section include Garry Sparks (2014; 2017; 2019), who
is the premier scholar on the manuscript, and also William Hanks (2010), who is an expert on
colonial Mayan manuscripts. This section will explain the pre-colonial and colonial history of the
K’iche’s, then Domingo de Vico, and finally the Theologia Indorum itself.
Ultimately, the argument of this paper is fairly simple. I address two primary questions:
First, how does Domingo de Vico perceive K’iche’an gods, ancestors, and idols? Second, how
do the K’iche’s view them? To answer these two questions, I review the ontological
schematization of being that informs Vico (Chapters 3) and the K’iche’s (Chapter 5). I also
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analyze the Theologia Indorum to interpret Vico’s understanding of idols, gods and ancestors
(Chapoter 4). After that, I analyze indigenous writings, especially the Popol Wuuj and Rab’inal
Achi, to attempt an understanding of the K’iche’an perspective (Chapter 5). Essentially, I argue
that Vico sees the gods as demons, the ancestors as souls sent to Hell, and idols as dead rock and
wood. On the other hand, I argue that the K’iche’s perceive the gods and idols as the same type
of divine being, a k’ab’awil, and they view their ancestors as more than disembodied spirits who
have departed to the unreachable metaphysical dimension.
A Brief History of The K’iche’s
Before the arrival of the Spanish, the K’iche’s were the most powerful group in the
Guatemalan highland region. According to Fox, the K’iche’s “were descended from Epigonal
Toltec warriors who migrated into the highlands following the collapse of Chichen Itza”
(1978:2). It is important to note that the Toltec “Conquest” theory, which is still advocated by
scholars such as Coe (2015) and Sparks (2019:41), has largely been refuted in favor of a tradebased model involving mutual networks of cultural and material exchange (Hoggarth 2016;
Ringle 2017; Tejero-Andrade et al. 2018). 1 In other words, the Chichen Itza population was
genetically Maya, not conquering Toltec implants. Still, Fox attributes the collapse of Chichen
Itza as the catalyst of Lowland Maya migration into the highland regions. Hoggarth attributes the
political collapse of Chichen Itza, which occurred around 1000 A.D., to “the longest and most
severe drought recorded in regional climate records between AD 1000 and 1100” (2016:2). Fox
states that the Lowland Mayan migration into the highlands occurred in the early 1200s A.D. and
“was simply the last of at least three separate lowland to highland movements during the
Postclassic Period” (1978:270). Fox adds that the Lowland Mayas migrated as small groups,
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A former professor of mine, Dr. Kenneth L. Brown, was particularly adamant about this point.

2

“[taking] local highland women as wives and soon lost their Gulf Coast language” (1978:2).
Among their descendants were the K’iche’s.
The K’iche’s became militarily dominant in the highlands. According to Fox, by 1470 the
“[K’iche’an] state became too large in area for effective administration, and a number of subject
groups…revolted and initiated rival systems” (1978:4). These conflicts progressed into “a series
of protracted wars between the [K’iche’s], the newly independent [Kaqchikel], the [Tz’utujil],
and the Pipil” that occurred half a century before the arrival of the Spanish (Fox 1978:302). Fox
concludes that by the time the Spanish arrived, the Kaqchikel “were clearly on the ascendency”
(1978:302). By the time the Spanish arrived to the region, the K’iche’s were no longer the
dominant power in the highlands.
The Spanish arrived in the highlands in 1524. According to Christenson, three years after
Hernán Cortés successfully razed the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan in 1521, he “sent his principle
captain, Pedro de Alvarado, to invade the Maya lands southeast of the Aztec Empire in early
1524” (2016:110). According to Fox, the Spanish “chose to side with the [Kaqchikel], and
establish their first capital, Santiago de los Caballeros, at Iximche itself,” which was the
Kaqchikel political center at the time (1978:302). With the Kaqchikel as allies, Alvarado focused
his military campaign on the K’iche’an presence in the region. Significant battles were waged
against the K’iche’s in late March, and the K’iche’an capital of Q’umarkaj finally fell on March
27, which was Easter Sunday that year (Christenson 2016:113, 114). Then Alvarado executed the
K’iche’an rulers, burned Q’umarkaj to ruins, renamed the city “Santa Cruz” in commemoration
of the Easter holiday, and left on April 11 to return to Santiago de los Caballeros (Christenson
2016:113). The Kaqchikel would assist the Spanish in other military ventures. For instance, 300
canoes of Kaqchikel warriors would later assist the Spanish in defeating another Maya group, the
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Tz’utujil (Christenson 2016:129). By this period, the Kaqchikel were the most dominant Mayan
group. Sachse states that Kaqchikel became the lingua franca of the highlands, and the Spanish
called Kaqchikel the lengua de Guatemala and the lengua metropolitina while referring to
K’iche’ as the lengua utlateca, taken from Utatlan, the Nahuatl name for Q’umarkaj (2018:69).
In other words, the K’iche’ language was considered a “regional” language, secondary in both
influence and utility to Kaqchikel. Nevertheless, Christenson concludes that while the Tz’utujil
“capitulated to the Spaniards…and never rebelled openly against Spanish political authority once
it was established,” the descendants of both the K’iche’s and the Kaqchikel maintained a long
and active resistance to the Spanish newcomers (2016:3). In fact, Alvarado faced so much
resistance from highland Maya groups such as the Achi, Q’eqchi’, Ch’ol, and Poqomchi’ that he
called the region the “Land of Eternal War” (Sparks 2019:98). Mayan resistance did not
exclusively involve military action. According to Hanks, resistance “took a variety of forms,”
including armed rebellion but also fleeing to nearby towns, outright exodus away from Spanishcontrolled regions, litigation, or simple refusal to follow the Crown or the subsequent
missionaries (2010:50). In present day Guatemala, which is nicknamed the “Land of Eternal
Spring,” this spirit of resistance persists among the Mayas against colonial systems of
oppression, especially in schools and education.
Domingo de Vico and the Dominican Order of Spain
Once the Spanish military subjugated the Mayan centers of leadership and established the
Spanish Crown as the political authority of the New World, the missionaries naturally followed
the trails of burning towns and bloodshed to convert the Crown’s new citizens with the gift of the
cross. Hanks notes that the missionaries were often critical of the Spanish military, believing that
“the violence and havoc [that the soldiers] wreaked in military conquest and extractions of the

4

colonial regime…impeded the saving of souls” (2010:3). Yet the missionaries also clashed with
each other. Sparks is exceptionally keen on this, noting the “notable diversity” of Christian
theologies of Iberia. These diverse “Catholicisms” and “Christianities” were not only influenced
by the migration of Visigoths, Suevis, Vandals, and Arlan Arian Christians from central Europe
but also by the Muslim caliphates and emirates who had entered across the Strait of Gibraltar and
through Spain’s southern border (Sparks 2019:53, 55). These theological variations spawned
various Catholic orders throughout Spain, and their differences became extremely apparent in the
New World, where the linguistic diversity of the Mayan region “caused Dominican and
Franciscan mission territories to overlap, resulting in intense competition and discord among the
various mendicant orders and their competing semiotic ideologies” (2019:269). The Franciscans
(Ordo Fratrum Minorum, 2 O.F.M.) and Dominicans (Ordo Praedicatorum, 3 O.P.) represented
the vast majority of the Christian missionary presence among the Maya. According to Sparks, the
highland region was divided into separate Franciscan and Dominican domains in order to “limit
frictions among the clergy,” with the Franciscans operating primarily with Kaqchikel and some
K’iche’ speakers, and with the Dominicans operating primarily with K’iche’ speakers but also
Q’eqchi’ and Poqom and a “limited” number of Kaqchikel (2019:50). Despite the rivalry
between the two orders, Hanks clearly states that the Franciscans “dominated the missions for
the first century,” and meanwhile the Dominicans failed to compete with Franciscan influence
(2010:10). Quiroa echoes as much, stating that by a Dominican chronicler’s own admission: “the
Dominican order never accomplished an effective conversion of the Maya-K’iche’ population as
envisioned by the early missionaries” (2013:75). Simultaneous, Sparks admits that the
Franciscans were not just the first to arrive to the Maya world but were also the most numerous
2
3

“Order of Friars Minor,” founded Francis of Assisi, patron saint of Italy and the Franciscan Order
“Order of Preachers,” founded by Dominic de Guzmán, patron saint of astronomers
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of any Catholic order (2019:76). Nevertheless, the Dominicans still represented a significant
portion of the missionary population in the New World.
The two orders differed not only in theological nuances but also in other significant ways.
For instance, the Franciscans emphasized vows of poverty and living as nomadic friars and
“beggars,” while the Dominicans emphasized preaching (Hanks 2010:9, 61; Sparks 2019:57, 59).
Perhaps most significantly, the two orders differed in approaches to evangelization. Hanks, who
devotes much of his book to Franciscan writings specifically, states that the Franciscans prized
“simplicity,” preferring “simple, transparent statement over elaborate metaphors,” an aspect that
is a crucial device in Mayan rhetoric (2010:9). Furthermore, the Franciscans often favored
introducing Castilian theological terms to the Maya languages because translation “was fraught
with danger, since the entire evangelization was to be conducted in Maya: false equivalents
would yield false beliefs” (2010:117). Sparks echoes the same notion, commenting that the
Franciscans favored the use of Castilian or Latin over using indigenous vocabulary to convey
Christian theological concepts (2019:163). The Franciscan evangelization effort was completely
founded on the notion that all languages merely attach arbitrary sounds (i.e. words) to an
objective reality that all people experience in the same way, an assumption that Sapir famously
critiqued (Hill and Mannheim 1992:385). This approach to language reflects a general trend of
Franciscans attempting to utterly divorce the Maya religion from their own. As Sparks notes, the
Franciscans adamantly avoided using an indigenous word for God, simply preferring the
“Mayanized” Tyox, 4 and considered any Mayan cosmology a form of pagan “demonology”
(2019:164, 295). In general, the Franciscan approach was harsh and unforgiving towards the

It seems even Tyox could develop pagan associations, since one Tz’utujil dictionary lists “Tyoox” to mean
“imagen, ídolo” while Dios is listed as “Dyoos” (Mendoza 1996:437, 621).
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Mayan religion and hoped to destroy it at its root (prius evellant, de inde plantent) from the
Mayan mind.
The Franciscan approach of evangelization completely differs with that of the
Dominicans. On a more general level, the Dominicans had a more sympathetic disposition
towards the Mayas, often praising them, comparing them to the Greeks and Romans, and even
attempting to restore “some indigenous royal privileges” by recognizing land claims and “some
limited sovereignty” for certain elite Mayan lineages (Christenson 2016:68, 84). In line with this
disposition, the Dominicans tended “toward valuing non-Christian cultural sources and thought
in general” (2019:58). Shapiro describes this notion well, namely as “a belief that the elements of
indigenous culture chosen for translation into Christian terms were, in reality, adumbrations of
the Christian message, seeds of the Gospel planted by God so that peoples all over the world
should recognize and accept the true religion when they were fortunate enough to encounter it”
(1987:126). This disposition led to the Dominicans attempting to use indigenous vocabulary
rather than introducing Castilian or Latin words into the language. For instance, the Dominicans
initially attempted to use the K’iche’ word k’ab’awil, which the K’iche’ used to refer to their
stone and clay deity images, to signify “God.” The backlash from the Franciscans was so severe
that the Dominicans relented and adapted k’ab’awil to signify “idol” instead of “God” (Sparks
2019:164). Yet rather than referring to God exclusively as Tyox or Dios like the Franciscans, the
Dominicans also referred to God by using new K’iche’ constructions such as Tz’aqol B’itol
(“Framer Former”), Nima Ajaw (“Great Lord”), and Alom K’ajolm (“Bearer Begetter”) (Sparks
2019:162, 163). In fact, the Dominicans not only favored the use of indigenous vocabulary to
express Christian theological concepts but even favored the use of indigenous rhetorical
conventions and style over mere “simplicity” (Sparks 2019:162). Walker explains the divergence
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in Dominican and Franciscan thought well: the Dominicans believe that “in so far as these other
religions differ from the one true religion (i.e. Christianity), they are superstitious, but they all
contain some spark of truth,” whereas the Franciscans believe that “all pagan religion is diabolic;
what gains of truth it contains are stolen from Moses; it is the same as, or indissolubly mixed
with, black magic” (2003:93, 94, 146, 147). Domingo de Vico, author of the Theologia Indorum,
was a Dominican, whose sentiments are echoed in Athanasius: “Everything is filled with the
knowledge of God,” for “he had not hidden himself invisibly from human beings, nor given them
knowledge of himself in one way only, but had unfolded it to them in manifold ways and through
many forms” (2011:61, 66). 5 This Dominican attitude no doubt inspired Vico’s comparatively
sympathetic treatment of the K’iche’ in his writings.
Domingo de Vico’s exact birthdate is unknown. Sparks approximates it sometime
between 1485 and 1519 “in the province of Jaén, in or around the towns of either Úbeda or
Huelma, when the area was still also an Arabic- and Ladino- (Sephardic Castilian) speaking
region of southern Iberia” (2019:95). Virtually nothing is known about Vico’s early life, and
Sparks notes that “little is mentioned of him in the surviving written records” (2019:23). But
some biographical data has been recovered. At some point, Vico eventually entered the
Dominican convent and studied at the convent’s Colegio de San Andrés in the town of Úbeda.
From there he pursued further education from University of Salamanca and its Dominican
Colegio de San Estaban (Sparks 2019:95). During this same time, the Dominican Order was
conducting ambitious missionary projects in present-day Yucatán and Guatemala, but their
missionary envoys struggled to cope with the various Mayan languages. The Dominican Order

This Dominican attitude was not permanent. By the late 1600s, Dominicans such as Francisco Ximénez separated
any connections between the Tz’aqol B’itol and God, arguing that the Mayan language was inadequate in conveying
God’s magnificence, and furthermore considered any reference to Mayan religion as “dangerous” and “evil” (Quiroa
2013:76-79).

5

8

began scouting for the “best and brightest” linguistic talent within their own universities (Sparks
2019:97; Sachse 2018:70). The Dominican Order observed Vico’s linguist aptitude at Salamanca
and recruited him, along with his cohort, to travel to the Maya-speaking regions of the New
World and to help with the proselytization effort. In fact, Christenson notes that it was the
famous Bartolomé de las Casas, “Protector of the Indians” and author of A Short Account of the
Destruction of the Indies, who personally convinced Vico to travel to Guatemala (2016:81). Vico
and his cohort left Salamanca on January 12, 1544. Their ship stopped several times, many in the
cohort disbanded, and those who remained were eventually shipwrecked; however, Vico and a
small remainder of his cohort did arrive in present-day Chiapas, Mexico on March 12, 1545, well
over a year after their departure (Sparks 2019:98). Vico would die eleven years later in late 1555.
Vico had been bedridden and “deathly ill,” and during his sickness Ch’ol-speaking Acalá Mayas
ambushed Vico and shot him full of many arrows, then sacked the Dominican mission house
(Sparks 2019:103). Vico reportedly died at 7 A.M. on Friday, November 30, 1555 (Sparks
2019:103). Although Vico would ultimately only spend eleven years ministering to the Mayas,
he spent that small remainder of his life in vigorous and productive work.
Linguistic skills were highly prized among the Spanish missionaries. As Hanks notes, a
missionary working in New Spain often needed to master “three or more different languages in
order to communicate with local people,” especially since the missionary schools often failed to
teach the Mayas to speak Castilian and, with utterly abysmal result, Latin (2010:10, 75). He later
adds that “it is costly to train friars in Maya, all of whom come from Castilla. It takes years, and
half of them never learn” (2010:89). Vico, who was noted for a work ethic unmatched by his
missionary peers, learned at least seven Maya languages, including K’iche’, Kaqchikel, Tz’utujil,
Ch’ol, Poqomam, Q’eqchi’, and Poqomchi’ (Sparks 2019:94, 95; Sachse 2018:70, 72). He
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demonstrated his linguistic skill in his books and catechisms, most famous of which is the
Theologia Indorum.
The Theologia Indorum as Manuscript
The Theologia Indorum is the single longest text written in an indigenous Amerindian
language. Sparks states that the manuscript’s title can either be translated as “Theology of the
Indians” or “Theology for the Indians” (Sparks 2019:93, 2017:25, 2014:401). I disagree with
Sparks’ second translation, which implies an indirect affect onto the indigenous by the theology.
“Indorum” is a second declension plural noun in the genitive case, and so the name should only
be translated as “Theology of the Indians,” with Indorum serving as a noun modifier for
Theologia. Simpson shows that Indi (from Ἰνδοί) has historically always been treated as
masculine rather than neuter (1968:299). Therefore the closest approximation to “for the
Indians” would be the dative Indis, not Indorum. It could be that the name Theologia Indorum
reflects the Dominican notion that all pagan religions contain a partial amount of objective Truth
attained through natural revelation, as articulated so well by Walker (2003). But based on the
extremely orthodox and simplistic content of Vico’s book, this does not seem likely. Rather, it
seems Vico named his book the Theologia Indorum simply because it is a theology written in an
Indian language with an Indian audience in mind. The Indian audience, moreover, is expected to
not dynamically engage with it but rather absorb it. Hanks distinguishes between dialogic and
monologic work; the Theologia Indorum is clearly monologic, meaning that the audience is
expected to “receive it and…follow its urgings but do not speak” (2010:266, 275). Sparks argues
that the Theologia Indorum was intended to be read by literate Maya, noting how the manuscript
frequently address its audience with ix (“y’all”) and numi’al, nuk’ajol (“my daughters, my sons”)
(2019:120). Sparks’ assessment certainly might be the case. But the Theologia Indorum might
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also be intended to serve as one of the various sermones, pláticas, or discursos used by the
missionaries to address an indigenous audience during mass (Hanks 2010:271). Hanks adds that
these sermons were essentially scripts designed “to be performed aloud,” in some cases by a
single individual (2010:112). To put it simply, the Theologia Indorum may have served as a
script or sermon outline for missionaries in the highlands. Sparks even notes that highland
missionaries as far as the eighteenth century formally acknowledged using the Theologia
Indorum “en especial” when ministering (2019:113, 114). Thus it appears fairly certain that Vico
wrote the Theologia Indorum for the purpose of it being read aloud to a K’iche’an audience.
The Theologia Indorum is written entirely in K’iche’, employing a highly formalized
rhetorical register that is distinctly K’iche’an. Vico completed his composition of the manuscript
“as late as November” of 1554, a year before his death in November 1555 (Sparks 2019:102,
117). It is clear the Vico was extremely talented at acquiring languages, a sentiment that
Christenson echoes (2016:82). But whether Vico is exclusively the author remains unclear.
Sparks, it should be noted, makes no suggestion of additional authorship, instead praising Vico
for his “ability to convey complex ideas of the Christian [G]od not by merely translating
European catechisms, sermons, or questio into Mesoamerican languages, but rather by
negotiating in, through, and with Mayan concepts, style, and rules” (2014:407). But Christensen
astutely observes: “The title pages of printed texts propose Spanish ecclesiastics as the sole
authors. Yet upon closer examination of the historical record and the texts themselves, the
contributions of [indigenous] as assistants, scribes, ghost writers, and authors become
increasingly apparent” (2014:7). In other words, just because an indigenous name does not
appear on a manuscript’s title page does not mean that no indigenous helped in writing it. In fact,
many Maya were trained not only to speak Castilian but also to read and write in both Castilian

11

and Latin (Hanks 2010:76, 81; Christensen 2014:7-9). And while it is possible that Vico wrote
without indigenous assistance, it certainly should not be ruled out. Christensen makes a strong
case that indigenous assistance was necessary, stating “the eloquence and native rhetoric of many
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century texts betray the contributions of native assistants”
(2014:9). The First Mexican Provincial Council of 1555 did ban indigenous involvement in the
creation of manuscripts, but this occurred a full year after the Theologia Indorum was complete
in 1554. Moreover, Christenson explains that after 1555, indigenous involvement became less
prevalent, and texts became “increasingly shortened and simplified,” plainly demonstrating that
without indigenous assistance, the supposed masters of Mayan languages were not so gifted after
all (2010:358; 2014:9). Nevertheless, in 1554 Vico would have been well within legal bounds to
rely on indigenous assistance.
Vico, along with the other missionaries, had to cope with various challenges in the
Mayan world, and these challenges directly influenced the creation and preservation of the
Theologia Indorum. For instance, missionaries often lacked not just valuable reinforcement from
the Catholic orders in Europe but even critical resources. Sparks states: “Due to its difficult
terrain and lack of valuable materials like gold, the region attracted fewer clergy and resources
than central Mexico or the Andes” (2019:84, 269). The resource crisis was so severe that the
missionaries in the Yucatán did not receive their first printing press until 1813, whereas the
missionaries in Mexico began printing as early as 1539 (Christensen 2014:5). It is for this reason
that Vico composed the Theologia Indorum entirely by hand. Anandasivam states that Vico
wrote the Theologia Indorum as two separate volumes, which together comprised 215 chapters
spanning over one thousand pages (2019:2). Others disagree with these proposed numbers.
Sparks states there are 216 chapters, not 215, and both he and Sachse agree that there were over
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700 folios, not a thousand (Sparks 2014:404; Sachse 2018:70). At the time, missionaries had
already been using an orthographic adaption of the Latin characters for writing in Mayan
languages. Due to the Moorish presence in Spain, many of the missionaries had at least
encountered and become acquainted with the Arabic abjad, and so they often adapted certain
Arabic characters to represent Mayan morphemes not present in Castilian, though Latin
orthography remained the foundational template (Sparks 2019:71, 100). These writing
conventions were by no means standardized to the same extent as Latin or Castilian, but Hanks
does note a “single emergent standard” between various colonial works (2010:113, 124, 167).
Nevertheless, the Latinate Mayan orthography was relatively consistent in its logic if not its
execution, and when Vico wrote, he used the orthographic conventions that were fairly wellestablished in the region.
A final challenge for the missionaries was their nomadic tendencies in a varied and
difficult terrain. As Hanks notes, travel was common among various members of the Catholic
orders (2010:121, 166). Part of the the missionary’s journeys included transporting manuscripts.
Christensen notes that due to the lack of a printing press, missionaries in the Maya regions relied
heavily on drafting hand-written texts and circulating them (2014:6). Hanks states that without
the convenience of small bound printed books, missionaries had to carry “stacks of manuscripts
between hard covers” (2010:113). For this reason, it would have been extremely impractical for a
missionary to carry 700 folios of the Theologia Indorum from mission to mission. To
accommodate frequent travel, the missionaries created a type of manuscript called the vade
mecum (“go with me”), which were smaller and more portable than normal manuscripts (Sparks
2019:61). Christensen describes these manuscripts as “small in size, brief, and typically housed
between a makeshift leather cover” (2010:360). Such a manuscript would have only included
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selections of the Theologia Indorum to allow for greater mobility. Sachse affirms that many
colonial writers “reproduced and reconfigured” “entire passages” of the Theologia Indorum
(2018:70). Sparks reasonably attributes the vade mecum for the seeming lack of complete copies
of the Theologia Indorum known today, stating “it seems to have been broken up into smaller
works that were continuously copied and used by [missionaries] over the course of the next
centuries and misidentified and wrongly catalogued in European and US colonial manuscript
collections” (2019:4). The manuscript was never published, leaving all the copies hand-written.
Anandasivam states that there are twelve known surviving manuscripts of the Theologia Indorum
(2019:2). Sparks states otherwise. In 2014 he had counted seventeen extant versions, and in 2019
he seems to have uncovered an additional copy, raising the total count to eighteen (2014:404;
2019:245). He notes that all of the copies seem to be “at-least [sic] second generation copies”
(2019:127). Although the location of the original manuscript is unknown, the Theologia Indorum
is by no means “lost.” But due to its limited access and length, no one has yet translated the
entire document into any other language.
The Theologia Indorum as Message
Finally, while the content of the Theologia Indorum was extremely thorough, it was also
extremely simple. Within the manuscript, Vico states the purpose of the Theologia Indorum as
follows: “Chitzukuj ta iwetamab’al, chupam wa’e wuj k’o wi nima etamab’al chetamax wi Dios
nim Ajaw iwumal” (“Que sepan buscar sus conocimientos, en este libro hay grandes
conocimientos en donde ustedes pueden saber de Dios gran Señor”) (2017:24). The content is
extremely orthodox and explains biblical stories, the difference between virtues and vices, basic
tenants of Christian theology, and the importance of God, among other things. Sparks
particularly enjoys linking Vico’s Theologia Indorum to the Summa Theologica of Thomas
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Aquinas (2014:399, 403, 404, 407, 408; 2017: 30; 2019:60, 102, 131, 147). Certainly the
canonized theologian influenced Vico. As Sparks points out, Vico studied at the University of
Salamanca, where Aquinas became the “curricular standard” of the school (2019:131). Yet in
addition to Aquinas, and whom Sparks does little more than acknowledge, Erasmus and
Averroës also became extremely popular figures at Salamanca. According to Sparks, “Erasmus’s
popularity reached its apex at Iberian universities in Salamanca and Acalá in the late 1520s,”
while Averroës became one of the “essential sources for Thomas Aquinas’s theological
scholasticism” and particularly influenced “Dominican thought in general but especially in
northern Iberia by the 1530s” (2019:54-59). These two figures critically influenced Vico and the
approach to writing the Theologia Indorum.
It is possible that Averroës influenced Vico as much as Aquinas. Abu’l-Walīd Ibn Rushd,
better known as Averroës, was one of the two greatest Aristotelians of the thirteenth century, the
other being Aquinas (Fakhry 2008: preface). One of Averroës’ most important contributions to
Vico was the idea of stratifications of intellect. In his Decisive Treatise Determining the
Connection between Law and Wisdom, Averroës states that “it is obligatory to reflect upon
existing things by means of the intellect, and to consider them; and consideration is nothing more
than inferring and drawing out the unknown from the known” (2008:2). To put it simply, the
purpose of humanity is to use reason to obtain Truth. But while it is required that humans use
reason, not all people are capable of it. Averroës also states that people fail in philosophical
reflection “either due to a deficiency in his innate disposition, poor ordering of his reflection,
being overwhelmed by his passions, not finding a teacher to guide him to an understanding of
what is in them, or because of a combination of all or more than one of these reasons” (2008:7).
Essentially, humans fail to learn by means of reason primarily due to their “passions” (i.e.
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hedonism, or in Christian terms, succumbing to the sinful nature of the “flesh”), lack of
education, or a frank lack of capability. The first two can be amended, but the third cannot. This
is why the Dominicans created schools and advocated so adamantly against Maya following their
sinful natures. Christenson notes that even Vico himself taught elite Maya children as an
instructor, possibly with Averroës’ warning in mind that “anyone who prevents someone suited
to reflect upon the books of wisdom from doing so…is like one who prevents thirsty people from
drinking cool, fresh water until they die of thirst” (Christenson 2016:82; Averroës 2008:7). But
Averroës amends that not all can be trained to reason philosophically.
Rather, there are three types of intellectual dispositions (or “natures”) according to
Averroës. There are people who may ascend in knowledge and wisdom either through
“demonstration,” which is the highest and rarest intellect, or else through “dialectical
statements,” or lastly through “rhetoric,” which is the lowliest and most common. This supposed
stratification promotes an elitist attitude towards “the masses,” who would have been the
majority of the indigenous in the New World. According to Averroës, the “masses” are
characterized as “not adept in knowledge of [philosophy] nor capable of understanding it”
(2008:11). Such people can only learn through preaching without interactive engagement. They
are not permitted to study on their own at risk of “heretical innovation on their part” and should
in fact be kept ignorant that philosophy exists at all (2008:11, 19). In fact, Averroës goes as far to
say that “the duty of those within the multitude who are not capable of rhetorical statements is to
let them stand in their apparent sense, and it is not permissible to know that interpretation at all”
(2008:26). Simply put, it is the obligation of the “multitude” to listen to an instructor, which
contradicts his initial and most basic premise that the purpose of humanity is to use reason to
learn. The influential priest Ficino echoes as much, stating that good knowledge such as
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astrology becomes “bad” when in the hands of the “plebians” (Walker 2003:54). Even Gregory
of Nazianzus states that “For one who is not pure to lay hold of pure things is dangerous, just as
it is for weak eyes to look at the sun’s brightness” (2002:27). In truly elitist fashion, “learned
men” like Vico are expected to bar the majority of people from access to knowledge, and if Vico
does try to teach the “masses” anything beyond the mundane sermon, then he is “an unbeliever
[of God]” (2008:27). By threatening the likes of Vico with accusatory labels of infidelity against
God, Averroës ensured that elitist stratifications of power remained in place in Europe and
beyond.
This very same elitism can also be found in Erasmus, another titanic Western figure
whom Vico likely read at Salamanca. In one of Erasmus’ best-known works The Education of a
Christian Prince, Erasmus begins by stressing that philosophy, which he defines as that which
“frees the mind from the false opinions of the multitude and from wrong desires and
demonstrates the principles of right government by reference to the example set by the eternal
powers” (2010:2). Immediately Erasmus separates the great “thinkers” from the lowly “masses.”
Erasmus states that “for the most part the nature of man inclines towards evil,” confirming the
Christian notion that the masses, especially without philosophy, are naturally wicked and
deserving of correction (2010:8). This notion manifested grotesquely in the New World. Hanks
states that “to re-form the habits of the indigenous people,” “the use of punishment was an
integral part of missionary teaching, justified on the grounds that the Indios were like children,”
and even adds that “the friars were insistent on the necessity of punishment in transformative
pedagogy” (2010:64, 180). No doubt the perception of adult Maya as children stems directly
from Averroës’ view that the masses are, to put it bluntly, stupid. In his commentary on Plato’s
Republic, Averroës even advocates this “transformative pedagogy.” He describes a method of
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instruction called the “affective argument,” which “is the way applied to enemies, foes, and him
whose way it is not to be aroused to the virtues that are desired of him” (1974:11). Averroës not
only states that the “sinful masses” should be treated like “enemies” and “foes,” but even states
that this type of “argument” serves to “move them toward the [good] qualities” (1974:11,
brackets original). Even Erasmus relents that it is better to be a slave to another human than “to
be a slave to vice and shameful desires” (2010:24). It is this European “wisdom” that led the
brutal treatment of indigenous across two continents.
Erasmus is equally accountable for this sense of European superiority, and a common
theme in his work is the belittlement of the “masses.” In addition to accusing people of their
sinful nature, he adds that “a large section of the masses are swayed by false opinions, just like
those people trussed up in Plato’s cave, who regarded the empty shadows of things as the things
themselves” (2010:13). For Erasmus, as is the case for Averroës, there is a stratification of
intellect that brands the majority of people as insipid and incapable of discerning Truth from lies.
Thus Erasmus characterizes the “masses” as people who “hate the unknown” while preferring
their familiar ignorance (2010:67). Meanwhile the “learned” philosopher should not just “avoid
the degrading opinions and interests of the common folk” but even “avoid the dress and life-style
of the lower classes” (2010:15). Finally, Erasmus affirms that “priests and bishops are admittedly
an important factor here,” since the “common people imitate nothing with more pleasure than
what they see their prince do” (2010:21). In other words, the majority of people are sheep who
will gleefully and unquestioningly follow whoever holds power. Sparks is certainly correct that
Aquinas inspired Vico, but he neglects these other important sources. The key difference
between Aquinas and Vico is that Aquinas wrote for an educated audience of fellow theologians,
whereas Vico wrote for the lowly, naked salvaje.
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Why the Theologia Indorum Matters
To the Spanish missionaries living in 16th century Guatemala, it is without exaggeration
that their chief and most unifying purpose was to save souls. In their eyes, they were rescuing the
uneducated Maya from ignorance by providing the Truth. This self-identified altruism was
grounded in good intention. After all, were the missionaries not risking harm and, in Vico’s case,
death for the sake of the pagan? Were they not a moral and intellectual people obligated to
elevate the lowly savage? This lack of self-awareness coupled with dogmatic loyalty to their own
oligarchic intelligentsia led to the creation of unforgiving indoctrination programs. Vico was
among the missionaries who taught Mayan children in these programs and even had his own
school (Christenson 2016:82). The schools emphasized the teaching of children, who were not
only indoctrinated to be Catholic but also to perform the duties of the missionary so they could
serve the missionaries as aides in the future (Christensen 2014:8, 2010:359). The children
education programs succeeded in producing adults who enforced the organizing, teaching, and
monitoring of other Mayas (Hanks 2010:75). The missionaries did not need to understand the
Mayas, for there was nothing worth understanding. The Mayas on the other hand were expected
to not only understand the Spaniards but to become Spaniard. This meant abandoning ignorance
for education and paganism for Truth.
Vico was a part of this systemized colonization project, and he contributed to it by
writing the Theologia Indorum, a “Theology of the Indians.” After he completed his book, copies
were produced and disseminated to missions across the highlands. At those missions, Vico’s
words words came alive straight from Spanish mouths to Mayan ears. Vico’s manuscript was a
central component of a relentless indoctrination machine. Despite the best intentions, Vico and
the rest of the missionaries inflicted terrible harm to the people they intended to help.
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The Spanish were unable to understand the Mayas, nor did they desire to try. Instead,
they burned the bad ideas in book bonfires, forbade the Mayas from writing anything outside the
Christian genre, then in 1555 forbade them from even doing that, and tasked the Mayas with
purposeful labor (Christensen 2014:9, Hanks 2010:91). Christenson says that disease, massacre,
and labor reduced the Mayan population by 85% (2007:32). Sparks estimates the number closer
to 90%, and says the K’iche’ population plummeted from 60,000-150,000 in 1520 to 11,50015,000 by 1672, and then continued to drop to 7,500-8,000 by 1689 (2019:34, 88). The Mayas
were also enslaved and tortured. If a Maya had more than one wife, for instance, the Spanish
would brand the number “4” onto their forehead and dispossess them of half their goods (Hanks
2010:37). If the Mayas rebelled, they were subdued, enslaved, and hanged (Christenson
2016:130). Just following the rules was not enough either. With the transformation of the
highlands and lowlands into a Spanish province, the Spanish forced the Mayas to leave their
homes and relocate to Spanish towns (Hanks 2010:48). There, they were forced to memorize and
recite prayers, perform in scripted group readings, and sing, because the Spanish believed that
forced routinization would induce belief (Hanks 2010:95, 113). To enforce this routinization,
those who didn’t attend mass or failed to reform their habits were punished (Hanks 2010:64,
180).
Finally there was forced enslavement and labor. The Spanish forced the Mayas to build
convents, churches, and roads, as well as to provide the materials for construction as a mandatory
taxes (Hanks 2010:49). Even from the beginning of European exploration, men like Vespucci
enslaved indigenous people, claiming that they ate other humans, or attacked them, or committed
some other heinous, ungodly act (Vespucci 2012:53, 71). Vespucci himself describes a battle
against the indigenous in which “we routed and slaughtered them,” killing “fifteen or twenty of
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them,” wounding an untold number of others, and capturing five indigenous people, including
two girls (2012:46). From its outset in 1492, the colonization project supported itself with the
fruit of human labor, and Vico was a part of that project.
In this way, the Spanish assigned labor that was meaningless to the Mayas, and they
punished those who resisted. They then attempted to control the thoughts of the Mayas,
demanding they speak, sing, and pray European ideas in Castilian and Latin. Mayan ideas on the
other hand were not only pagan but those of a child (Hanks 2010:64, 180). Through forced
church attendance and labor, the Spanish ensured that the Mayas allocated every waking hour
towards productivity that benefited the missionaries. Unable to spend their time as they wished,
and forced to regurgitate thoughts they did not agree with, many Mayas lost joy, hope, and sense
of meaning. Over fifty percent of the Mayas stopped attending mass (Hanks 2010:60, 72). As
Diego de Landa reported, “two or three Mayas hanged themselves ‘in order not to give up their
idols nor abandon their evil ways’” (Christenson 2016:22). Domingo de Vico claimed to bring a
message of hope, but he and the rest of the clergy only brought despair, and like a wild horse
trapped in a pen, many Mayas stopped bucking and surrendered to the saddle.
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Chapter 1
Literature Review of Ontological Theories and Other Concepts
In this chapter, I explain my theoretical framework and other relevant concepts to this
study. My theory will build on the basic foundations provided by Philippe Descola in Beyond
Nature and Culture (2014), in which he outlines four types of ontological schemas. These
schemas, which Descolas commonly refers to as “types of ontologies,” “modes of
identification,” and “schematizations of experience,” include totemism, naturalism, analogism,
and animism (2014:172, 232). I specifically focus on animism, which I argue is the ontology of
the K’iche’ Mayas. Yet animism is a broad ontological framework that prominently ranges
across the world, especially in North Asia and South America. Moreover, Descola admits to only
providing a basic “tour” through the various ontologies, offering generalized microschema
within each of the four macroschema, and using specific case studies to demonstrate those
microschema (2014:233). Therefore, this paper uses the work of Viveiros de Castro and his
Amerindian cosmopolitical theory, which is a theory tailored specifically for the Amerindian
rather than for a generalized, global population of animists. This theory is explained in the first
section of this chapter.
In the second section of this chapter, I explain how a naturalist ontology influenced the
colonial experiment of the Spanish in the Mayan world. In this ontology, living beings are
categorized as either “human” or “non-human,” and humans are differentiated by their religion
and state of their soul. This section will serve as context for Chapters 3 and 4, in which I
examine how Domingo de Vico perceived and addressed K’iche’an idols, ancestors, and gods.
In the third section, I explain the contexts of colonial Christian manuscript production, as
well as concepts of reducción, genre, and lengua reducida. I also examine the Spanish
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missionaries’ methods and theories of translation. Finally, I compare those theories to modern
translation theory. Like the second section, this section will also serve as context for Chapters 3
and 4 of this paper.
An Amerindian Cosmopolitical Theory
To develop a theory of K’iche’an animist ontology, I will build on the of Brazilian
anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, namely for his theoretical framework of Amerindian
cosmopolitical theory. This theory is outlined in his book Cannibal Metaphysics, which focuses
on the colonial Tupinambá of coastal Brazil. Complementing this invaluable text is another
touchstone work by Viveiros entitled The Indian Soul: The Encounter of Catholics and
Cannibals in 16th Century Brazil. This paper will treat the two books as complementary to each
other in articulating this theoretical framework. The theory he proposes, an Amerindian
cosmopolitical theory, is a post-structuralist theory of relationality that seeks to enable
“Anthropology…to finally assume its new mission of being the theory/practice of the permanent
decolonization of thought,” namely by “[putting] indigenous ideas on the same plane as
anthropological ideas” (2017:40, 77, 170, 189). The theory is therefore a counter-argument to
Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist method. In his analysis of Gê-speaking groups in Central and Eastern
Brazil, Lévi-Strauss applies his structuralist method to social organization. Lévi-Strauss provides
a “dialectical interpenetration of opposites” wherein he reinterprets the data on Gê dual
organizations “in terms of his theory of elementary structures of kinship and the various kinds of
exchange generated by certain rules of marriage” (Maybury-Lewis 2009:902, 915). Lévi-Strauss
concludes that “the dual organizations of Brazil were partial expressions of a more complex
reality, shared with Andean societies, and that they…[concealed] from themselves the
asymmetry and hierarchy which represented the true nature of their societies” (Maybury-Lewis
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2009:905). Viveiros de Castro shifts away from this structuralist framework in favor of a poststructuralist approach. Maybury-Lewis attributes this departure from “flaws” in Lévi-Strauss,
namely that he is “too formal” and “relied too much on reasoning from the alliance theory he had
put forward in The Elementary Structures of Kinship” (2009:919). Rather than apply structuralist
models of Southeast Asia, Africa, or New Guinea, Viveiros de Castro developed a model tailored
specifically for the South American lowlands. This counter-argument to Lévi-Strauss became
foundational to current understandings of animist ontology.
Viveiros de Castro incorporates two primary concepts into his theoretical framework:
perspectivism and mutlinaturalism. These two concepts serve as a bedrock for a contemporary
philosophical metaphysics of animism. While Viveiros departs from the structuralism of LéviStrauss, Viveiros also uses him as a stepping stone or, perhaps more aptly, as the shoulders of a
giant. Viveiros states that Lévi-Strauss “unexpectedly confirmed the importance of an economy
of corporeality at the very heart of those ontologies recently redefined…as animist” (Viveiros
2017:54). What Lévi-Strauss unintentionally showed, and what Viveiros expounds, is that the
animist’s body is not merely conceived as “the specific physiology or characteristic anatomy of
something but [rather as] an ensemble of ways or modes of being that constitutes a habitus,
ethos, or ethnogram” (Viveiros 2017:72). In other words, the animist views the body as a gamut
of differences while simultaneously seeing all interiority as the same. Descola frequently cites
Viveiros in his summation of animist ontologies, although he admits that he does “scant justice”
to the Brazilian scholar (2013:140). Nevertheless, he still provides useful expository on Viveiros’
ideas, reiterating that “it is not through their souls that humans and nonhumans differ but through
their bodies” (2013:129). Therefore, in an animist ontology all living beings share the same
interiority, which involves conscious and experience, but beings are distinguishable by different
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physicalities, such as jaguar print, feathers, scales, or bark. This makes animism the most
opposite ontology to naturalism, which perceives a shared physicality distinguished by a
multiplicity of interiorities (e.g. a hierarchy of sentience). Moreover, Viveiros states that “each
kind of being appears to itself – as human – even as it already acts by manifesting its distinct and
definitive animal, plant, or spirit nature” (2017:68). In other words, post-structuralism breaks the
naturalist’s categorizations of spirit, animal, plant, and human. This naturally leads to the
development of Viveiros’s first concept of perspectivism. Viveiros first defines perspective as
“the capacity to occupy a point of view” and then defines perspectivism as a “conception of the
world as composed of a multiplicity of points of view” (2017:55, 58). Viveiros adds that, within
such a conception, “every existent is a center of intentionality apprehending other existents”
(2017:55). While Lévi-Strauss contributed to this revelation, it is not his only contribution to this
Amerindian cosmopolitical theory.
The second contribution of Lévi-Strauss involves his assisting of Amazoniantists to
perceive “certain theoretical implications of this non-marked or generic status of the virtual
dimension or ‘soul’ of existents” (Viveiros 2017:55). This not only implies perspectivism but
also multinaturalism. According to Viveiros, multinaturalism implies “an objective universality
of bodies and substances” (2017:56). Like naturalists, animists also believe in an objective
reality, only this objective reality is based in the universality of the interiority rather than
physicality. Because interiority is universal, there is no fixed point of view or one “true” and
“objective” perspective (Viveiros 2017:157). Viveiros adds that this metaphysics “reaches its
highest expression in the strong speculative yield of those indigenous categories denoting
matrimonial alliance, phenomena that I translated with yet another connect: virtual affinity”
(2014:50). While much can be said about affinity along with kinship and marriage alliances, at
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the theory’s core, relationality is central to understanding animism and, more specifically, the
animist shamanic figure. As Viveiros notes, “this intensive affinity crosses the borders between
species: animals, plants, spirits, and other tribes whose humanity is uncertain are all found to be
implicated in such synthetic-disjunctive relations with humans” (2017:175). Just because one has
the ability to “occupy” the point of view of another being, this does mean any individual has the
capacity to do so. Rather, this requires the enlightenment of the shaman, who has the ability to
assume and experience the perspective of a being through transformations. These figures are thus
“‘commuters’ or conductors of perspective, the first operating in a zone of inter-specificity and
the second in an interhuman and intersocietal one” (Viveiros 2017:151). Descola adds that such a
transformation is not a metamorphosis involving “an unveiling or a disguise” but is rather an
anamorphosis that “constitutes the ultimate phase in a relationship in which each party, by
modifying the viewpoint imposed upon him by his original physicality, endeavors to coincide
with the perspective…[of] the other party” (2013:138). Thus, within the framework of
Amerindian cosmopolitical theory, the world is composed of a multiplicity of perspectives that
are not categorically separated but rather united in a system of affinity grounded in relationality.
Further, all species experience other species as human. Viveiros explains this well when he
states: “If everything and everyone can be human, then nothing and no one is human in a clear
and distinct fashion” (2017:70). This is perhaps one of the most decolonizing thoughts in his
book, completely demolishing all Western (i.e. naturalist) assumptions of humanity and being.
Ultimately, when missionaries like Vico came to the highlands of Guatemala, they failed to grasp
the animist ontology of the K’iche’ and other Maya. Tragically, this failure on the part of the
European aliens led to brutal colonization, religious conversion, and even enslavement.
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The Naturalism of 16th Century Europe
In order to properly interpret the Theologia Indorum and other Spanish Christian
manuscripts of the New World, such manuscripts must first be contextualized within the
ontology of naturalism. Descola devotes the least space of his book to this ontology because this
ontology is markedly Western and has shaped and filtered Western theology, philosophy, and
literature, a corpus commonly called the Western Canon. Thus Descola states: “[Naturalism] is
the simplest of all to define and the most intuitive, for it corresponds to the sense of self-evidence
that modern doxa has instilled in us. It is the formula that we learn at school, that the various
media transmit” (2014:256). Additionally, Descola points out that naturalism is the most
opposite ontological schematization to animism: “The counterpart of animism is not totemism, as
I had earlier supposed, but naturalism” (2014:172). In animism, living beings all have an
unmarked interiority, which is to say that no one’s conscious and experiences are different from
another’s. While all living beings have identical interiorities, they on the other hand have a
multiplicity of different physicalities. Therefore, even though all interiorities are the same, one
being can easily distinguish itself from another being by physicalities alone. Because animism is
the ontology most opposite to naturalism, it serves as a useful contrastive tool to better
understand what is so familiar to Westerners, or as the late David Foster Wallace put it, animism
allows us to solve the question “What the hell is water?”
Like animism, naturalism also organizes the identifications of beings into categories
based on systematic relationships. As Descola states, these systematic relationships “make it
possible to throw light on not only the properties of its constituent parts but also those of the
totality that results from their combination” (2014:172). Yet the difference between animism and
naturalism is that while animism perceives a single interiority among a multiplicity of
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physicalities, naturalism perceives the opposite. Specifically, naturalism perceives “a
discontinuity of interiorities and a continuity of physicalities” (2014:172). That is to say, the
naturalist perceives that all physicalities are the same, since all living beings share certain
physiological attributes and characteristics in common, but perceives a multiplicity of
interiorities. Simply put, a living being is not unique because of their bodies but because of their
minds, conscious, or “soul,” depending on how the interiority is conceived. The second major
difference between naturalism and animism is that naturalism reverses the “hierarchical order” of
interiority and physicality, “with the universal laws of matter and life providing naturalism with
a paradigm for conceptualizing the place and role of the diversity of the cultural expressions of
humanity” (2014:172). The naturalist emphasizes “science” and “objectivity” and uses these
concepts to analyze the continuity of physicality shared between all living beings. This method
for distinguishing between living beings bears significant ramifications on not just how a
naturalist perceives reality but how they interact and engage with reality. Viveiros astutely
observes how this engagement manifests as “objectivist epistemology encouraged by Western
modernity,” and this epistemology is namely “objectification; what has not been objectified
simply remains abstract and unreal” (2017:60). By objectifying another living being as an object,
it can thereby be deconstructed into its constituent parts. Viveiros notes how this leads to “a
systematic and deliberate abduction of agency,” concluding: “An exhaustive scientific
explanation of the world, it is thought, should be capable of reducing every object to a chain of
causal events, and these, in turn, to materially dense interactions” (2017:61, 62). This notion is
nothing modern though, as its roots can be traced back to Aristotle’s Four Causes. Yet even these
Causes included a “Final Cause,” which is the purpose of a thing. Newtonian physics removed
this by stating that everything in the universe can be described mathematically. The naturalist
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ontology of the West removes purpose and, by extension, meaning from “objects,” reducing
them to lifeless atoms forming molecules forming proteins, and so on. In this way, naturalism
renders the physicality of living beings as homogenous, meaningless, and systematically ordered.
Rather, in naturalism it is the interiority that distinguishes living beings from each other.
Oakdale summarizes the implications of this well and succinctly: “”The ontology of ‘the West’
or of ‘modern,’ in contrast, is based on an understanding that all living things have a shared
biological nature, but are divided according to the categories of nature and culture, and within
the human domain, between different culture” (2018:58). First there is the naturalist’s
categorizations of beings by their respective nature and culture. This fosters distinctions between
“human” and “non-human.” Descola describes this distinction as follows: “Humans…make
rules…, and create conventions…; they transform their environment, they share out tasks…, they
create signs and values…, they consent to some form of authority, and they assemble to
deliberate…. In short, they do all the things that animals do not do.” (2014:257). The chief
distinction between “human” and “non-human” almost exclusively pertains to animals. As
Descola points out, “vegetative life” is considered a minimal form of life and often excluded
even from the “non-human” category of animals (2014:176). Significantly, these two categories
imply that “humans” are the most central and important category, since all other living beings are
not categorized by their own traits but according to the absence of the human traits. There are
humans, and there is everything else, lumped together in a single category of beings that is only
marked as exclusive to humans. Descola concludes, “Even if humans and animals do possess
comparable faculties of feeling and thinking, the souls from which those faculties stem are not
comparable: a human’s soul is immortal; an animal’s soul is mortal” (2014:177). These
categories of “human” and “non-human,” coupled with the ever-surging global rise of Western
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influence and power, has led to the indifferent destruction of environmental habitats, permanent
eradication of animal species, and casual push of indigenous languages into forgotten oblivion.
De la Cadena describes this as the separation of “Humanity” from “Nature,” something that led
to a “hegemonic biopower” that ultimately “declared the gradual extinction of other-than-human
beings and the worlds in which they existed” (2010:342-345). In this framework, humans are the
most important type of being, and all non-humans are expendable so long as their loss benefits
humans. The two categories themselves imply an anthropocentric cosmos.
Finally, while naturalism separates all humans from non-humans, it also distinguishes
between humans based on interiority. Thus Descola states: “humans are what they are because
they have a physicality plus an interiority; and nonhumans are what they are because they have a
physicality minus an interiority” (2014:243). Yet even among humans, there is a wide range of
interiorities, and these interiorities are the only way to distinguish one human from another.
During the colonial period of Vico, Westerners defined interiority in terms of religiosity and the
“state of the soul” (i.e. saved or damned), and so religion became the primary means of
distinguishing between other people. Sparks defines religion as “a community’s articulation of
its meanings and values, manifested through speech, symbols, and practices…. Religion also
entails discernment of what community members understand by the ‘proper’ selection and
ordering of those meanings and values” (2019:6). The importance of religion as a social marker
is clearly demonstrated by Hans Staden, a 16th century German navigator who lived among the
Tupinambá in South America as a captive. Nowhere else is he so overt in his aversion to the
Tupinambá than when he states: “[The Tupinambá] are a skilled people, expert in every kind of
wickedness” (Staden 2008:107). Staden frames his statement around a religious argument by
calling the Tupinambá “wicked,” strongly implying that it was the damned and spiritually
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corrupt interiority of the indigenous that he detested above all else. Amerigo Vespucci’s attitude
is similar. In his letters, he refers to the indigenous as a “faithless and ill-conditioned people,”
adding that “they cannot be called Moors or Jews, but worse than Gentiles. For we did not see
that they offered any sacrifices, nor have they any place of worship” (2012:42, 56). 6 Within the
naturalist framework, animals do not have an interiority, or in this case a religiosity. Within
naturalist logic, if a human lacks any religion, that human is more akin to the animal “nonhumans” than to humans. Vespucci affirms this logic by referring to the indigenous as a “people
worse than animals” (2012:69). This condemnation is clearly based on religious interiority and
not any physicality. He is certainly sensational in his physical descriptions of the land and the
people, but these descriptions are never associated with condemnation from Vespucci (2012:40,
50, 69). Rather, it is specifically the the lack of religion (i.e. a lack of interiority) that makes the
indigenous “worse than Gentiles” and “worse than animals.”
The same applies to the inverse relationship, namely between Christians and Christians.
Because Christians are saved souls, they share a commonality in interiority that becomes its own
type of classification. For instance, when a Frenchman refuses to rescue Hans Staden, Staden
later refers to him as “godless” and, when he met the Frenchman again, rebuked the Frenchman
by saying “I asked whether he…had a Christian heart beating in his body” (Staden 2008:72,
102). Moreover, Vespucci frequently refers to his fellow sailors collectively as “our Christians”
and even refers to one individual sailor as simply “Christian” rather than by the sailor’s name
(2012:48, 70, 71). In 16th century Europe, religion is the primary mode of identification between
humans. Fishman is particular astute of this point, stating:

Vespucci’s letters are extremely untrustworthy, replete with vague descriptions and blatantly fabricated places,
people, and events. But it is his sentiments of the indigenous that are relevant here, even if the veracity of his
accounts are highly dubious.
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But theories of white racial superiority, which played so important a part in nineteenthcentury imperialism, did not serve as a basis for, or justification of, European expansion
in the early modern era. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religious issues
preoccupied society. The European experience in the New World cannot be understood
apart from a mentality that was primarily non-secular. Spiritual concerns were surely a
higher priority for some individuals than for others, but the reality of the supernatural was
a central component of the early modern worldview. (2002:30)
Religion, or the interiority of humans, was therefore the primary means of distinguishing
between people, not physicality. De la Cadena affirms this, stating that notions of “race” are a
“modern tool to rank ‘Humanity’ along a ‘Civilization’” compared to the much older, interioritybased distinctions between “Nature” and “Human” (2010:344). What determined the superiority
and inferiority of humans was solely based on the interior. In fact, the slavery of non-whites by
European whites originates from religion, not race itself. Cannon states that slavery resulted from
the religious wars between Christian Europe and the Muslim Middle East and North Africa
(2008:127). Looking for a way to halt Islamic expansion, the Europeans looked towards the
shores of Africa. With the backing of papal bulls, Christians sailed down the African coast
beyond Muslim territory, evangelizing to the African people in order to impede Islam from
spreading down the continent (Cannon 2008:127). Many Africans rejected Christianity, and so to
force the African peoples to convert to Christianity, the European voyagers enslaved them.
Europeans considered "conversion and enslavement as interchangeable terms," resulting in the
launch of "globalized imperialist voyages of captivity" (Cannon 2008:128). Moreover, in
medieval Spain specifically, the Reconquista and its battles against the Muslim Moors “provided
a continual source of captives that could be sold as slaves,” and even though “the church was
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unhappy about [slavery] in the case of other Christian nations, this was not so where Islamic or
pagan peoples were concerned” (Whitehead 1984:72). Ultimately slavery became a lucrative
trade and so became institutionalized, globalized, and one of the hallmark evils of the West. But
this was not merely an issue of Islamophobia specifically. On March 31, 1492, the Spanish
crown issued the Alhambra Decree, which ordered all Jews living in Spain to either convert to
Christianity or face forced exile within four months (Lewis 2015:5). Racism, or prejudice on the
basis of physicality, has its historical roots in a prejudice and even hatred against non-Christians.
Language, Writing, and Colonialism
To convert the Mayas of the New World, the Spanish missionaries had to learn Mayan
languages and use those languages as a tool for their overall objective of turning the indigenous
into good Christian citizens who respected the authority of the Pope in the Vatican and the crown
in Spain. This colonization project is the core of Hanks’ book Converting Words, in which he
states: “The colonizing process was guided by a surprisingly systematic logic, even though it was
implemented under sometimes chaotic circumstance” (2010:xiii). Hanks calls the colonization
efforts reducción, “which may be glossed ‘pacification, conversion, ordering,’ according to
context,” and states that it “was a total project, aimed at coordinated transformations of space,
conduct, and language. […] The new language spread faster and penetrated deeper and more
tenaciously into Maya culture than any other aspect of reddución” (2010:xiv). While Hanks
primarily focuses on the lowland Yucatán region, the Spanish implemented reducción in the
highlands as well. As Sachse points out, “The Highland Maya language K'iche' has one of the
longest written traditions in the Americas,” including not just Christian manuscripts and
documents but also manuscripts by indigenous authors, including títulos, notarial and quasinotarial documents, autochthonous calendars, dance dramas like the Rab’inal Achi, and of course
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the Popol Wuuj (2014:1). Meanwhile, the Spanish missionaries “set about learning Maya
language, producing the grammars, dictionaries, and other descriptions [which] made it possible
to translate Christian doctrine, prayers, sermons, and parts of the sacraments into Maya
language” (Hanks 2010:7). The longest of any these documents, not just in the Mayan world but
in the Americas, was the Theologia Indorum. Historically scholars have stated that this led to
syncretism in the Christian missionary documents. For instance, while Iverson notes the “highly
unequal power structures” between Spanish and indigenous relations, she explicitly makes
reference to syncretism and concludes her article by stating that “Still, in spite of and because of
the violence of the Spanish evangelization campaigns…[and] the friars’ Utopian ambitions,
[syncretism] created a fundamentally new Christianity in the process” (2019:268, 278). Hanks
disagrees with this long-held assumption of syncretism, stating “Christian practices done in
Maya appear indigenous, whereas the meanings are in fact Christian – the opposite of the
syncretism model” (2010:8). Reducción was extremely methodical and organized at least in
theory and logic, and this meticulous scrutiny of its own manuscript productions ensured that
even when Mayan languages were used, European Christian signs were conveyed. This church
made this absolutely clear when, during the First Mexican Provincial Council of 1555, they
banned all indigenous involvement in the writing process to ensure no subversive meanings crept
in and “tainted” their production of manuscripts.
The corpus of manuscripts produced during the Conquest were extremely varied.
Roughly, the Spanish missionary genres can be divided into three categories, or what Sparks
refers to as “fields.” This first category is theological; these include “common genres” such as
“collections of sermons (sermonarios), lectures or lessons (pláticas), songbooks (cantos, coplas,
and psalmodias cristianas), booklets of prayers (cartillas), confession manuals (manuales or
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confesorios), and catechisms (catecismos or doctrinas cristianas)” (Sparks 2019:73). The second
category is linguistic; these include “dictionaries, vocabularies, artes (practical grammars),
grammars, lexicons, in short a whole range of linguistic studies” (Hanks 2010:10). The third
category is ethnographic; these included the histories and chronicles of Spaniards like Bartolomé
de las Casas and Diego de Landa. While the missionaries managed the majority of manuscript
production, the indigenous also produced their own documents outside of the Christian
missionary context. These documents included notarial genres such as the carta (letter), deslinde
(land survey), título (land title), acuerdo (accord), testamento (will), petición (petition), and
election records, as well as “forbidden genres” such as the Books of Chilam Balam (of which
nine are extant) and the Ritual of the Bacabs (Hanks 2010:19). The Popol Wuuj of the highland
K’iche’s would also especially fallen within the “forbidden” category. The Theologia Indorum,
on the other hand, was a theological work and one of the most important products of reducción
in the highlands.
Dictionaries held a particularly significant role in the reducción of the New World.
Leavitt notes that despite threats of the new Protestantism and a few “activists in France and Italy
[but not Spain],” the Catholic church “maintained a monopoly on sacred texts” (2015:264). In
light of rising resistance against the church from the Protestantism of Luther and Calvin as well
as indigenous resistance in the New World, the missionaries in the Mayan region became
protective of their knowledge. They became especially protective of dictionaries which were
“closely guarded textual emblems of an esoteric knowledge” (Hanks 2010:122). Hanks adds the
dictionaries also lack “deictic centering,” which is to say that the dictionaries provide neither an
author nor a date, they do not reflect any specific regional dialect of a language due to the
constant travelling of the missionaries, and they often include recycled entries from other
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dictionaries (2010:120, 121). These are not the only complications. Sachse notes that some
dictionaries “are exact copies, other were amended, modified and expanded upon,” and other
dictionaries served “as templates and sources, from which lexical data were mined for other
compilations” (2018:69). In a specific instance in Ximénez’s multilingual Tesoro, Ximénez does
not copy entries from Domingo de Vico’s dictionary Vocabulario copioso de las lenguas
cakchikel y ꜭiche but instead “excerpts only the relevant key terms” and includes citations of
Vico at the end of the entries (Sachse 2018:88). To further murk the issue, Sachse does not
believe Vico was actually the author of the dictionary but that a Franciscan like produced the
dictionary 150 years after Vico’s death (Sachse 2018:89, 90). Such ambiguities in the
dictionaries make the tracing of textual genealogy extremely challenging. Yet the dictionaries
were one of the most important tools in reducción. As part of a systematic effort to convert and
subserviate the indigenous, the dictionaries maintain “a surprising amount of agreement
regarding the graphic representation and meaning of Maya expressions. The commonalities
across the dictionaries reflect a trend toward standardization in missionary Maya” (Hanks
2010:125). Hanks notes that generally the orthographic spellings of Mayan words are the same
across various dictionaries with the exception of the glottalized affricates such as [tʃ’] and [ts’]
(2010:124). Dictionaries varied on how to represent these morphemes not found in Castilian, and
so they often diverge in this singular aspect with little other incongruity elsewhere.
The importance of these dictionaries is a matter of intertextuality between all Christian
manuscripts, whether linguistic or theological. Sachse states that the bilingual dictionaries “were
not simply collections of native vocabulary; lexicographers were moreover concerned with
finding and defining the vernacular words and neologisms to express the complex concepts of
the Christian faith. The lexical compilations are thus records of the creation of Christian
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discourse” (2018:68). These dictionaries complimented the grammars, which were based in
understandings of Latin. Hanks states that the missionaries “sought to reducer the Indian
languages…by describing them in terms of rules and patterns,” leading to the production of
grammars, “or a set of rules that specify the structure and regularity of the language” (2010:4).
That is to say, the Spanish attempted to superimpose grammatical terminology and methodology
derived from Latin (as well as Greek) and superimpose it onto Mayan languages. Sparks also
affirms this point, stating that “missionary grammars of Mayan languages relied largely on a
Latin grammatical framework, and most often used Antonio de Nebrija’s 1481 Latin grammar as
a template” (2019:71). Such templates describe languages “in a certain order, using many tables
and listing exceptions to proposed rules” (Hanks 2010:111). The Spanish were so proud and
confident in their Latin-based dictionaries that one Spaniard named Beltrán de Santa Rosa María
said that the Mayas needed to read his grammar or else they would speak without knowing what
they are saying (Hanks 2010:11). The grammars and bilingual dictionaries functioned in tandem
with the theological works that the missionaries produced. Hanks refers to this as “a proliferation
of intertextuality across genres” and states: “The doctrina uses the language as it is described in
the grammars and dictionaries, and the latter describe and presuppose the language as used in the
doctrina” (2010:116. 117). This circularity of intertextuality became the basis for production of
all genres of Christian missionary documents.
The Spanish production of Christian manuscripts involved European theories of
translation. According to Mannheim, translation in the 16th century was based in the religious
contexts of the church and specifically “traditions for denotational equivalence” (2015:205). That
is to say, translation starts with bilingual dictionaries and the identifying of synonymous words
between two languages. Additionally, the Spanish did not attempt to find genuine equivalents but
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instead altered the Mayan languages in their dictionary entries, which affected their use in the
theological manuscripts. Hanks refers to these reconfigured Mayan languages as lengua
reducida, stating: “The language of the missions was a new sign system, in which Maya forms
were joined to Spanish meanings, a process that would inevitably alter both” (2010:128). That is
not to say there was universal agreement on this process, particularly between the Franciscans
and the Dominicans. According to Sparks, the Franciscans had a Scotist and voluntaristic
nominalist theory of translation in which “a sign could not be readily separated from its referent,
and thus a word in one language could never truly substitute for a word in another language”
(2019:12). Within this theoretical framework, Mayan terms were deemed inherently inadequate
to express Christian ideas and would ultimately only lead to miscommunication and even heresy.
Because of this theory of translation, the Franciscans embraced neologisms, which involved
either using Castilian loanwords or creating new word compounds that functioned within the
rules of Mayan grammar (Sparks 2019:12, 13; Sachse 2014:2). The Dominicans on the other
hand embraced a thomist theory of translation, which was founded in the humanism of Thomas
Aquinas and believed that “a sign, including words, was less natural or essentially connected to
what it referenced and thus was increasingly arbitrary, established as it was by human
convention or culture” (Sparks 2019:63). This theory encouraged the Dominicans to use Mayan
words and repurpose them to convey Christian meanings.
The clearest instance of disagreement between Franciscans and Dominicans involves
their treatment of the word for “God.” The Franciscans preferred to use the Spanish loan Tyox or
Dyos, whereas Dominicans such as Vico used Tz’aqol B’itol, the name for the creator deity in the
Popol Wuuj. In general though, Sparks outlines three general translation strategies. These include
the introduction of Castilian loan words especially for biblical names and religious terminology
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(Jesús, Espíritu Santo, ángel, sacramento, &c.), the use of Mayan terms with loan Castilian
translations (k’axtok’ “bringer of pain” for “el diablo”), or finally to use the Mayan terms
through circumlocutions without intentionally altering the meaning (Sparks 2019:70). Finally,
the missionaries desired their manuscript productions to be aesthetically pleasing. This was
especially important since the manuscripts were intended to be read and performed aloud (Hanks
2010:112). Thus Hanks states, “The language of indoctrination was to be beautiful. Translations
of doctrinal material, including sermons, prayers, and catechisms, were to be made aesthetically
pleasing, to draw the Indo into the text and move the soul toward things of God” (2010:66). The
importance of aesthetic in translation was popular in Europe during the 16th century. According
to Leavitt, various European thinkers such as the French poet Joachim du Bellay (c.1502-1560),
the Italian mathematician and philosopher Gerolamo Cardano (1501-1576), the Italian
Dominican friar and philosopher Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), and the Florentine intellectual
Giambattista Gelli (1498-1563) all emphasized the forze e bellezza (“force and beauty”) of
languages and believed that even when translations succeeded in conveying the original
meaning, the beauty of the original text was lost (2015:266, 267). This is likely why so many of
the colonial Christian manuscripts written in a Mayan language, including the Theologia
Indorum, use a highly formalized rhetorical style.
While these were the popular translation theories of 16th century Europe, today’s
understand of translation is much different. Paraphrasing traduttore traditore (“translator [is]
traitor”), Hanks and Severi bluntly state that “fully accurate translation is exceedingly difficult, if
not impossible” (2015:2). Mannheim takes this view further and refers to appropriative
transduction, stating: “Transduction can encompass a translation more narrowly understood,
evoking the contextualizations of one culture-and-language in another, or it can recontextualize it
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so thoroughly that it is no longer recognizable, but serves the social, political, or cultural interests
of the other” (2015:203). For Mannheim, the former is an analytic transduction, and the latter is
appropriative transduction. It is this latter type, which Mannheim also calls “radical translation,”
that describes the lengua reducida project in the Mayan region. Mannheim cites two examples of
this type of translation. The first is the Quechua puriy, “which usually appears in translation
manuals (R3) with the gloss ‘to travel’” (2015:211). Mannheims states that the gloss “is utterly
unhelpful in understanding the range of uses of the word in even [a] small set of examples,”
noting that puriy has a “privative semantic relationship with another verb, tiyay ‘to be in a single
place’” (2015:212, 213). Rather, an analytic transduction should be the method as opposed to the
simple and forced method of identifying a single lexical equivalent. The second example he cites
is wak’a, “which is customarily translated as (R3) ‘sacred object’ or ‘shrine,’ with an emphasis
on sacrality” (2015:214). Again, the gloss is pitifully small and strips the word of its true
semantic range. And even then, Mannheim concludes that “For an ethnography, all translation is
radical translation” (2015:215). In other words, translation isn’t just traitor, it’s damage.
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Chapter 2
Methodology
While Viveiros and Descola provide a rich literature on Amerindian animist ontology, I
was unable to find any readings that attempted to analyze K’iche’an or Mayan animist ontology
in depth. To fill this gap, my methodology for this paper includes an application of Amerindian
cosmopolitical theory as the basis for carefully developing a distinct K’iche’ Mayan animist
theory. I will establish this theory in Chapter 5. Additionally, I use the well-established methods
of New Philology, which include intertextual analysis of colonial Christian manuscripts written
in indigenous languages, as well as intertextual analysis between colonial dictionaries. Finally, I
incorporate the Western Canon into my data as well as limited amounts of ethnographic data.
The Western Canon will be used in Chapters 3 and 4, which focus on Vico’s naturalist ontology.
Application of Viveiros
In Chapter 5, I argue that the K’iche’s of the 16th century had an animist ontology for
perceiving and discerning between living beings. Westerners have historically considered
animism to be the most primitive stage in the an evolutionary development of complex region.
Radin states: “The earliest stage, it seemed, was to be found among primitive peoples. There we
find a religion characterized by a faith innumerable, often indefinite, spirits, a belief in the
general animation of nature: animism in short” (1992:220). This evolutionary view of religion
and animism originates with Darwin, but Westerners have viewed animist ontologies as a
primitive spirituality or paganism since colonial times. This is especially true of the Spanish in
Guatemala and the Yucatán. But no two animist ontologies are the same, nor are they simple. I
therefore use the Amerindian cosmopolitical theory proposed by Viveiros de Castro (2017, 2011)
to analyze the animist ontology of the K’iche’s of Guatemala’s highlands. His theory is highly
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specific and provides an extremely complex and nuanced view of indigenous Amazonian animist
ontology, specifically that of the Tupinambá and other Tupí groups of lowland Amazonia.
But Viveiros only serves as a guiding framework for analyzing the ontology of the
K’iche’s, rather than an exact formula. The dangers of generalizing the animisms of the New
World come not from anthropology but from archaeology: “There is a risk that the indiscriminate
use of the term animism will serve, at best, as a replacement for the term indigenous and, at
worst, a shorthand for primitivity and, in the end, will not move the ontological project forward”
(Harrison-Buck 2012:65). In the case of this study, there is a risk in relying too heavily on
Viveiros and unintentionally equivocating the animist ontologies of K’iche’s and Tupinambá.
Harrison-Buck advises: “To avoid homogenizing the ‘animist society,’ the concept of animism
must be further defined as it pertains to the local context on a case-by-case basis” (2012:65). I
take this warning to heart, both in the research and analysis of this paper. That is to say, while I
use Viveiros’ Amerindian cosmopolitical theory to analyze K’iche’an ontology, I argue for a
uniquely K’iche’an animist ontology.
In Chaper 5, I use Viveiros’ Amerindian cosmopolitical theory to analyze the K’iche’an
ontology of the 16th century, and I also use Descola’s broader and more general analysis of
animist ontologies as a supplemental theory. Because Descola is more generalized, he provides a
broader scope of animism, with a various number of microschema and other concepts that
distinguish different animist ontologies from each other. He also provides real examples of
various animist ontologies as means to distinguish between varieties while also observing the
core similarities that make them animist as opposed to naturalist, totemist, or analogist. I will use
these two sources in tandem to analyze the ontology of the K’iche’s. My approach will
incorporate a comparative and contrastive analysis of K’iche’an animism against Nahua
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analogism and Tupinambá animism. Descola treats the Mayas as analogist and frequently
includes them in his analysis of Nahua analogist ontology. Therefore the Nahua analogist
ontology will serve as a contrastive tool to argue for a K’iche’an animism rather than an
analogism similar to that of central Mexico. Additionally, the Tupinambá will serve as both
comparative and contrastive. On the one hand, I will argue that the K’iche’s are animist, and so I
will use the Tupinambá animist ontology as a comparative tool, especially to contrast against the
Nahuas, to show that the K’iche’s much more resemble the general animist tendencies of the
Tupinambá than the analogism of the Nahuas. On the other hand, I will also treat the Tupinambá
ontology contrastively in order to demonstrate a uniquely Mayan animist ontology, one that is
distinctly unique in the world.
New Philology and Indigenous Language Sources
In conjunction with the Amerindian cosmopolitical theory of Viveiros, this paper will
also be based in the New Philology method that is well-established especially in research of
Nahuatl and Maya language colonial manuscripts. A number of this paper’s primary sources use
this New Philological method, including Christensen (2016, 2014, 2010), Sparks (2019, 2017,
2014), Hanks (2015, 2010), and León-Portilla (1990, 1980). Restall, who self-identifies as a New
Philologist, describes New Philology as a school, model, and method wherein the ethnohistory of
colonial Mesoamerica involves a historical-linguistic (or philological) analysis of nativelanguage sources “with the view that the study of native-language sources is crucial to
understanding indigenous societies” (2003:114). As Restall observes, while philology is itself
nothing new as a model of analysis, New Philology adds the innovations of “emphasizing native
roles in colonial history through the study of native-language sources (the model) and of
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analyzing those sources philologically (the method)” (2003:114). This method will be prevalent
in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
In all three chapters of primary analysis (3, 4, and 5), this paper draws heavily from
indigenous language sources. Chapters 3 and 4 specifically draw from sources in the Christian
missionary genres. The primary source is Domingo de Vico’s Theologia Indorum, which is
written in K’iche’. I will be analyzing three volumes of transcriptions and translations made by
Saqijix López (2017, 2012, 2011 [Tome 1], and 2011 [Tome 2]). These transcriptions include
Vol. 1 Ch. 1-23 and Vol. 2 Ch. 1-31 of Vico’s manuscript (so far). I will provide her Spanish
translations alongside her transcriptions. In addition to the work of López, I also analyze Vol. 1
Ch. 25, which is provided as an English translation in Sparks’ book The Americas’ First
Theologies (2017). Sparks does not provide a K’iche’ transcription, but Vol. 1 Ch. 25 has helpful
content and so is mentioned briefly.
I will not be analyzing the Theologia Indorum in isolation. Rather, Hanks (2010) and
Sparks (2019) both emphasize the intertextuality of colonial Christian manuscripts and state that
such manuscripts cannot be understood without a comprehensive knowledge of the whole corpus
and intertextual analysis between individual documents. Sparks explicitly states, “Texts,
mendicant or Maya, [cannot] be fully understood and appreciated simply on its own terms and its
own respective ‘indigenous’ sources’…but rather also via their various relations to each other”
(2019:21). Colonial missionary documents do not exist in isolation to themselves. Rather, the
missionaries founded their documents on the same source materials. Additionally, these
documents all exist in conversation with each other and relay the same themes and messages
with a near-uniform consistency. But this conversation was an echo chamber that actively
excluded indigenous thought. While indigenous thought certainly impacted these colonial
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documents, this happened despite a power imbalance wherein missionaries controlled most
manuscript production. For the purposes of this paper, “intertextuality” is treated as an echo
chamber of thought involving colonial documents, the Bible, and Western canon works. In this
paper specifically, I analyze Vico’s Theologia Indorum with an intertextual, comparative
analysis of other colonial Christian manuscripts written in indigenous languages. These include
the Yukatek Mayan Teabo Manuscript, the “Nahuatl Bible,” Yukatek Mayan Christian tales, as
well as baptismal texts, catechisms, and confessional manuals in both Yukatek and Nahuatl.
Translations of these various documents are provided by Christensen in his two books The Teabo
Manuscript and Translated Christianities (2016, 2014). Kellogg praises Christensen’s work for
“show[ing] that the introduction of Christianity led to diverse, multifaceted processes of
evangelization. This process was one in which official texts, unofficial texts, and daily life and
practices…reflected and promoted local customs, needs, and political economies, and reinforced
differences” (2014:788). She is absolutely correct in her observation, but I will break from
traditional analysis of Christensen’s translations and instead emphasize the similarities that
reflect the singular, systematic colonization project of the Spanish. I will accomplish this through
intertextual analysis between these various documents and the Theologia Indorum. Through this
intertextual analysis, I will show that the Theologia Indorum was not unique in its general
content, nor in its approach to addressing indigenous “paganism.”
In Chapter 5, I break away from the Christian genres and focus instead on various
“forbidden” genres and non-Christian writings. Restall states: “Much of this work [in New
Philology] does more than just present the ‘Indian’ view. It analyzes indigenous perspectives
with all their complexities and contradictions, often – but by no means exclusively – using
native-language sources” (2012:156). That is to say, the goal of analyzing these indigenous-
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language documents is to try to understand them to their fullest and richest extent, not just
creating a superficial “Indian” perspective. For this paper, I will primarily incorporate the Popol
Wuuj and the performative drama Rab’inal Achi, both of which are in K’iche’. Thanks to the
work of Mondloch and Carmack (2018), I am able to analyze the original K’iche’, though their
Spanish translations will be included alongside the transcriptions. In the case of the Rab’inal
Achi, Tedlock (2003) only provides a translation without transcription, and so I can only analyze
the drama based on the English provided. Nevertheless, these two will have the most emphasis
since they are both in K’iche’ specifically. I will also incorporate translated lowland Mayan
glyphs into the research. While they pertain to the Mayas of the lowlands rather than the Mayas
of the highlands, I use them in only two instances as a secondary, corroborative source of
evidence. The glyphs are visually recreated and translated in Tedlock’s 2000 Years of Mayan
Literature (2011) as well as in Houston’s article “Symbolic Sweatbaths of the Maya” (1996).
Additionally, whenever I explain or reference the analogism of the Nahuas, I will briefly mention
the Nahuatl in xóchitl in cuícatl (poems, “flower and song”) provided by León Portilla (1990,
1980). Ultimately, I will incorporate all of these sources into my argument that the K’iche’s were
animists.
Finally, I will incorporate various colonial Spanish bilingual dictionaries into my paper.
These dictionaries will include El Vocabulario en lengua ꜭiche otlatecas (also called Diccionario
k’iche’ de Berlín) (Sachse and Dürr [ed.] 2017), the Thesavrvs Verborv (Acuña [ed.] 1983), and
the Manuscrito Américain 59 (also called the Vocabulario de lengua Quiché) from the
Bibliothèque Nationale de París (Acuña [ed.] 2005). Additionally, this paper will include
Edmonson’s Quiche-English Dictionary (1965), which bases its entries on a survey of forty-one
other dictionaries, at least twelve of which were produced in the 16th century specifically but in
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general range from the 1500s to the 1900s. I will also refer to a modern K’iche’ dictionary, but
only as reference (Ajpacaja et al. 1996). And lastly, I will refer to Christenson’s K’iche’-English
dictionary (n.d.). In addition to these various K’iche’ dictionaries, I also incorporate two
Kaqchikel dictionaries. These include the Diccionario Cakchiquel-Español (Saenz de Santa
María [recopilador] 1940) and the Diccionario Cakchiquel Central y Español (Munson
[compiladora] 1991). Finally, I use the Diccionario Tz’utujil (Mendoza and Mendoza 1996). All
three languages are closely related sister languages within the K’iche’an language branch of the
Mayan language family. Additionally, the speech communities of all three respective languages
lived in neighboring vicinity to each other and were three of the first major groups targeted by
the Spanish during the Conquest of the highlands (Christenson 2016:3). Through intertextual
analysis between these dictionaries, and with a special focus on the colonial K’iche’ dictionaries,
I analyze the meanings of specific K’iche’ words and how Vico uses them in the Theologia
Indorum. These dictionaries are especially used in Chapter 4.
The Western Canon
In my analysis of Vico and the Theologia Indorum, I also incorporate the Western Canon.
Both Hanks (2010) and Sparks (2019) argue for the importance of intertextual analysis between
Christian manuscripts and documents of all genres. However, Hanks does not mention the
Western writers and thinkers whose works are the intellectual foundation of Vico and the other
missionary manuscripts. Sparks at least acknowledges their influence, but even he chooses to
focus on intertextuality rather than the Western intellectual tradition undergirding Vico. Sparks
even states that there was never even one Christianity in Spain but rather many competing
Chrsitianities (2019:32). While he is correct that there were many competing ideas within the
Catholic church, he overfocuses on the theological debates at the expense of ignoring the
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significant agreement on the vast majority of theology and doctrine that the “Universal Church”
held, not just among themselves but even with the Protestants. Sparks allows nuance to eclipse
the larger picture, which is a theology founded on the Western canon.
Therefore, I include various key texts from the Western cannon, particularly in Chapters
3 and 4. These sources primarily include Averroës, Aquinas, and Athanasius, all of whom greatly
influence the Catholic church, as well as Aristotle, Gregory of Nazianzus, and D. P. Walker’s
titular work Spiritual and Demonic Magic (2000), which analyzes Renaissance-period thought
regarding magic among European Catholics. Most importantly, I will incorporate Scripture from
both the Old and New Testament. Even Sparks, who at least acknowledges the importance and
influence of Western thinkers, never explains the influence that the Bible had on these
missionary documents at all. Neither does Hanks (2010) or Christensen (2016, 2014, 2010). Yet
the Bible is the single most important document that influenced 16th century Christians, whether
Catholic or Protestant. Therefore, in Chapters 3 and 4 I include key verses that directly relate to
certain passages in the Theologia Indorum. According to Sparks, the missionaries tried to teach
elite Mayan children both Latin and Greek (2019:82). It is certain that Vico knew Latin, and it is
very possible he also knew Greek, which Leavitt points out had long been the two languages of
“scientific and biblical truth” in Europe under Catholic dominance (2015:263, 264). Therefore, I
cite Old Testament verses from the Latin Vulgate and New Testament verses from the Koine
Greek, which was the original language of the New Testament. All translations of biblical verses
are mine.
The Ethnography of Modern Highland Mayas
I will briefly mention my use of anthropological ethnographic data. Sparks rightfully
warns against overreliance of ethnographies of modern Mayas to study 16th century Mayas
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(2019:32, 33). While it is true that societies are never stagnant but are always changing, since at
least the Conquest (though likely before that) the highland Mayas have greatly emphasized the
importance of following their ancestors and the traditions and lifestyles of those ancestors.
MacKenzie, for instance, uses colonial ethnohistoric data in conjunction with modern
ethnographic data, stating that “While these varied data do not offer an absolutely unified vision
of Mayan religion through time, scholars (including contemporary Maya themselves) have
identified certain continuities and themes that continue to animate the tradition” (2018:917). To
indifferently dismiss the modern Mayas as irrelevant in studies of colonial Maya is to blatantly
disregard their resilience against surmounting colonial pressures and active resistance to
overcome those hegemonic systems. Therefore, I incorporate a limited amount of data from four
ethnographies: Christenson’s The Burden of the Ancients (2016), Watanabe’s Maya Saints &
Souls (1992), Tedlock’s Time and the Highland Mayas (1993), and Vogt’s Tortillas for the Gods
(1976). All four of these ethnographies pertain specifically to highland Mayan groups. However,
I never use them as sole evidence. Rather, I use them as secondary, corroborative evidence to a
point already being made based on primary data taken from either a colonial indigenous
language source or colonial account. Finally, I only incorporate these ethnographies sparingly,
and always try to mention at least two ethnographies together to prevent any cherry-picking of
convenient data. It should be noted that Christenson’s book is only half ethnography, with the
other half devoted to records of the highland Mayas during the Conquest and colonial period.
With the exception of Christenson, these ethnographic sources are used exclusively in Chapter 5,
though the colonial sources remain the focus of the chapter and take vast precedence.
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Chapter 3
The Use of Western Categories in Vico
Vico was neither exceptional nor unusual in his Western assumptions and biases. One
such bias, one which greatly affected his interaction and communication with the K’iche’, was
the assumption that knowledge is most optimized when it is categorized. Viveiros echoes as
much in Cannibal Metaphysics, stating that Westerners strove to make knowledge “authentic,”
treating Amerindian thought as the “savage mind” and taking any non-Western thought “hostage
each time it threatens to slip free of the modest, reassuring limits of encyclopedic organization”
(2017:78). This Western thinking dates as far back as Aristotle, who states in his Physics
regarding the principles of nature: “In any subject which has principles, causes, and elements,
scientific knowledge and understanding stem from a grasp of these….” (2008:9). In other words,
for Westerners, scientific progress can only be achieved when subjects are deconstructed into
their most basic elements and then organized neatly. Averroës, who was one of Vico’s primary
influencers at Salamanca, argued the same, stating that “scientific or certain knowledge of any
entity consists in knowing its primary causes, followed by its proximate causes and the elements
or components making it up” (Fakhry 2001:43). The distinctions between categories must be
explicit, and no categorical boundaries can blur. Thus Western thought is deeply rooted in the
understanding that knowledge must be categorized in order to be understood. Western
categorization also influenced the Catholic theologians of Europe. Thomas Aquinas, who was
another significant source material at Salamanca, states in his Summa Theologica: “Sacred
doctrine is a science [that] depend[s] on principles known through a higher science, namely the
science of God and the blessed. Just as music accepts the principles given to it by arithmetic, so
does sacred doctrine accept the principles revealed to it by God” (1954:37, 38). Aquinas
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therefore equates sacred doctrine with science. He later states that not only is sacred doctrine a
science, but it even “transcends all other sciences, whether practical or speculative,” because
even the smallest amount of knowledge about the divine “is worth more than the most certain
knowledge of lesser things” (1954:40, 41). According to Thomas Aquinas, theology is not
merely a science but the most important of the sciences. As a science, theology embraced the
logical structures and categorizations of Western philosophy. As the most superior of the
sciences, it was the science that made Europeans the most “superior” to the indigenous of the
New World. The importance of categorizations in the Theologia Indorum therefore must not be
underemphasized.
The Theologia Indorum is replete with examples of wholly Western categorizations. As
Vico himself states: “Keje k’ut cholmayjinaq wi chi rib’il rib’ ub’anoj Dios ri’. Are k’u retal xa
jun Dios cholmay rech ub’anoj, xucholmayij xuchokonisaj puch ronojel ub’anoj” (“De esta
manera, la obra de Dios está ordenada de forma especial entre sí. Esa es la señal de que hay un
solo Dios, el que ordena su propia creación. Toda su creación la ordenó y la hizo útil”)
(2017:86). Here, Vico uses ub’anoj, which literally translates “His (God’s) work,” though here it
may also be translated as “His (God’s) creation.” The word contains the verb root ban, which El
Vocabulario en lengua ꜭiche otlatecas, a colonial K’iche’ dictionary, defines as “hazer [hacer]
algo” (Sachse and Dürr 2017:82). Vico describes God’s interaction with His ub’anoj using three
words: cholmayjinaq, cholmay, and xucholmayij. All three words contain the base verb root chol,
which the same colonial dictionary defines as “por contar días; poner en ringlera; repartir por
orden, uno por uno” (Sachse and Dürr 2017:205). Essentially, Vico is emphasizing how God
created the universe with order and reason. In addition, Vico uses a second verb xuchokonisaj.
This verb contains the verb root chok, which means “encargar,” though in the passive form the
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verb’s meaning shifts to “to be useful” (Ajpacaja et al. 1996:53; Christenson n.d.). Such a
universe would naturally lend itself to being categorized, as God Himself has already established
an intentional order to His creation’s design. This understanding serves as a justification for Vico
to categorize all of Creation using Western categories.
Categorizing the Physical and the Metaphysical
The first of these categorizations is between the metaphysical and physical. In Chapter 12
of Part 2, Vico describes Mary, the mother of Jesus Christ, as the following: “Xa ral xnimar wi,
xoqojawar wi, ri xoqojawil wi kaj ulew, ri xoqajawalil kaj ulew, ri xoqojawalil angeles, ri
xoqojawil winaq ronojel xuxik, xa rumal ral….” (“La grandeza la tuvo por el hijo, por eso se
conviritó en reina, es la reina del Cielo y la Tierra, es la reina de los ángeles, es la reina de toda
la humanidad, y esto es por el hijo….”) (2011:53). Here Mary is described as the queen of both
the metaphysical and the physical. These two categories are presented in pairs; the first pair is
kaj ulew. Literally, the word pairing translates as “sky, earth” and is an extremely common
couplet in K’iche’, even appearing in the Popol Wuj. Yet Christenson demonstrates that kaj may
also mean “heaven” (n.d.). Thus, kaj ulew could be rendered “heaven, earth,” which is a common
pairing in Christian literature. This option seems more likely when the second pair is considered:
ri xoqojawalil angeles, ri xoqojawil winaq ronojel. Here ángeles is set adjacent to winaq ronojel,
which translates as literally “the people all of them.” It may be more clearly rendered as “all the
people” or even “all of humanity.” This second pairing implies the existence of two types of
beings, the physical humans and the metaphysical beings called ángeles. Vico describes Mary as
queen of the metaphysical category, which includes Heaven and the angels, and also the physical
category, which includes earth and humanity.
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The distinction between metaphysical and physical in Western conceptions of the
universe can be seen again in Part 1. Vico states in Chapter 21: “We ta ronojel winaq, ronojel ta
pu chikop we ta pu ronojel Angeles k’o chi kaj, ronojel ta pu diablos k’o chi xib’alb’a chiyoq’o
re, chich’akatin ta re, chilab’alin pu re, xma chutzin wi chich’akatajik chiyoq’otaj pu rumal, xma
yoq’otajel wi xma ch’akatajel wi” (“Si fueran todas las personas, todas los animales, si fueran
todos los ángeles que están en el cielo, todos los demonios que están en el infierno los que
quieren vencerlo, los que quieren hacerle la guerra, no será posible vencerlo, Él es invencible”)
(2017:146). Here, Vico distinguishes between winaq (“humanity”), chikop (“animals”), Angeles
(“angels”), and diablos (“demons”). The first two types of beings are humans and animals; these
are terrestrial and thus physical. The second two types are angels and demons; these are
metaphysical. Vico further distinguishes between angels and demons by stating that the angels
“k’o chi kaj” and that the demons “k’o chi xib’alb’a.” Xib’alb’a is the K’iche’ word for the
underworld, which is described in detail in the K’iche’an text of the Popol Wuj. Vico has adapted
the word to signify the Christian Hell, which Vico describes as a place “pa rapa 7 k’ax, pa q’aq’,
pa itzel” (“in pain [from the] whip, in fire, in evil”) (2017:132). Vico attempts to override the
K’iche’an cosmology of Xib’alb’a with the Christian cosmology of Hell, which is a place of fire
and punishment. Whereas the demons are from Xib’alb’a, the angels are “k’o chi kaj” (“they are
in heaven”). Again, we encounter kaj. Here, kaj likely signifies “Heaven” as it did in the
previously analyzed passage in Part 2 Chapter 12. This is especially likely when juxtaposed with
the demons of Hell. Vico explicitly places the angels and demons in locative opposition: “We
Angeles e k’o chi kaj, we xib’alb’a e pu diablos k’o chi xib’alb’a” (“Ya sean ángeles que están
en el cielo, ya sean demonios que están en el infierno”) (2017:122). Heaven and Hell are
Lopez Ixcoy notes: “La forma rapuxel…significa ser azotado, rapa entonces se deriva de la raíz rap-, azotar”
(2017:133).
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opposites and are the places of dwelling for morally, militarily, eternally opposed metaphysical
beings.
The Nonpermeable Separation between Categories
Vico’s categories appear to be utterly segregated without any potential for an item to
belong to more than one category. This certainly appears to be the case between the metaphysical
and physical. In Part 2 Chapter 24, Vico recounts the biblical narrative of Jesus’ baptism in the
Jordan River by John the Baptist. When Jesus rises from the water, the Holy Spirit in the form of
an ut (“paloma montés”) descends upon Christ and rests on him (Sachse and Dürr 2017:309). To
the K’iche’, this might have seemed to be a transformation. Vico is clear to state that the Holy
Spirit’s appearance in the form of a dove was not a transformation, as this would defy the distinct
boundaries between the metaphysical and physical. Vico states: “ma nab’e ut ta ri Spíritu Santo,
ma pu xa ta keje uk’oje’ik, xa uk’utb’al rib’ chi kiwach winaq” (“no es que el Espíritu Santo sea
una paloma, sino es el símbolo, la señal para presentarse ante las personas”) (2011:293). In
other words, the Holy Spirit’s descent in the form of a dove was a symbol or a sign, not the
product of a metaphysical-to-physical transformation. It should be noted that this can be found in
the language of the original biblical text. The event of the Holy Spirit’s descent in the form of a
dove is related in all four Gospels. For instance, Matthew 3:16 states: “καὶ εἶδεν πνεῦμα θεοῦ
καταβαῖνον ὡσεὶ περιστερὰν καὶ ἐρχόμενον ἐπ' αὐτόν” (“And he saw the Spirit of God
descending like a dove and coming to rest on him”). Ὡσεὶ (“as, like, about”) is the key word, as
it clearly implies that the πνεῦμα θεοῦ (“Holy Spirit,” literally “Spirit of God”) descended “as,
like” a περιστερὰν (“pigeon, dove”), not by transforming into one. Furthermore Mark 1:10, Luke
3:22, John 1:32 all confirm this by stating that the Holy Spirit descended ὡς περιστερὰν (“like a
dove or pigeon”); all three of these Gospels use this exact phrase. The distinction is therefore one
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of simile, not metaphor, and so Vico is able to retain the distinctions between the metaphysical
and physical despite the Holy Spirit’s appearance in the form of a physically visible animal.
Just as Vico distinguishes between the metaphysical and physical as irreconcilably
separate, he also distinguishes between various physical things. To do this, he frequently
provides lists of seemingly-related things that exist physically (i.e. not metaphysically). For
instance, he occasionally provides lists of precious material wealth in order to emphasize a point.
In Part 2 Chapter 34, he states that God does not ask his followers for wealth, listing them as
follows: “Ma nab’ek q’anapwaq saqipwaq taj chiraj Dios chi qe, ma nay puch xit taj ab’aj
q’oq’ol xtekok taj chutz’onoj” (“Dios no nos pide oro y plata, nos nos pide jade y piedras
preciosas, no es lo que Él nos pide”) (2012:155). Vico provides a list of treasures, including
q’anapwaq saqipwaq (“oro y plata,” lit. “dinero amarillo” and “dinero blanco”), and also xtekok
(“piedra preciosa”) (Acuña 1983:384, 419, 421). In Part 1 Chapter 22, Vico describes the eternal
riches of the kingdom of God, stating: “Junelik xit junelik pwaq, q’anapwaq saqipwaq, junelik
q’oq’ol xtekok, junelik k’wa’l yamanik, junelik q’uq’ raxon” (“Por siempre habrá jade, plata,
oro, piedras preciosas; por siempre habrán perlas preciosas, como plumas azules del quetzal”)
(2017:150). Here Vico again lists the riches of earth as q’anapwaq saqipwaq (“gold and silver”)
and xtekok (“precious stones”), but here he provides additional items such as q’uq’ raxon (“green
[quetzal] feathers”) and k’wa’l yamanik (“precious emeralds”) 8 (Sachse and Dürr 2017:322, 244;
Acuña 1983:422, 423). While the lists have items that would have appeared familiar to
Westerners as icons of wealth, such as gold and silver and precious stones, the lists are tailored
to the K’iche’. As Coe notes, the Maya elite valued many material goods, “above all jade [and]

Lopéz Ixcoy wrongfully translates k’wa’l as “perlas.” According to El Vocabulario en lengua ꜭiche otlatecas,
k’wa’l is identified as “esmeralda” (Sachse and Dürr 2017:244). Meanwhile, the Thesavrvs Vervorv states that perla
“no tienen nombre propio. […] El Vocabulario pone: ru qux çaz [lit. ‘corazón de la langosta’]” (Acuña 1983:412).
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quetzal feathers” (2015:23). This is further demonstrated by the K’iche’ play the Rab’inal Achi,
which lists the following: “shaded by quetzal feathers / shaded by glistening green / under the
golden pataxte / under the golden cacao / under the golden money / under the silver money”
(Tedlock 2003:49). The list is not much different from the one included by Vico, who ensures to
include these items in his lists of material riches so that it resonates with the K’iche’s.
Vico categorizes other physical (i.e. non-metaphysical) items into lists, and these lists
might have resonated with the K’iche’ less than the lists of precious goods. In Part 2 Chapter 33,
Vico states: “Xa wi junelik chiqanab’aj unimaloq’ob’al Dios nim Ajaw chi qe ta xub’an kaj ulew,
xub’an pu ik’ ch’umil xub’an nay pu ronojel juyub’ taq’aj, che’ ab’aj, chikop, tz’ikin, kar, tap,
kej umul, koj, b’alam” (“Por eso recordemos siempre el gran amor de Dios gran Señor a
nosotros, al haber creado el cielo y la Tierra, al crear la Luna y las estrellas, al crear los cerros
y los campos, los árboles, las rocas, los animales, los pájaros, los pescados, los cangrejos, los
venados, los conejos, los leones, los tigres”) (2012:131). This list is unique because of its scope
of entries. He states that the K’iche’ must always remember the great love of God, who xub’an 9
kaj ulew (“created the sky and earth”). Here kaj most likely means “sky” as opposed to
“Heaven,” since the entries that follow are celestial features such as ik’ (“moon”) and ch’umil
(“star”), which are then contrasted with terrestrial features such as juyub’ (“hill”), taq’aj
(“field”), che’ (“tree”), and ab’aj (“stone”). Thus Vico begins his list with a sweeping
encapsulation of the physical world, which is comprised of sky and earth. Vico then transitions
from the earth and sky to the life that inhabits the world. First, he lists three categories of
animals: chikop (“animals”) tz’ikin, (“birds”), and kar (“fish”). After listing these three
categories of animals, he lists specific animals: specifically the tap (“crab”), kej (“deer”), umul,
9

x-Ø-u-b’an
COMPL-3sA-3sE-VT:to do, make

56

(“rabbit”), koj (“mountain lion”), and b’alam (“jaguar”). Thus the list begins with the largest and
most general of God’s creation, namely earth and sky, and gradually narrows onto specific
animals. Significantly, Vico’s list appears to follow the patterns of the six days of God’s
creation, a narrative related in the book of Genesis. For instance, God creates the sky on the
second day, and He creates the earth on the third day (Genesis 1:7-10). God also creates
vegetation on the third day, and He created the sun, moon, and stars on the fourth day (Genesis
1:12-18). God creates the fish and the birds on the fifth day (Genesis 1:20-23). Finally, God
creates the animals on the sixth day (Genesis 1:24-25). These creation days mirror Vico’s list
with near exactitude.
The Categories of Human and Non-human
Vico categorizes life within the categories of “human” and “non-human.” These two
categories are intrinsic to naturalism, which Descola lists as a type of ontology, which he also
refers to as a “schematization of experience,” and “mode of identification” (2014:172, 232).
According to Descola, identification of life within an ontology is “organized in accordance with
systematic relationships that make it possible to throw light on not only the properties of its
constituent parts but also those of the totality that results from their combination” (2014:172).
Yet because there are various other types of ontologies, such as analogism, totemism, and
animism, these ontologies differ in how they schematize those relationships. One of these
relationships is between physicality and interiority. Vico embodies the naturalist ontology, which
observes a continuity of physicalities while also distinguishing the discontinuity of interiorities.
Descola states that naturalists try to distinguish themselves from animals (2014:174). This is one
of the central axioms of naturalism and is the basis for its categories of “human” and “nonhuman.” Yet naturalism does not distinguish between the physicalities of life. All of life is
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physical and so is considered temporal (i.e. not eternal) and therefore doomed to fade away.
Moreover, the external faculties are essentially identical, wherein humans and animals share the
same basic anatomical features (muscles, bones, eyes, internal organs, skin, blood) and wherein
humans, animals, and plants share the same physical needs (water, relatively temperate climate)
and all are bound by the same laws of physics (gravity). The physicalities of “humans” and “nonhumans” are the same. Rather, the difference lies in the interiority. As Descola poignantly states,
“humans are what they are because they have a physicality plus an interiority; and non-humans
are what they are because they have a physicality minus an interiority” (2014:243). To put it
bluntly, within the naturalist schema humans have souls while the rest of life does not.
Vico embodies the naturalist ontology and so relies on naturalist categories of “human”
and “non-human.” As has already been shown in Part 2 Chapter 33 of the Theologia Indorum,
Vico divides non-human life into three general categories. These three categories include chikop
(“animals”), tz’ikin (“birds”), and kar (“fish”). The categories are almost certainly influenced by
the Genesis story, wherein fish are relegated to the seas, birds to the air, and animals to the earth.
In Western thought, these three categories could be considered as the three major categories of
non-human life, each of which are relegated to the three major realms of the cosmos, namely
ocean, sky, and earth. These categories appear elsewhere in Vico’s Theologia Indorum. For
instance, in Part 1 Chapter 13 Vico describes the great wisdom of God, who alone brought about
“ub’anik kaj ulew. Ub’anik puch winaq, ub’anik nay puch chikop, tz’ikin, kar, tap. Ub’anik k’ut
juyub’ taq’aj, cho palo, ub’anik puch ronojel q’alaj chi qawach” (“la creación del cielo y la
tierra, al pensar en la creación de la persona, al crear a los animales, a los pájaros, a los peces,
a los cangrejos; al crear los cerros, los campos, los lagos, los mares; al crear todo lo que está a
nuestra vista”) (2017:108). Here Vico provides some different items, such as cho palo (“the
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lakes and seas”). But most significantly, Vico includes winaq (“people, humanity”), along with
the already familiar categories of chikop (“animal”), tz’ikin (“bird”), kar (“fish”). In Part 1
Chapter 9, Vico states: “We ta nimawinaq, we ta nimachikop nimatz’ikin, we ta nimakar
ch’utikar, xax uk’oje’ik wi ronojel k’o chuwach ulew” (“Sea persona mayor, sea animal grande,
sea pájaro grande, sea pez grande, sea pez pequeño, esa es la existencia de todo lo que hay
sobre la faz de la tierra”) (2017:84). Again, Vico lists winaq (“humans”) with chikop, tz’ikin,
and kar, affirming that these three categories include ronojel (“all”) of uk’oje’ik (“existence”) k’o
chuwach ulew (“on the face of the earth”). Here Vico lists all “earthly” life, which all share the
same physicality and therefore can be coherently listed together.
This list in Part 2 Chapter 33 is not only useful because it shows “human” and “nonhuman” life; it also demonstrates the difference between general “life” and “non-life.” Vico does
not consider mountains, stars, the moon, or rocks to be alive and so he relegates them to the
category of things that are “lifeless.” He even includes the che’ (“trees”) with the “lifeless”
objects of the universe. Even though plants share some aspects of physicality with other life,
such as the ability to grow and the need for water, they share enough differences from humans
and animals (bones, muscles, blood) to be considered “non-life.” Averroës, for instance,
distinguishes between plants and animals since plants are incapable of “abstracting in particular
forms, such as colors and sounds, from their material substrata and raising them to a higher level
of immateriality” (Fakhry 2001:59). Walker notes that, for Catholics, “vegetable forms” cannot
have any spiritual significance (2003:157). This is why Vico lists trees with other “lifeless”
objects. Humans on the other hand are unique because they have an interiority, which Averroës
defines as the capacity to reason. This capacity for reason sets humans apart from “non-life.” In
Part 2 Chapter 12, Vico lists humanity together with the angels as both being subjects of Mary
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(2011:53). Because humans have the capacity to reason (i.e. an interiority), they share with the
metaphysical, eternal category of angels, whereas animals lack an interiority altogether. These
categorizations of life create a hierarchical value of life. Essentially, Western naturalism situates
plants as the lowest level of life, more than “dead” rocks but less than “soulless” animals .
Meanwhile the animals, fish, and birds have a more complex cognitive faculty than plants, but
they are soulless and unable to reason like humans. Humans are the apex of life and superior to
all “non-human” life. This conception of life has precedent that long predates Vico. For instance,
in Aristotle’s De anima (On the soul), the philosopher states that there is a hierarchy of
sentience. Within this hierarchy, plants are the lowliest soul because they are incapable of
perceiving the physical world around them. Meanwhile, humans are the apex of the hierarchy of
sentience because they have the ability to reason (1984:659-660). Averroës also argues for a
hierarchy of interiority. According to Fakhry, Averroës states that humans, animals, and plants
all share the “nutritive faculty,” which is the “primary faculty” for life and is “common to all
living organisms” (2001:57). The nutritive faculty “exist[s] in the animal for the sake of its
survival” and is based in the appetitive desire for procreation as well as growth and instinct
(Fakhry 2001:57, 67). Averroës therefore acknowledges the sameness of the physicality of life.
Yet he also argues that all life shares “nature’s urge to rise higher and higher from the lowest to
the highest faculties of the soul in a hierarchical manner” (Fakhry 2001:57). Here Averöes
defines the soul as reason that seeks “the perfection of the natural body,” and while animals and
plants only seek survival, “the rational faculty [i.e. interiority] has been placed in mankind for
the sake of their perfection” (Fakhry 2001:57, 67). Thus humans have interiority, which situates
them as not only unique but superior to all other life.
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The ontological hierarchy allows for the assumption that humans have the capacity and
authority to rule over non-humans. Vico echoes this notion in Part 1 Chapter 5, where he states:
“Nim upatan nim uchak kaj ulew. Xa tzuqb’al qe xa kob’al qe, ronojel chikop ronojel tz’ikin,
ronojel kar ronojel saq’ul, ronojel ki’ ronojel wa, ronojel ja’ k’o chuwach ulew. Xa loq’ob’al re
ronojel winaq rumal Dios” (“El cielo y la tierra es [son] de gran importancia. Es [son] el [los]
que nos da[n] de comer, el [los] que nos sustenta[n]. Todo animal, todo pájaro, todo pez, toda
fruta, todo lo dulce, todo lo que es comida, toda el agua que hay sobre la faz de la tierra, es la
muestra del amor de Dios hacia la persona”) (2017:62). In other words, God created life for the
sake of humanity. This is much more acutely expressed in the Teabo Manuscript, a YucatecMaya Christian manuscript, which states that God created humans “to have dominion over the
fishes that exist in the ocean and the birds that exist in the air, and the animals that exist on the
face of the earth,” and in which God later tells man “All these things that I have created are
yours” and even calls him “the lord of [M]y creations on the earth” (Christensen 2019:69-71, 77,
81). According to the Teabo Manuscript, this exaltation of humans is justified because “man is
not like this [i.e. non-humans], [because] he is erect and raised high, his gaze is marvelous, it
examines his soul and what he sees” (Christensen 2019:71). Western writers affirm as much. In
Politics, Aristotle goes as far as to assert that forms of life lower in the hierarchy only exist to
serve higher forms of life (1998:5). Even Thomas Aquinas argues for the superiority of
humanity, stating that before the Fall in Eden, animals followed the commands of humans “of
their own accord” (Summa Theologica, I, Quaest. 91. Art. 1-5). This is also articulated in the
Teabo Manuscript, in which God tells Adam: “All these [animals] I created here on earth are
very tame for your, and they love you also so that whichever of any of them you desire to eat,
when you call their names they will come also, when you choose whichever of them you want to
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eat, because they truly love you” (Christensen 2019:87). Not only are non-humans inferior to
humans, but they are meant to be servants for humans. Herein lies the significance of this
naturalist categorization in Vico: his thought was utterly anthropocentric, creating a hierarchy of
value on life. This hierarchy prizes humanity above all.
Complementing Vico’s hierarchy of categories is a strict rule stipulating that human and
non-human categories can never merge. In Part 2 Chapter 27, Vico explains how there are four
Evangelists (“kajib’ chik evangelista”), named “San Matheo,” “San Marcos,” “San Lucas,” and
“San Juan” respectively, all of whom wrote one of the four canon Gospel accounts of Christ
(2012:43). Vico explains how the Evangelists are each associated with one of four symbols, three
of which are animals. He states that Matthew is associated with a “winaq” (“person”), Mark with
a “koj” (“lion”), 10 Luke with a “waca” (“cow”), 11 and John with a “kot” (“eagle”) (2012:43).
Vico is quick to explain that although three of the Evangelists are associated with animals, they
are not literal animals. He states: “Ma nab’e e ta chikop kik’oje’ik ri evangelista, xa kiketaxik,
retaxik puch kiloq’olaj tz’ib’” (“No es que ellos eran animales en su existencia, sino fue una
forma de compararlos, de comparar su sagrado escrito”) (2012:43). Essentially, humans and
animals are categorically different and therefore emphatically unequal. A human cannot become
an animal, nor can an animal become a human. This further establishes the assumption that
categories cannot blend, nor can their boundaries blur.
Physical beings and metaphysical beings are also incapable of changing between “spirit”
and “material” due to the extreme rigidness of categories. As Vico insinuated in Part 2 Chapter
24 regarding the Holy Spirit’s appearance in the form of a dove, nothing can be both physical

Koj actually signifies a “mountain lion” which is endemic to the highlands. The missionaries use it since it is the
closest analog to the African león.
11
Since domesticated cows were not native to the Americas, Vico uses the Castilian vaca. K’iche’ does not have the
phoneme [v], and so Vico uses the phoneme [w].
10
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and metaphysical. Vico devotes much of Part 1 in explaining the difference between God and
His creation (2017:26-32, 40, 78, 80, 82, 90, 102). In general though, one of the chief differences
between metaphysical beings such as angels and physical beings such as animals is their eternal
(or mortal) state of being. Vico explains this clearly in Part 1 Chapter 5: “Are k’u rumal k’ax
chikina’o kekamik kesachik, ronojel ub’anoj Dios maja b’i chik uk’olem. E junamatajinaq e pu
k’exwachitajinaq ruk’ uk’olem Dios junelik k’olik, maja b’i chik utaqem uterenib’em puch
uk’aslem uk’olem pu Dios” (“Pero ellos sienten tristeza porque tienen que morir, tienen que
desaparecer, toda la creación de Dios ya no tendrá existencia. Son comparados, son
diferenciados con la existencia de Dios quien existe para siempre, no hay quien sea eterno como
lo es la existencia de Dios”) (2017:62). In other words, all physical beings are doomed to perish,
whereas metaphysical beings will exist forever. Vico reiterates this in Part 1’s Proemium, stating
that all physical beings and materials “xma k’isinaq wi, xma tane’inaq wi, xma chisach wi xma
chik’is wi” (“se termina, se suspende, todo va a desaparecer, todo se va a acabar”) (2017:22).
Because all physical beings share their fate with a world doomed to perish, they by extension
cannot interact with the metaphysical world. And perhaps most emphatic of all, Vico asserts in
Part 1 Chapter 11: “Ma wi ilel Dios chub’aq’ uwach winaq, xma chutzin wi chiril winaq uwach
Dios k’a k’as loq waral chuwach ulew, rumal xa ti’ojilal wach qawach oj winaq” “(Dios no se
deja ver a los ojos de la persona, no es posible que la persona vea a Dios mientras esté viva aquí
en la tierra, porque nosotras las personas somos corporales”) (2017:90). Not only are humans
not metaphysical, but they cannot even perceive the metaphysical. Thus the physical and
metaphysical are utterly separated categories.
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Two Exceptions to the Non-permeability of Categories
Finally, there are two exceptions to the rigid separation between the physical and
metaphysical that must be addressed. The first, which is apparent in the Theologia Indorum, is
the amphibious nature of humans, which seemingly allows them to be simultaneously physical
and metaphysical. In Part 1 Chapter 10, Vico acknowledges that humans all have a unique
“ranima’” (“soul, heart, being”) that must be cherished and protected (2017:88, 90). In Part 1
Chapter 17, he goes as far as to say: “Xuya qanima’ xuya qak’u’x, xuya quxlab’, ma wi oj keje
chikop. […] Oj k’ut oj winaq, ma wi oj keje k’olik, k’as chi pu qanima’ qak’u’x quxlab’,
kaminaqa chik qati’ojil” (“Nos dio nuestro corazón, nos dio nuestro espíritu, nos dio aliento, no
somos como los animals. […] En cambio, la existencia de nosotras las personas no es así,
nuestro espíritu está vivo, nuestro aliento está vivo”) (2017:128). According to Vico, humans
have an immortal interiority, whereas animals, because of a lack of an interiority, die and cease
to exist completely and forever.
Logically, this would make humans categorically metaphysical rather than physical. Yet
Vico contradicts this elsewhere. Vico clearly states in Part 2 Chapter 33: “Are chiqak’uxla’aj
qakamik qasachik rumal xax oj wi kamel xax oj pu sachel wi waral chuwach ulew, ma na oj ta
junelik k’olik waral chuwach ulew” (“Recordemos nuestra muerte, nuestra desaparición, porque
nuestro destino es morir en este mundo, no somos eternos en esta Tierra”) (2012:143).
Additionally, in Part 2 Chapter 15 he states: “Oj k’o chuwach ulew rumal ma wi chi kaj oj
petinaq wi, xa wi oj ulewal winaq” (“nosotras personas que estamos aquí en la Tierra, porque
nosotros no venimos del cielo, nosotros somos de la Tierra”) (2012:113). Vico clearly considers
humans to be physical rather than metaphysical, going as far as to say that people are of the
earth, not Heaven. Not only can humans not perceive or interact with the metaphysical, but
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humans are also fated to die. By their nature, metaphysical beings cannot die. There is therefore,
in the mind of Vico, an unbridgeable dichotomy between the body and the soul. Such notions can
be found in the Pauline epistles. In Galatians 5:17 for instance, for author writes: “ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ
ἐπιθυμεῖ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός: ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται” (“For
the flesh is against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for they are opposed to each other”).
And in Romans 8:13: “εἰ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ζῆτε μέλλετε ἀποθνῄσκειν, εἰ δὲ πνεύματι τὰς πράξεις
τοῦ σώματος θανατοῦτε ζήσεσθε” (“For if you live according to the flesh you will die, but if by
the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live”). Both of these verses clearly
establish a conflict between the human σάρξ (“body, flesh”) and the human πνεῦμα (“spirit,
breath, wind”). In Vico’s Theologia Indorum, the categories of physical and metaphysical are so
intensely disparate that the human cannot be conceived of as both flesh and spirit conjoined.
Rather, the naturalist Western mind conceives of the human as two parts so internally conflicted
that humans should choose the spirited portion, which is deemed good and eternal, and utterly
reject the physical portion, which is deemed utterly evil and perishable.
While this seems to imply that humans are simultaneously physical and metaphysical,
this is not actually the case. Rather, in Western canon the “soul” is typically equated with the
ability to reason. For instance, the highly influential Christian writer Athanasius writes: “It is the
function of the soul to see by reasoning even what is outside its own body, without however
acting outside its own body or to move things distant from the body by its presence” (2011:67).
Meanwhile Averroës bluntly states, “‘Soul’ is also used for the rational part, the thinking part, of
our consciousness. It…is not related to or bound up with matter […] and it is the only only part
of our thinking soul that seems to possess eternity or be immortal” (2019:62). The soul is
therefore the ability to reason and is limited within the physicality of the human body. In other
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words, a human is not two distinct parts comprised of “soul” and “body,” but is rather a single
whole of which reason is an aspect or component of the person’s interiority. Averroës affirms
this, arguing: “However, the disposition to apprehend universal intelligibles [i.e. to reason] must
subsists in a subject necessarily, which cannot be a body nor an intellect. Therefore, it must be a
soul, or a power in the soul to apprehend universals” (Fakhry 2001:70). This ability to reason
makes humans metaphysical rather than physical. This is why Walker states “Most demons have
aerial [i.e. metaphysical] bodies, and they have, of course, souls” (2003:71). The difference
between angels and demons is that the former use their reason to perfect themselves while the
latter do not. Averroës states as much, asserting that reason “has been placed in mankind for the
sake of their perfection” (Fakhry 2001:67). It is this ability to reason that perfects humans. This
is why Vico in Part 2 Chapter 17 describes the Christian as follows: “chi kajil winaq angelil
winaq santo’il winaq puch uk’oje’ik ri xpiano ub’i’” (“la existencia del que se llame cristiano
será persona del cielo, ángel del cielo, será santo”) (2011:162). A true Christian will be like the
angels, not in the vague sense of simile, but in an actualized sense because their interiorities will
have been “perfected.” Thus Athanasius concludes that “[Christ] was incarnate that we might be
made god,…that we might inherit incorruptibility” (2011:107). Even though humans are both
physical and metaphysical, Catholic Christian doctrine has ensured that they are not mutually
exclusive categories in the same way that “humans” and “non-humans” are, allowing humans to
exist within both categories without disrupting those categories.
The second exception to unreconcilable Western categories is the Incarnation of Christ.
In the Theologia Indorum, Vico asserts the metaphysical ontology of God as utterly separated
from the physical existence of His creation. In Part 1 Chapter 5 he states: “ma wi yujtajinaq
uk’oje’ik ruk’ uk’oje’ik ub’anoj, xa utukela’am uk’oje’ik xax jun wi chuk’oje’ik. Maja b’i chi rij
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chuwach xere wi uxenab’al utikerib’al ronojel k’olik” (“no está mezclada la existencia de Él con
la existencia de su creación, sola es su existencia, es único en su existencia, no tiene ni adelante
ni atrás, es solo el principio, el inicio de todo lo que existe”) (2017:45). Here Vico clearly
articulates that God’s existence is not mixed with His creation. Yet almost immediately
following this statement, Vico states how Christ took on corporeal form: “Xa k’exewach uti’ojil
chitz’ib’axik rumal winaq. Xa wi xere uk’exewach rumal qitzij wi xuluk’ama qati’ojil, winaq
xuxik chupam Santa María rumal qaloq’oxik rumal” (“La gente escribió sobre su ser corporal,
esa sí es su representatividad porque en verdad vino a tomar nuestro cuerpo, se hizo persona en
el vientre de santa María por amor a nosotros”) (2017:45). Thus Christ is an exception to the
clear distinctions between the metaphysical and physical categories. Vico reiterates this concept
throughout his Theologia Indorum, though it is uncertain how the K’iche’s would have initially
received his descriptions on the divinity and corporeality of Christ. Nevertheless, in Part 2
Chapter 15 Vico clearly explains how Christ was in fact fully human, not only by assuming the
form of a man but also qakosik (“our exhaustion”), qarapaxik (“our whip”), and qakamik (“our
death”) (2011:105). Christ is metaphysical because He is God, and He is also human and even
physically died.
The issue is that Christ defies the categorical boundaries of the physical and the
metaphysical. In this case, the Western conceptual framework of physical and metaphysical
categorizations breaks down. This is demonstrated in the monastic literature. Athanasius writes
in his De Incarnatione (“On the Incarnation”): “And thus it happened that both things occurred
together in a paradoxical manner: the death of all was completed in the lordly body, and also
death and corruption were destroyed by the Word in it” (2011:71). Gregory of Nazianzus echoes
the same point, stating: “Man and God blended. They became a single whole, the stronger side
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predominating, in order that I might be made God to the same extent that he was made man”
(2002:86). Gregory adds bluntly: “He [Christ] asks where Lazarus is laid – he was man; yet he
raises Lazarus – he was God” (2002:88). Due to a Western framework, the Christian thinkers
like Vico can only compensate with the conceptual challenge of the Incarnation by relinquishing
it to an incomprehensible “paradox.” The Incarnation is generally accepted as a paradox; many
attempts to reconcile this paradox to fit within a naturalist framework have resulted in
Christological heresies including Arianism, Docetism, Apollinarism, and Monothelitism. Thus in
Part 2 Chapter 12 of the Theologia Indorum, Vico states without any theological elaboration:
“Keje k’ut xa uti’ojil wi ral Santa María ub’ixik, ma na are ral wi Santa María, udiosil xuxik,
xax Dios wi, xax k’o wi, maja b’i oq, maja oqo chalaxoq, maja’ qo nay pu chik’oje’ oq Santa
María waral chuwach ulew” (“Así que el cuerpo del hijo de Santa María es el de ella, por eso es
hijo de Santa María, pero también tenía su divinidad, era Dios, ya estaba, ya existía aunque
todavía no había nacido y aún no existía Santa María aquí en la Tierra”) (2011:53). Vico does
not attempt to fit Christ in either the metaphysical or the physical category because Christ’s
Incarnation is a paradox and must be accepted as a paradox incomprehensible to humans.
Conclusion
As a naturalist of the West, Domingo de Vico relied heavily on categorization to interpret
reality and systematize relationships. With extremely rare exception (such as the Incarnation of
Christ, which is considered and accepted as paradox), categories are extremely rigid and do not
allow for blurring or permeation. Examples of this include “human” and “non-human,” “life and
non-life,” and “physical” and “metaphysical.” These categories stem from a naturalist ontology
that recognizes the sameness of physicality while simultaneously identifying the multiplicity in
interiority. This need for categorizations stems from Western philosophers and theologians,
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many of whom were read by Vico during his time at Salamanca. Thus Averroës states that the
purpose of reason is to identify objective universals in an objective reality (Fakhry 2001:66, 67).
The problem is that by emphasizing these categories as objective, Vico attempted to apply these
categories to K’iche’an ontology, which not only failed to understand the K’iche’s but ultimately
led to the Spanish missionaries punishing the Maya for not comprehending their objective
reality. This is clearly demonstrable in Vico’s depiction of K’iche’an “gods,” “idols,” and
“ancestors,” a topic that will be covered in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Vico on K’iche’an Idols, Ancestors, and Gods
In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated how Vico heavily relied on the Western
convention of categorizations in the Theologia Indorum. In this chapter, I will demonstrate how
Vico applied Western categorization to specifically “idols,” “ancestors,” and “gods.” By
analyzing these “three” aspects of ceremonial Maya life with Vico’s categorical framework, I
ultimately intend to demonstrate how not only were Vico’s categories wholly arbitrary but
inevitably failed in understanding and accurately describing 16th century K’iche’an conceptions
of their religiously-associated beings that occupied a central role in the cosmology and ritual.
The Bane of Idolatry
It seems that nearly every Amerindian group became associated with a European cliché.
For the Indians of North America, the Anglos likened them to a “wild animal” occupying
gargantuan swaths of virgin land (Deloria 1988:8). For the indigenous Brazilians of the
Amazonian basin, the Portuguese likened them to “rude plants” that were inconstant, forgetful,
and quick to happily return to the jungle soon after converting to Christianity (Viveiros 2011:25). For the Mayas of Central America, the Spanish considered them pagan “idolaters.” The
Spanish characterized the Mayas as idolaters more than anything else, and in many ways, the
k’ab’awil (“idol”) became emblematic of the Maya during the colonial period.
Idols were ubiquitous in the Maya region. According to Prufer (et al.), the Spanish
Chroniclers, especially Diego de Landa, “were amazed by the incredible numbers of idols they
witnessed everywhere they went,” including at temples, shrines, oratories, houses, roads, town
entrances, and stairways (2003:227). Hanks adds that within the first two hundred years after
Contact, the Spanish discovered over two dozen “idol houses” in the Yucatán alone (2010:53).

70

These idol houses were noted for their spacious size as well as the number of idols stored inside
them. Christenson relates one particular account from Bernal Díaz del Castillo, who reported
how the idol houses featured not just idols but also an altar and paintings on the walls of idols
and serpents (2016:52). For these reasons, the Spanish began to associate the Mayas almost
solely with their idols. In fact, in 1604 the king of Spain requested a report from fray Juan de
Izquierdo exclusively on the “state of idolatry” alone (Hanks 2010:103). Lorenzen notes that
idols were typically constructed of wood, stone, or ceramic (2005:26). According to one colonial
Spanish description, the idols were made of stone, wood, clay, gold, or copper, and were adorned
with rattles, feathers, woven coverings, and sea shells (Christenson 2016:126). The idols usually
appeared in anatomical, anthropomorphic form. Prufer uncovered one such idol during an
excavation in Xmuqlebal Xheton cave, in the Muklebal Tzul regional center of Belize. The idol
had accumulated severe damage over time but still showed some basic anatomical form.
Additionally, Prufer identified the idol’s material as cedar wood and traced remnants of colorant,
namely a red earth pigment and a “dark-brown-black” pigment (2003:226). Prufer notes that
colonial-era wooden idols usually would not have survived to the present day “except in the
rarest of environmental conditions” (2003:226). Obviously, the missionaries did not approve of
these idols.
The missionaries responded to the seeming superfluousness of the idols with aggressive
and destructive tactics. In 1510, even Pope Innocent IV took a vocal stance against idolatry,
calling it contra naturam (“against nature”) and deeming it more evil than murder or blasphemy
(Whitehead 1984:72). In the highlands in 1555, Alonso de Zorita, the official oidor of Guatemala
who represented “the legal interests of the governing tribunal in Mexico,” began traveling from
town to town seizing idols, and he sent warnings ahead to each town that if the people did not
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surrender their idols to him, then they would “suffer severe punishment” (Christenson 2016:77).
Then in the 1560s the idolatry trials began in the Yucatán. During the idolatry trials, Diego de
Landa aggressively sought idols. On July 12, 1562 alone, Landa burned more than 20,000 idols
and forced hundreds of Mayan prisoners to watch and afterwards suffer further punishment
(Chuchiak 2005:614). Landa also ordered his clergy to require the Maya to confess their idolatry
and even report other “idolaters” whom they knew, including family who lived in their homes
(Chuchiak 2005:617). This system of reporting spawned an inquisition on Maya “idolaters” who
had to defend themselves in court. Hanks notes that many Mayas had to give testimonies under
oath during these trials (2010:57). Landa was infamously ruthless to the Mayas. Christenson
states that in the search for “idolaters” and their idols, Landa and the other missionaries
“interrogated and tortured thousands of Mayan converts suspected of reverting to paganism”
(2016:21). Popson notes that within three months alone, Landa arrested and tortured 4,500
Mayas from just a single village (2003:64). Christenson adds that their methods of torture
included beating the witnesses until the ears and nose bled, holding them under water for
extended periods, splashing boiling water on them, suspending them with ropes tied around their
wrists and a heavy stone tied to their feet, forcing their mouths open with sticks and pouring
water down their throats, and scorching them with wax tapers. These methods were only for
those suspected of idolatry or else knowing an idolater; if found guilty, the Mayas would be
lashed up to two hundred times or sold into slavery (2016:21). This inquisition continued
unofficially for centuries. In the early 1600s, Sánchez de Aguilar reported his confiscation and
destruction of many idols (Hanks 2010:54). In the late 1600s, Francisco Ximénez reported the
need to tear away the presence of idols in the highlands, which “may appear as only a spark
among them, [but] it is in fact a burning fire” (Quiroa 2013:77, translation Quiroa’s). Even as far
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as the late 1790s, the fray José Perdomo in Teabo was actively imprisoning Mayas for idolatry
(Christensen 2016:19). Idolatry had quickly become the most severe sin a Maya could commit
and incited some of the most cruel savagery that the missionaries ever inflicted.
Despite the relentless and systematic cruelty of the missionaries, the Mayas remained
resilient. As Prufer remarks about the idol found in Xmuqlebal Xheton cave, it is possible that
Mayas hid their idols in caves such the one in Belize and kept their locations secret (2003:226).
Furthermore, the existence of idols still exist to the present day. Centuries later, the renowned
and pioneering Mayanist Barbara Tedlock relates that the Mayas of Chichicastenango still
possess household idols, placing them at shrines and practicing rituals that involve the idols
(1992:128). And in Santiago Atitlán, the Tz’utujil Mayas now use the images of saints as “social
currency and prestige” in the same way that the idols did in the colonial period (Christenson
2016:154). In this way, the Mayas continue to demonstrate a remarkable spirit of resistance
against the hegemonic colonial powers that arrived from across the sea on wooden ships.
The Theologia Indorum and the Idols
The Theologia Indorum is extremely orthodox in its content. It begins with a logical (i.e.
philosophical) proof of the existence of God, which is based on Aquinas’ Quinque viae (“Five
ways”) (Aquinas 1954:54-56). But because the Theologia Indorum is a theology for the Indians
rather than fellow clergy, Vico instead provides a theologia tenuis that only includes the Prima
via (2017:34) and Secunda via (2017:36). Christensen mentions how the Prima via, which is the
logical proof of the Prime Mover (see Aristotle 2008:185-231, esp. 207, 210, 211), is included in
many other colonial Christian manuscripts including the Teabo Manuscript (2016:31, 32).
Moreover, the Theologia Indorum is replete with various topics which include: biblical stories
that either demonstrate or overtly conclude with a moral lesson (2011[T2]:301), a declaration
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that Mary is the Queen of the Universe (2011[T2]:53), how to be an utzilaj xpiano (“good
Christian”) (2011[T2]:157, 165), a commentary on the three theological virtues and four cardinal
virtues (2012:75-115 and 115-195), an explanation of the angels (2017:52), an explanation of the
seven sacraments (2012:55), that Satan enslaves sinners (2011[T1]:45), the importance of
confession and baptism (2011[T2]:169, 217), and finally how Christ has power and authority
over Satan (2011[T2]:137). It cannot be stressed enough that every single one of these topics
appear in other colonial Christian manuscripts, including the ones written in an indigenous
language. Christensen demonstrates how each of the aforementioned topics has appeared not just
in Maya manuscripts but also Nahuatl manuscripts from Mexico (2014:31, 32, 41, 46, 49, 54, 57,
78, 79, 104). Clearly then Vico’s Theologia Indorum, while long, is by no means unique in
content. Vico’s treatment of idolatry is no different. Like the other missionaries, he too
condemned it, and was even commissioned to write a treatise on idolatry. This treatise, which
was intended “to serve as a moral and confessional primer or summa consciencia,” was never
produced but instead inspired the creation of the Theologia Indorum itself (Sparks 2014:402).
While extremely orthodox, the manuscript is thorough and, naturally, condemns the idolatry of
the K’iche’s of the highlands.
The Theologia Indorum is replete with mentions of idolatry. The first time he references
idolatry is in Part 1 Chapter 12 where he states: “Naqi chi pa chiraj ik’u’x, ma kixq’ijilon chik
che’ ab’aj, chi rij ri nim Ajaw Dios mi xnub’ij chiwe. Ma utzijoxik che’ ab’aj, keje ri ma
xch’awik ma xtzijon pa chiwech. Ma xuchol ri keje ri uk’oje’ik D. ni. mi xnucholo chiwech”
(“Que el corazón de ustedes no desee otra cosa, por eso ya no adoren a los palos, a las piedras,
es a Dios gran Señor, como se los he dicho. No hablen con los palos y las piedras, porque no les
hablarán a ustedes, por eso Dios gran Señor relató su ser, es lo que yo les he relatado”)
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(2017:106). Here it is immediately evident how Vico perceives of the idols: as che’ ab’aj (“wood
and stone,”). The pairing of che’ and ab’aj frequently recurs throughout the manuscript. This
type of couplet represents a diphrastic kenning, which Hull defines as “the pairing of two distinct
elements to produce a metaphorical, more abstract third concept” (2012:73). Hull continues that
“parallelism defines poetic or ornate discourse in [Mayan languages],” adding that diphrastic
kennings are “firmly entrenched in the parallelistic structuring” (2012:73, 74). By juxtaposing
two specific words as a couplet, the Mayas use the associative connections shared between the
two words to produce a third concept. In the Theologia Indorum, for instance, Vico pairs rax
(“green”) and q’an (“yellow”) as a couplet in the phrase “ronojel uraxal uq’anal Dios” (“all of it
/ His greenness / His yellowness / God”) (2017:140). Both green and yellow have extremely
strong connotations of rebirth and renewal. On the one hand, rax is strongly associated with jade,
which in turn is strongly associated with the youthful corn god and, by extension, rejuvenation
and rebirth (Taube 2005:28, 31; Miller 1992:160). On the other hand, q’an has strong
associations with corn. This is articulated in the Rab’inal Achi, which mentions “yellow-colored,
white ears of ripe corn / yellow sustenance / white sustenance” (Tedlock 2003:67). Corn, like the
corn god, also has strong associations with cyclical rebirth (Christenson 2016: 286, 314, 327).
When rax and q’an are paired together, the couplet uraxal uq’anal denotes a meaning:
abundance. Thus ronojel uraxal uq’anal Dios translates as “all of God’s abundance.” Hull
provides a number of other diphrastic kennings that frequently appear in Mayan language
manuscripts. For instance, a common kenning is the pairing of ulew (“earth”) and kaj (“sky”),
which together refers to “everywhere” or may else refer to “domain” or “the world” (Hull
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2012:80-82). This exact kenning also appears throughout the Theologia Indorum and even the
Popol Wuj. 12
It is doubtful that the kenning che’ ab’aj existed prior to Contact. Rather, it is likely a
product of the colonial lengua reducida, which Hanks describes as “an objectification produced
by translingual practices of missionaries and Mayas, but…at the same time a practical instrument
used to form new missionaries and new Christians” (2010:96). This lengua reducida became a
“hybrid at all levels” and entailed the superimposition of Castilian meanings onto Mayan
grammatical and lexical forms (2010:128, 134). In some cases this involved adapting a Mayan
word to signify a Western Christian concept; using the rules of Mayan grammar to create new
words, kennings, and phrases; or else simply using the Castilian when the Mayan seemed
inadequate. In the case of che’ ab’aj, Vico uses the Mayan kenning convention to create a new
meaning: namely “idol.” Most colonial K’cihe’ dictionaries list che’ as meaning either árbol,
madera, or palo. The possible translations in Edmonson’s more modern dictionary are more
varied and include “stick, pole, tree, wood, cudgel, wooden object, footstool” (1965).
Furthermore, other highland languages in the K’iche’an Branch of the Mayan language family
also use the word che’. Kaqchikel uses che’ to signify “árbol, madera,” although a colonial
dictionary lists che ru to signify “madera, árbol, monte, bosque” (Munson 1991; Saenz de Santa
María 1940:84). Meanwhile in Tz’utujil, chee signifies “palo, árbol, madera” (Mendoza
1996:67). Since the word che’ is present in K’iche’, Kaqchikel, and Tz’utujil, it is likely that the
word at least predates the Contact and has not undergone any dramatic semantic shift. The same
applies to ab’aj, which is a general word for “rock, stone.” Like che’, the word ab’aj appears in

It is worth mentioning that diphrastic kennings also appear in Nahuatl, a feature that León-Portilla refers
to as difrasismo. One of the most famous examples is in xóchitl in cuícatl (“flower and song”), which
León-Portilla says refers to poetry (1990:75).
12
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both Kaqchikel and Tz’utujil. For Kaqchikel, Munson’s dictionary lists ab’ej, ab’ij, ab’oj as a
single entry meaning “piedra,” while a colonial dictionary lists abaj ru with a larger semantic
field of “piedra, talismán, amuleto; los órganos de la reproducción” (Munson 1991; Saenz de
Santa María 1940:31). Meanwhile in Tz’utujil, the term aab’aj refers to “piedra, testículos;
huevos” (Mendoza 1996:1) Like che’, ab’aj appears to have enjoyed a long use among Maya in
the highlands that predates the arrival of the Spanish, since the same word appeared in other
sister languages at the time of contact.
While Vico does not alter the meanings of che’ and ab’aj, he does create a new meaning
by juxtaposing them into a kenning that likely did not exist prior to Contact. As has already been
established, the idols of the colonial period were generally made of wood, stone, or ceramic.
However, it is doubtful that Vico and the other Catholic clergymen created the kenning che’
ab’aj simply as a reference to the materiality of the idols. Rather, the Western logic of the
kenning is founded on a long precedent established in the Western literary canon. The first and
most relevant source in the Bible, which emphatically condemns idolatry. Even the First
Commandment condemns idolatry, referring to idols as “sculptile” (lit. “a carved or sculpted
thing”) and “omnem similitudinem quae est in caelo desuper et quae in terra deorsum nec eorum
quae sunt in aquis sub terra” (“any likeness of anything that in the sky above, or that is in the
earth below, or of those things that are in the water under the earth”) (Exodus 20:2-6). The
importance of this command is echoed in other Christian manuscripts as well. As Christensen
demonstrates, the Nahuatl Catecisimoob ti le Metodistaoob (“Catechism of the Methodists”) lists
the Ten Commandments in Section 7, although in Protestant fashion it distinguishes “you will
not have other gods before me” and “[you] will not make images” as two separate commands,
unlike the Catholics who view them as a single commandment (2014:90). The Bible generally
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defines idols by their materiality and powerlessness. Psalm 115 describes idols first by their
materiality, specifically silver and gold, and then characterizes them by their feebleness, which
constitutes being unable to speak, hear, feel, walk, or smell. The prophet Habakkuk follows the
same formulaic description of idols, first by describing the materiality as metal, and then by
asserting that the idols cannot speak, with the implication being that idols are inanimate and by
extension powerless and useless (Habakkuk 2:18). This formulaic description recurs throughout
the Western canon. For instance, Athanasius employs this same formula, characterizing idols as
“wood and stones” and elsewhere “stones and wood,” concluding that the “weakness of [pagan]
idols” is “proved” by the Greeks (2011:61, 93, 104). Vico employs this same formulaic
description. In Part 1 Chapter 25, Vico states: “With it then nothing moves, nor walks. It does
not have legs that it may walk. It is only wood, only stone it was said” (Sparks 2017:118). In the
Western framework, humans are superior to animals, and animals are superior to plants.
Meanwhile wood and stones are not just considered “non-human” but are considered inanimate
and devoid of any interiority at all (as defined by Descola 2014). Thus when Vico uses the
diphrastic kenning che’ ab’aj, the couplet is not just referencing the materiality of the idols but
also their impotency. To Vico, idols are objects made of wood or stone, and their materiality
implies a lack of interiority and agency.
The Theologia Indorum and the Ancestors
There is no single, general word for “ancestor” in K’iche’. In the Popol Wuj, the phrase
ojer winaq (“ancient people”) is used to refer to the ancestors (Mondloch and Carmack
2018:102). Likewise, the words qamam (“our grandfathers”) and qaqajaw (“our fathers”) also
refer to ancestors in the Popol Wuj (Mondloch and Carmack 2018:158). During my own K’iche’
language program through Tulane University (2020), the Maya instructors of Nawalja’ (Nahualá)
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used the kennings qanaan qataat (“our mothers, our fathers”) and qati’t qamaam (“our
grandmothers, our grandfathers”) to refer to their ancestors. Tedlock states that the K’iche’s of
Momostenango refer to their ancestors as simply “Nantat” (“mother, father”) (1992:61).
Generally though, the K’iche’s refer to ancestors by using the following morphological formula:
the first person plural pronominal prefix (qa-) is appended to a couplet of kinship stems denoting
a pair of older lineal relatives such as parents (taat, naan) or grandparents (maam, ti’t).
Ancestors are extremely important to the K’iche’s and to their sense of identity and obligation.
Tedlock mentions how many rituals in Momostenango involve the ancestors, and on four days of
the ritual calendar (namely 1, 6, 8, and 9 K’at) “great stacks of offering are given in order to
make up for any neglect of duties to…the ancestors” (1992:110). Vico would have easily
observed the reverence that the K’iche’s held for their ancestors, but he clearly misunderstands
how or why the ancestors held a position of such centrality. Thus he understands ancestors from
both a lineal and a Christian perspective, specifically as the physical progenitors of subsequent
generations of people and as the genetic carriers of original sin.
Vico understands ancestors from a temporal perspective; ancestors are the people who
predate the present generation in time. This is most evident in Part 2 of his Theologia Indorum.
For instance, in Chapter 2 he describes the ancestral lineage of the virgin mother Mary, stating:
Ronojel mi xqab’ij kanoq, xuwachinik wi q’alaj saqil rumal Dios ta xalaxik jun utzilaj
winaq Joaquin xalax na xalax nay puch jun utzilaj ixoq ub’i’ Santa Ana. Are kichak
chuk’u’x Dios nim Ajaw Are nay puch kokel wi chuchuch chuqajaw qaloq’olaj chuch
Santa María. Are ri San Joaquin chupam ukaj chinamital elenaq wi ajawab’ chi rij nim
ajaw David chinamitalim wi.
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(Todo lo que dejamos dicho, fructificó en la luz en la claridad por Dios cuando nació
una gran persona, Joaquín, nació también nació una gran mujer, llamada Santa Ana. El
trabajo de ellos en el corazón de Dios, es ser los padres de nuestra sagrada madre Santa
María. San Joaquín ha venido del cuarto linaje, venido de los reyes, descendiente del
gran señor David.) (2011:45-59)
Here Vico provides an extremely plain ancestry that only includes Mary’s two parents, Santa
Ana (“Joachim”), Santa Ana (“Anne”), and her distant ancestor nim ajaw David (“the great lord
[i.e. king] David”). This ancestry is also distinguishably European because it emphasizes specific
names in a linear order, whereas K’iche’s tend to refer to their ancestors as a general group
existing within cyclical time. The Teabo Manuscript is even more extreme, providing the
genealogy of Christ through his father Joseph’s line. The ancestry begins with David, who is the
father of the patriarch Abraham, and concludes with Christ, mentioning a total of forty-four
names (2016:117-123) Thus for Vico, the ancestors are purely a matter of bloodline through
time. Thus Vico emphasizes the ukaj chinamital (“fourth lineage”) of Joachim. Because of the
emphasis on linear progression and succession through time, Vico counts the number of lineages
as well. 13 Thus Vico conceives of ancestors as a matter of genetics continuing in linear time.
For Vico, with the passing of each generation also comes the passing of original sin to
their descendants. Aquinas characterizes original sin as a “corrupt habit” and a “disorder in the
disposition of the parts of the soul [and] privation of original justice” (1954:120). And so while
sins themselves are not habits, the disposition of sinning is a habit. The Spanish missionaries
attempted to articulate this concept to the Mayas, as demonstrated by the Catecisimoob ti le

The Italian theologian Campanella emphasizes the importance of number in Western literature by “asserting that
numbers alone can be physical causes,” since God has designed the universe in such a way that it can be measured
in a plethora of ways (Walker 2003:222).

13
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Metodistaoob. In Section 3 of its First Catechism, the dialogic script reads: “The first sin of our
parents made ruin for all men by making them be born in sin. […] All persons are born in sin
because they are born prideful, they do not listen (obstinate), they are lovers of things on this
earth and not of God” (Christensen 2014:86, 87). Vico also references original sin in Part 2
Chapter 9, stating: “chi winaq chi rumal umak Adan nab’e qaqajaw” (“la gente ha estado en
pleitos por el pecado de Adán, nuestro primer padre”) (2011:137). In Chapter 24 Vico explicitly
mentions “ri pecado original ub’i’” (“pecado, llamado original”) (2011:297). When Vico places
the blame (rumal, “because of it”) on Adam (nab’e qaqajaw, “our first father”) for passing sin
(umak, “his fault, sin, error”) to humanity, he is implying that every human passes their “habit”
for sin to their children in the linear movement of time. To this end, in Part 2 Chapter 10 Vico
likens Christ to Adam, stating that both “maja b’i uchuch, ma pu ja b’i uqajaw” (“no tenía
madre, no tenía padre”) (2011:178). This likening to Christ as the second Adam originates in the
New Testament (1 Corinthians 21-22), but has also been touched by Athanasius, who states that
Christ became man specifically in order to fulfill the role of second Adam (2011:60). Thus
within Vico’s Western framework, the ancestors are genetic, temporal, and corrupted by a sinful
nature.
Finally, Vico perceives of ancestry as an aspect unique to earthly life. In Part 1 Chapter
22 Vico states: “Maja b’i me’alanik k’ajolanik, maja b’i ixoqilanik maja b’i achijilanik chub’an
chik chi la’. Xa keje Angeles” (“No habrá engendración de hijos e hijas, no habrá para ser
esposa o esposo ahí. Serán como ángeles”) (2017:152). There will no longer be childbearing in
Heaven. Moreover, this will render the institution of marriage useless, and so marriage will also
cease to exist. All bloodlines and filial kinships will essentially be rendered defunct. Thus Vico
states that “oj ral oj uk’ajol” (“somos sus hijas, somos sus hijos”) and meanwhile frequently
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refers to God as “qachuch qaqajaw” (“nuestra madre y nuestro padre”) (2017:29, 68, 70, 102,
156). Not only does Vico render ancestry pointless after death, but he even condemns the
K’iche’an ancestors to Hell. In Part 2 Chapter 33 he states: “Ma wi keje xkil ichuch iqajaw mi
xekamik mi xesachik, mi pu xeb’ek, xetzaqatajik chi xib’alb’a, kek’atik keporoxik chi la’ rumal
kimak” (“Sus padres no vieron eso, por eso murieron, se perdieron, se fueron al infierno. Se
quemaron, fueron quemados allí por causa de sus pecados”) (2012:135). Vico condemns ichuch
iqajaw (“your [PL] fathers and mothers”) to xib’alb’a (“Hell”) where they keporoxik (“they are
burned”) (2012:135). Vico employs the familiar kenning ichuch iqajaw to denote ancestors,
except here he uses the second person plural pronominal prefix i- to clarify that he is referring to
the K’iche’an ancestors and not his own. But Vico affirms that their ancestors have no excuses
for their fate. In Part 1 Chapter 7 he states: “Keje ri qitzij chi ronojel k’o wi Dios, k’o chi kaj k’o
chuwach ulew, k’o chi qaxe’ k’o chi qawi’” (“Sí es que en verdad Dios está en todo, está en el
cielo, está en la tierra, está debajo de nosotros, está sobre nosotros”) (2017:74). Vico here is
referencing natural revelation. Thus we return to the Dominican attitude that all pagan religions
embody some aspect of objective Truth due to natural revelation. This belief stipulates that God
has revealed enough of Himself in nature so that divine revelation (i.e. direct revelation from
God) is not necessary to obtain Truth about Him. Gregory of Nazianzus also argues for a natural
revelation derived from observing animals, particularly the honey bee and the spider, as well as
plants, the sea, the stars, and the sun (2002:56-62). As Paul famously writes: “εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς
ἀναπολογήτους” (“So they [all humans] are without excuse”) (Romans 1:20).
The Theologia Indorum and the Gods
Strangely, Vico gives very little mention of the K’iche’an gods. What makes this so
peculiar is that the Popol Wuj, which devotes a large amount of its pages to the gods, “escrito
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durante la década de 1550,” which was at most only 16 years after Vico completed his work in
1544 (Mondloch and Carmack 2018:16). The gods were still extremely relevant to the K’iche’s,
and yet Vico does not mention them much at all. Vico does list the names of various gods in Part
1 Chapter 25: “Greatly you all were scared because, before you all is this Xib’alb’a, greatly
before you all is Jun Ajpu and Xb’alankej, Tasul Juraqan and Q’eteb’ Pub’a’ix, Jun Junajpu and
Wuqub’ Junajpu, Jun Kame and Wuqub’ Kame, Kik’ Re and Kik’ Rixk’aq, Mam and Iq’ Cho’a,
Wok and Jun Ajpu” (Sparks 2017:104-105). Yet Vico does not build on his list with any
rhetorical point beyond acknowledging the names of their gods. The reason for this seeming lack
of K’iche’an gods is deceptive. Like many other European missionaries operating in the New
World, Vico considered the gods to be either the devil or his demons. Thus whenever Vico
references either, he is also addressing the K’iche’an gods as well.
The closest approximation to the K’iche’an word for the European notion of “god” is
k’ab’awil. According to Lopéz Ixcoy, k’ab’awil in its original meaning signified “divino, puro”
and not necessarily “god,” which is a Western category and concept (2017:xxii; 2011:4).
Nevertheless the word is used frequently throughout the Popol Wuj in reference to the various
divine beings that occupy the narrative and is most often translated as “dioses” in Spanish
(Mondloch and Carmack 2018) and “gods” in English (Christenson 2007; Tedlock 1996).
Because of its pagan associations, this word was immediately targeted by the missionaries in
their efforts to create a lengua reducida. According to Hanks, the Franciscan missionaries in the
Yucatán did not use the Yucatec root word ku (“god, precious”) to reference God because they
“were quite aware that in using a preexisting Mayan term for ‘god,’ they ran the risk of
encouraging syncretism and confusion between the Christian God and the diabolical idols they
were seeking to extirpate” (2010:133, 153). Instead, they used Yucatec grammar to manipulate
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the root ku into the form kuulilantah (“to god-revere it”) to signify the worshipping of false gods
(2010:153). While the lowland missionaries adapted ku to mean “false gods,” the approach to
k’ab’awil in the highlands was different. Rather than retain the meaning “god,” the missionaries
applied the word to idols. The colonial dictionaries list “ídolo” as k’ab’awil in varying
orthographies including cabauil, qabovil, and ꜭabovil (Sachse and Dürr 2017:236; Acuña
2005:191, Acuña 1983). The missionaries adapted other forms of the word to signify actions
related to idolatry. For instance, the colonial dictionary El Vocabulario en lengua ꜭiche otlatecas
lists “idolatrar” as the verb form cabovilaɧ, which is listed with the kenning che, abaɧ (“idols”;
lit. “wood and stone”) (Sachse and Dürr 2017:236). The dictionaries list other forms as well,
such as ah cabauil (ajk’ab’awil; “idólatra”) and qabovilanic (k’ab’awilanik; “idolatría”). Vico
uses kab’awil (spelled by Vico as cabauil; transcribed by Lopéz Ixcoy as kab’awil) throughout
the Theologia Indorum. López Ixcoy notes how the k’ab’awil “moderno y malo” is different
from the k’ab’awil “antiguo y auténtico” and translates the word as “ídolo” whenever it appears
in the Theologia Indorum (2011:4). This reflects the lengua reducida, in which the missionaries
attempted to repurpose Mayan words to fit a Christian system of meanings. Nevertheless the
K’iche’s were resilient, and the original meaning of k’ab’awil clearly remained in use, as is
demonstrated in the Popol Wuj. But for the purposes of understanding Vico, k’ab’awil references
idols, not gods.
Vico does not appear to mention idols because to him they are demons. In the Theologia
Indorum, Vico refers to demons in Castilian as diablos and in K’iche’ as k’axtok’ (spelled by
Vico as caxtoc). Most colonial K’iche’ dictionaries use k’axtok’ as not just a signifier for demons
but also for Satan, though the orthographies vary usually between caxtoc, qaxtoq, and ꜭaxtoꜭ.
According to Lopéz Ixcoy, the term originally signified “la persona que miente” prior to Contact
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and Spanish reducción (2017:143). While the colonial dictionaries do not list this significance, a
colonial Kaqchikel dictionary also includes the word qaxtoq, defining it as “mentiroso,
engañoso” (Saenz de Santa María 1940: 201). The same dictionary also includes the entry
qaxtoq ajtsai and defines it as “demonio, engañador,” which provides some evidence that they
adapted the word k’axtok’ to mean “demon” for the K’iche’s as well. Satan is strongly associated
with deceit in the Bible, especially in John 8:44 which states: “ὅτι ψεύστης ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ πατὴρ
αὐτοῦ” (“for [a] liar he [Satan] is and the father of it [lies]”. The missionaries sought to
emphasize this characteristic of the devil and his demons by applying the K’iche’an word for a
“liar” to them. Lopéz Ixcoy mentions that “es más usual la forma itzel malvado, demonio,
diablo, y todas las formas con las que se denomina al demonio” (2017:143). El Vocabulario en
lengua ꜭiche otlatecas does mention itzeel (written ytzel), but it states that the word is “p{o}r
cosa suçia. o mala, o maldad. | o ruin, o ruindad” (Sachse and Dürr 2017:116). The dictionary
does not attribute the meaning “demon” or “devil” to it. The word also appears in a Tz’utujil
dictionary as itzeel, “feo, malo, mal” (Mendoza 1996:124). But itzeel does appear in at least one
of the Kaqchikel dictionaries. The dictionary lists itzel-winek (lit. “bad person”) to mean “diablo;
Satanás” (Munson 1991). Additionally, during my K’iche’ language program through Tulane
University in 2020, I was researching the Quema del Diablo tradition in Guatemala. During
private sessions, I asked various instructors for the word for “diablo” in K’iche’. All responded
that K’iche’s today simply say “diablo,” but one instructor said that some speakers also use
itzeel, and another said that some use k’axtok’ (2020, private recorded audio). Nevertheless, Vico
generally uses diablos and k’axtok’ to describe demons.
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Vico equates demons to the K’iche’an gods. He refers to Satan as “xax tz’aqol tzij wi”
(“él es un mentiroso”), 14 adding that Satan claims “in tz’aqol in b’itol” (“yo soy el creador, el
formador”) (2017:116). Here Satan claims to be a god, and Vico even gives Satan dialogue using
the first person singular pronoun in. This notion of demons pretending to be gods is extremely
common in Western Christian literature. Athanasius states: “They [non-believers] were so
impious that they even thereafter worshipped demons and called them gods” (2011:61). To Vico
and his fellow clergy, the demons and the K’iche’an gods were the same beings, only referred to
by different names. Hanks affirms as much, stating that demons and the Devil were “equated by
missionaries with the Maya gods” (2010:273). This notion is echoed in a Nahuatl Christian
manuscript called the “Nahuatl Bible,” in which an angel tells Paul: “Look upon the evil demons
with fear! […] Get rid of those whom you served and venerated as gods, before you bled
yourself…, the evil demons” (Christensen 2014:21). Moreover, Fray Geónimo de Mendieta
lamented that the Mayas were honoring demons as gods (Christenson 2016:149). Not only does
Vico associate the demons with the K’iche’an gods, but he also believes that the demons inhabit
the dead che’ ab’aj (“wood and stone”) of idols. This does not appear to be universal for all
demons, since Vico states “pu diablos k’o chi xib’alb’a” (“ya sean demonios que están en el
infierno”) (2017:122). Nevertheless, Vico does imply an association between demons and idols.
For instance, in Part 2 Chapter 14 he describes a “rochoch k’axtok’ ojer chi la’ Roma” (“casa del
demonio que estaba desde hace tiemp allá en Roma”) (2011:73). Here he is clearly referencing a
Roman temple. In the next sentence he states “xere pu…kab’awil xuchax iwumal” (“estaba…el
ídolo, así lo llamaron ustedes”) (2011:73). Here he states that the Roman temple contained
demons, which the K’iche’s call k’ab’awil, or “idols” in the lengua reducida. Vico’s connection
El Vocabulario en lengua ꜭiche otlatecas lists “tzakal tzih” to mean “mentiroso” specifically (Sachse and Dürr
2017:305).
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of demons and idols is most evident a bit further in the chapter where he states: “Retal qitzij chi
are rajawal ronojel k’axtok’, ronojel puch kab’awil, retal puch, are sachol re ronojel k’axtok’
xsik’ix rumal ronojel winaq chuwach ulew” (“Es la señal de que su Reino está sobre el demonio,
sobre todo ídolo, es el aniquilador de todo demonio que fue invocado por toda la gente aquí en
la Tierra”) (2011:81). Thus the idols and demons are inexplicably linked in Western conception.
This connection manifests in the belief that demons specifically inhabit the idols. This
notion is affirmed and echoed throughout Western literature and was believed by the European
missionaries who came to the New World. Athanasius states that “Formerly demons deceived
human fancy, taking possession of springs or rivers, wood or stone, and by their tricks thus
stupefied the simple” (2011:100). According to Walker, Hermes Trismegistus echoes the same
notion in Asclepius, describing how demons can be invoked and infixed into idols, thereby
imbuing the idols with power (2003:40). Walker adds: “[Hermes] admits…demons in the statues
were worshipped as gods” (2003:42). In the Western religious framework, idols are dead and
lifeless material, but demons may inhabit them. Therefore, whenever the Maya worship an idol,
they invoking the power of a demon, not the power of the idol itself. Hanks confirms that
missionaries linked “power and idolatry,” stating: “For the missionaries, of course, the power
behind evil, the ultimate idol, was the Devil” (2010:273). In fact, the missionaries in the Yucatán
used the term cizin not just to refer to the “devil” but also to signify “the spirit agency
materialized in the idol” (Hanks 2010:149). The idea is articulated in other colonial Christian
manuscripts as well. In the “Nahuatl Bible,” some newly-converted pagans burn their idols, later
stating “we believed that we burned the evil demons we had taken to be gods” (Christensen
2014:22). The underlying assumption is that by burning the idols, the demons that inhabited the
idols were also burned. For Vico and the other missionaries, the idols were lifeless and
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powerless, but they could be filled with a malicious supernatural demon. Their beliefs in demoninhabited idols were not simply theoretical. According to Christenson, Las Casas reported Maya
failing to fulfill their duties to such idols and mysteriously dying soon after. Las Casas attributed
their mysterious deaths to the demons inhabiting the idols, with God not commanding but
allowing the demons to do so 2016:88, 89). Thus when Vico lists the names of their gods in Part
1 Chapter 25, he is listing K’iche’an names for demons. The demons are therefore the same as
the K’iche’an gods and inhabit idols to give them power.
Conclusion
In the Theologia Indorum, Vico describes aspects of K’iche’ cosmology and metaphysics
by categorizing them within three Western categories. The first category is the “idol.” Vico
defines an idol purely by its materiality and refers to it as che’ ab’aj (“wood and stone”).
Because wood and stone are lifeless materials with no agency, the idol in turn is equally lifeless
and without any agency or power.
The second category is the “ancestor.” To Vico, ancestors are understood biologically
and temporally. He treats ancestors only from a lineal perspective wherein they precede and
produce the following generation of people. Generations form a “chain link” of names that are
traceable through time. Finally, an individual ancestor can serve as a status marker, as was the
case with Mary and Joseph both being direct descendants of King David.
The final category is the “god.” Vico considers gods to be demons who serve Satan.
Whenever a pagan calls upon the name of their god, they are invoking a demon. While pagan
groups across the world may give the demons different names, they all reference the same
demons. Thus Zeus is no different from Thor, and Thor is no different from the hero twins Jun
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Ajpu and Xb’alanke. Moreover, these demons fill and inhabit idols. Therefore, while the idols
themselves are powerless, they appear to have power because of the demons inside them.
While these three categories function with a Western framework, they fail to understand
and accurately describe the K’iche’an perspective. In the next chapter, I intend to describe the
K’iche’ perspective within the Amerindian cosmopolitical theory as articulated by Viveiros de
Castro. Such a metaphysical framework would have made the Western framework utterly alien
and in many ways incomprehensible to the K’iche’ in 16th century Guatemala.
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Chapter 5
The Animist Ontology of the 16th Century K’iche’s
In this final chapter, I intend to demonstrate that the categories of Vico fail to accurately
describe the K’iche’an metaphysical reality because the 16th century K’iche’s had an animist
ontological perspective, not a naturalist one. I will begin by showing that the K’iche’s were not
analogists, as Descola (2014) suggests. Rather, they were animists, and within this ontology they
did not perceive relationships between “human” and “non-human” but instead recognized all life
as human. I will then argue that the K’iche’s were specifically perspectivists with ontological
relationships based in exchange and annual renewal. Finally, I will explain how this ontology
influenced their perceptions of “idols,” “ancestors,” and “gods” specifically. This chapter will
incorporate the theoretical work of Viveiros de Castro (2017; 2011), Descola (2014), and
Christenson (2016).
The Nagualism of the Nahuas
Before explaining how the K’iche’s were not analogists, we must first understand what
analogism is. In the same way that K’iche’an animism is a highly nuanced and localized within
the Maya area, Nagualism is a highly specified and unique type of analogism. In general terms,
analogism finds correspondences and differences in a network of intrinsic properties. Whereas
naturalism conceives the physicality of life as the same and the interiority of life as a multiplicity
of differences, analogism discerns a multiplicity of differences in both physicality and interiority.
Descola defines “analogism” as follows:
By this [“analogism”] I mean a mode of identification that divides up the whole
collection of existing beings into a multiplicity of essences, forms, and substances
separated by small distinctions and sometimes arranged on a graduated scale so that it
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becomes possible to recompose the system of initial contrasts into a dense network of
analogies that link together the intrinsic properties of the entities that are distinguished in
it. (2014:201)
Descola notes that analogism is extremely common throughout the world, citing ancient China,
the Mandé-Voltaic region of Africa, and even Renaissance Europe as examples. Within this
ontology, “each individual is made up of a multiplicity of mobile components whose
combinations, all different, produce particular identities” (Descola 2014:222). In an analogist
ontology, each living being has a combination of physicalities and interiorities that, like a
fingerprint, make that being unique in the cosmos from all other beings. In Western naturalism,
the physicality of all living beings is the same; this significantly limits the scope and range of
possible differences between living beings, since only the interiorities can be different. On the
other hand, in analogism, both the physicality and interiority are different between each and
every individual being, and so there is an infinite number of possible beings that can exist.
Descola states that the analogist’s cosmos is “a priori a chaotic and inflated world, since it
contains an infinite number of different things, each in a particular place and each at the heart of
an idiosyncratic network” (2014:205). Analogism is literally a world of infinite possibility.
While various analogistic societies share in common a cosmos of infinite differences,
they are distinguished from each other by how they make sense of that chaotic world. In general,
the analogist must create meaningful similarities, associations, resemblances, and connections
within the chaotic cosmos. Descola states: “In order to reduce this dizzying atomist perspective,
the links of similarity that justify repeatedly moving along certain meaningful paths need to be
identified” (2014:205). Often, this creation of a network of resemblances leads to a stark
cosmological and metaphysical dualism. One analogic “group” is the various Nahuatl-speaking
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peoples of central Mexico. Descola states, while “Andean America would have served equally
well,” he ultimately chooses to focus on the analogism that is specific to Mexico (2014:207).
Like other analogistic societies, the Nahuas perceive of the cosmos as a chaotic habitat for living
beings with unique combinations of physicalities and interiorities. Specifically, the Nahuas
identify two types of physicalities, tanacayo and ihiyotl, and two types of interiorities, tonalli
and teyolia, all four of which contribute to “the virtually infinite variants rendered possible by
combinations of these types thus mak[ing] each entity in the world, whether human or
nonhuman, quasi-unique” (2014:212). Furthermore, within this schematization is a “thick web of
correspondences and mutual influences” not just involving living beings and their interconnected
relations with one another but “all levels of the cosmos,” including “social strata, occupations,
specializations, atmospheric phenomena, foodstuffs, medicaments, deities, celestial bodies,
illnesses, temporal divisions, sites, and cardinal points” (2014:217). In this way, the multiplicity
of beings is infinitely compounded and then amplified by an endless dynamism of interactions
and relations.
One critical aspect of Nahua analogism is nagualism. The term “nagualism” has been
used by English-speaking scholars since at least since the 1820s. In a paper read to the American
Philosophical Society in 1894, Brinton says: “The words, a nagual, nagualism, a nagualist, have
been current in English prose for more than seventy years” (12). Since the Conquest, the term
“nagualism” has been associated with a “belief” in a “guardian spirit” (Saler 1964:306; Villas
Rojas 1947:584, 584; Brinton 1894:21). This might not have always been the case though.
Brinton notes how “none of the dialects of the specifically Aztec or Aztecan stock languages do
we find the word nagual in the sense in which it is employed [today]” (1894:13). Klein et al.
confirm that Mexicanists still do not know for sure what nagual meant pre-Contact (2002:392).
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Nevertheless, the word has a very long history in academic literature. This history has led to a
fairly befuddled meaning over time, and Descola confirms “So many different factors have been
intermingled in the use of the term and over such a long period” (2014:214). In light of this,
Desclola clarifies the meaning of the term and provides a list of its components. These
components include an “animal double whose life cycle runs parallel to that of a human,” the
tōnalpōhualli 260-day calendar, “sorcerers” that can transform their physicality, the animal into
which those sorcerers incorporate themselves, and lastly “a component of a human person”
(2014:214). But in a more general sense, nagualism involves certain living beings or aspects of
the cosmos introducing “a foreign element of a generally physical nature (ihiyotl) onto an
independent entity” (2014:216). Descola provides an example of such an influence, stating that a
deity, animal, or the dead can assume the form of an animal (or in the case of animals, another
animal) specifically by infiltrating and possessing the body of another living being (2014:215).
Meanwhile he contrasts this with “tonalism,” which is another aspect of Nahua analogism.
Rather than involving a “transitory and intentional” link between two beings (such as
possession), tonalism involves an “involuntary and permanent” link (2014:215). This type of link
is found with the tona, an animal that is born on the same day as a person. Because they share the
same calendric day sign, a part of the human’s tonalli, which in certain instances can be
translated as a “destiny,” “installs itself in his animal alter ego…until death” (2014:215). While
nagualism and tonalism are different, their combination “amplifies the effect of multiplicity
already engendered in normal circumstances by the huge number of combinations between the
many different kinds of components that make up individuals” (2014:216). This Nahua
analogism is therefore extremely complex (at least from a Western perspective), yet serves well
as an example of a schema that sees multiplicity of differences in both physicality and interiority.
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The Case for a K’iche’an Animist Theory
Many scholars have applied nagualism, and by extension analogism, to the Mayas. As far
back as 1894, Brinton describes nagualism as a “universal belief” even “among the Maya tribes
of Yucatan and Guatemala” (1894:33). This assumption of a universal nagualism held by the
Mayas has continued to the present, though the assumption has updated its terminology with the
times. In 1998, Monaghan argues that the Nahua concepts of tonalli, vach, pixan, and the nagual
are a “Mesoamerican notion” that apply to the Mayas just as much as to Nahuatl-speakers
(1998:141-144). And Descola (2014) frequently connects the Mayas to Nahua analogism using
cherry-picked data in one-liner references (2014:209, 211, 219). But no matter the terminology
nor the time period, the implication is the same: the Mayas are nagualists. Yet even in 1964 Saler
astutely observed how ethnographers were “employing the term [nagual] generically even
where, properly speaking, the native vocabularies themselves may lack it” (1964:307). Klein et
al. also lament the reckless application of the word (2002:392). Nagual is a Nahuatl term, and yet
ethnographers have historically viewed it as a “universal” concept readily applied to any group in
Mesoamerica. This faulty and extremely outdated assumption continues to have an effect on
scholarship today, leading scholars such as Descola (2014) and Prufer and Dunham (2009) to
view Nahua analogism as a pan-Mesoamerican feature. Even Sparks is guilty of this assumption,
stating: “As a Mesoamerican people, the Maya shared in a set of cultural traits concentrated in
the areas of present-day central and southern Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, and western Honduras
and El Salvador” (2019:37, emphasis added). Only recently have some begun to consider the
Mayas within an animist theory (Pankey 2013; Permanto 2015; Harrison-Buck 2012). 15 I argue

It should be noted that these authors, at most, merely acknowledge that the Mayas had an animist ontology
centered around metaphysical renewal. None of these authors attempt to analyze this ontology any further.
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that the Mayas are not nagualists or analogists or a Nahua cultural spin-off, but in fact are
distinctly and uniquely Mayan. I argue that the Mayas are specifically animists.
While Viveiros’ Amerindian cosmopolitical theory is based on specific analysis of the
indigenous of the Amazonian lowlands, its articulation of a uniquely Amerinidan animism serves
as an excellent model for such a K’iche’an ontology, especially when coupled with Descola’s
analysis of an animism grounded in a relational schema of exchange. This relational schema
distinguishes the 16th century Tupinambá from 16th century K’iche’. The Tupian groups of
coastal Brazil had a relational schema based in “predation,” which fosters a society founded in
vendetta warfare and cannibalism. Meanwhile, the schema of the K’iche’ is founded in
“obligatory exchange,” which fosters a society to “strive to respect such obligations meticulously
in all their interactions with other inhabitants of the cosmos” (2013:345). Unlike the predation
schema, which supports an imbalanced exchange system involving a predator taking something
from prey (their body for sustenance, their life for vengeance, &c.), the exchange schema
supports a balanced exchange system. Undergirding this schema is a system of renewal founded
in the the daily movement of the sun, the growth cycles of corn, and the cyclical solar calendar.
The 16th century highland Mayas perceived time as a cyclical movement through stages
of birth, death, and rebirth. Descola explicitly states that this conception of time is an animist
one:
The fertilizing energy that emanates from Father Sun animates the entire cosmos and,
through this cycle of fertilization, gestation, and growth, of humans, animals, and plants,
ensures their vital continuity. […] However, the quantity of energy produced by Sun is
finite and is deployed in an immense closed circuit that encompasses the entire biosphere.
To avoid entropic losses, exchanges of energy between he various occupants and regions
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of the world therefore have to be organized in such a way that the quantities of energy
that humans extract can subsequently be reinjected into the circuit. (2014:346)
This conception of time precisely describes the 16th century highland Mayas, whose conceptions
of time are founded on the cycles of corn and the sun. The sun was particularly important since it
created time and space. In Maya thought, history is divided into a number of eras or epochs
called “suns.” When each sun dies, the world dies. A new sun is later born, and with it, a new
world dawns also (Christenson 2016:124). The only way to keep the sun alive was by extracting
energy and offering it to the gods; these offering included human blood taken through autosacrifice and human sacrifice. Christenson notes that when Alvarrado and the Spanish destroyed
Q’umarkaj, the Mayas believed the sun had died and the world had ended, and that a new epoch
had begun (2016:124). This why the appearance of the first dawn is such a central moment in the
Popol Wuj: the sun is the giver of time (Christenson 2003:228-232). The Mayas were animists
who used exchange in order to, literally, buy themselves more time.
The Nahuas meanwhile, though seeming to share the same conception of cosmology, are
demonstrably analogic in their ontology. According to Descola, analogic societies tend to
conceive of space as being symmetrical. He states that analogist systems emphasize “special and
temporal symmetries” in which “quarters, cardinal points, and levels all reflect one another”
(2014:276, 277). This is visually illustrated by the Nahua themselves in the Codex Mendoza,
specifically in folio 2r. The folio depicts the island upon which Tenochtitlan would later be
founded, and the island is divided into four quadrants by the crossing of rivers (Coe and Koontz
2018:63). According to Anawalt, Huizilopochtli commanded the Mexica to divide their city into
four main wards named Moyotla, Teopantlaza, Aztacualco, and Cuepopan (1997:4). The
divisions depicted on folio 2r are perfectly symmetrical and correspond to the cardinal points,
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fitting Descola’s description of the analogist. Coe and Koontz affirm as much, stating “the
Aztecs thought of the world in terms of the cardinal directions, each of which was assigned a
specific color and a specific tree on the upper branches of which perched a distinctive bird.
Where the central axis passed through was the Old Fire [g]od” (2013:214). On a less overt scale,
Taube mentions that “the Nahua would place small idols or ‘stones of good color’ at the four
corners of the [Templo Mayor]. Building L in the Aztec Templo Mayor precinct contained…five
jade beads forming a quincunx oriented to the four quarters and world center” (2005:25). Yet not
only was space conceived symmetrically but also hierarchically. The Nahua cosmos was one that
was analogical and by extension symmetrical.
Moreover, the analogic Nahua cosmos existed within a system of duality. Descola affirms
that because analogic systems can only make sense of reality by identifying correspondences and
differences, it can encourage a “dualist organization” involving “a classificatory order for the
moieties and quarters, which is structured around a series of pairs, the first term of which
symbolically predominates over the other one: east over west, right over left, masculine over
feminine, upper over lower” (2013:299). There is an extensive literature on the duality of the
Mexica, and so only a brief mention should suffice. One explicit example is the Templo Mayor,
which Bernadino de Sahagún documented before the Spanish demolished it and used its stone to
build a church. The Templo functioned as a temple of duality, with one half devoted to the sun
and war god Huitzilopochtli and the other half to the rain and fertility god Tlaloc (Sahagún
2012:175-176). As Rideout notes, “Agriculture and bloodshed, the foundation of the light and
dark twins, respectively, are two very opposing ideals and form the two halves of the
fundamental base of Aztec society and economy” (2015:60). Moreover, he notes how each half
of the temple featured ornamentation that was associated with each respective god, further
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emphasizing the dualistic contrast (2015:60). A second example involves the dual-sex godgoddess of duality, Ometecuhtli Omecíhuatl, which are referenced in various Nahuatl canciones
(León-Portilla 1990:83; 1980:201). This deity was so central to the Mexica that their own poetphilosophers describe the duality god-goddess as the origin of cosmic forces, supporter and
governor of the universe, origin of the gods, creator of humans, and even self-created and selfactuated ex nihilo (León-Portilla 1990:29, 45, 59, 84, 87, 95, 235). In these ways the Conquest
and pre-Conquest Nahuas are demonstrably dualistic and ultimately analogic.
The highland Maya did not perceive of a quadrisected cosmos within a dualistic system.
Rather, they perceived it as a single East-West axis based on the arching movement of the sun.
Not many colonial Maya dictionaries seem to list the cardinal points. But the Thesavrvs Verborv
lists “Oriente” as “Chi r’elabal 3ih” and “Ocçidente” as “Ch’u kahibal 3ih” (1983:377, 383).
The word for “east,” relib’al q’iij, 16 translates to mean “the sun’s coming out.” The word of
“west” is slightly more tricky. El Vocabulario en lengua ꜭiche otlatecas defines “kaɧ” as “bajar,
o descender” (2017:270). So uqajib’al q’iij 17 translates as “the suns’s going down.” Watanabe
states that in modern Mam, the word for “east” is ok took q’iij (“when the sun rises [enters]”),
but that the Mam also refer to “east” as simply ook (“enter”) and “west” as eel (“go out”)
(1983:719). The Mam’s use of directionality has not changed since the Conquest era, since it
also perceives space in an east-west axis. Watanabe further adds that the word for “north” is
jaaw (“go up”), and the word for “south” is kubni (“go down”) (1983:712). He notes that while
the words for east and west are used exclusively to refer to the movements of the sun, “north and
south are only secondary meanings for the ‘directions’ up and down – these latter also referring

r-el-ib’al q’ij
3sPOSS-VI:leave-VN N:sun, day
17
u-qaj-ib’al q’ij
3sPOSS-VI:descend-VN N:sun, day
16
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to the movement of the sun” (1983:713). Only the secondary meanings of jaaw and kubni refer
to north and south because they are secondary to the primary axis, which is based on the
movement of the sun. In this way, time, space, and motion are inextricably linked. Watanabe is
careful to explain how there is no dualism in this model. He states that “the line traversed by the
sun on its passage through the zenith does not physically divide the sky into two symmetrical
quadrants; the sun passes through the zenith directly to the east and west only at the equator”
(1983:721). In other words, the cosmos is not a dualistic composition of an overworld bluevaulted sky and a dark underworld sky. Rather, the sun is born at dawn and dies in the evening
(1983:721). Each day, the sun is born, then dies, and is reborn the following day. The link
between sun and time (i.e. the 24-hour day) is emphasized in the word q’iij alone, which refers to
both “sun” and “day.”
Ixiim (“maíz seco en grano”) 18 is the second aspect to renewal and is completely
complimentary with the sun. Corn is the primary source of sustenance and is so central to the
Maya that Guatemala is also called Iximulew (“corn land”). There is an entire corpus of words
based on corn, including nouns such as ija’ (“seed corn for planting”), ab’ix (“cornfield” or
“milpa”), jach’ (“corn harvest”), raxwa’ch (“black corn”), tz’alik (“fresh corn husks used to wrap
corn-dough tamales”), and wa (“corn-based foods”), but also verbs such as -jach’(o) (“to harvest
corn”) and -chaq (“to grind corn”) (Christenson n.d.). There are four types of corn grown in
Iximulew, namely black, yellow, red, and white. According to Watanabe, presently among the
highland Mam Maya of Santiago Chimaltenango, “Chimaltecos recognize two principle types of
maize, white saq and yellow q’an, each divided into ‘winter’ and ‘summer’ varieties”
(1992:131). This is reflected in the pre-Columbian K’iche’ play the Rab’inal Achi, which

18

Translation provided by Mondloch (2020:391).
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mentions “the yellow-colored, white ears of ripe corn / yellow sustenance / white sustenance,”
without giving mention to the other two varieties (Tedlock 2003:56). Like the sun, corn also goes
through cycles of birth, death, and rebirth. In the Popol Wuj, humans are created from q’ana jal
(“yellow ears of corn”) and saqi jal (“white ears of corn”) (Mondloch and Carmack 2018:152155). Thus ixim, the sustenance that feeds people and the substance that is a central aspect of the
cosmological cycle of death and renewal, is also the basic composition of people’s bodies. All of
these rich associative meanings of ixiim culminate in the iconic corn god depicted in preColumbian Mayan art. Miller describes the corn god as follows: “Like maize itself, the Maize
[g]od moves through the cycle of life: in one season, he is a handsome young man, alive and in
motion; in another, he is decapitated, his harvested head put on a plate as an offering”
(2002:160). The corn god is cyclically and eternally sacrificed as an “offering,” but his death is
always temporary, since the god will inevitably return by rebirth.
Humans have the obligation to perpetuate the cycles of time; they accomplish this
through a complex set of rituals including (but not exclusively) bloodletting and human sacrifice.
Viveiros was possibly the first to suggest the Mayas of Mesoamerica as potential animists, but
his expertise lies in Amazonia, and so he is left to muse that “elaboration of a classical sacrificial
system” within an animist ontology is “quite difficult” (2017:157). While this elaboration is
certainly difficult, a connection is feasible. Within an animistic system, all beings have the same
interiority while all having a multiplicity of different interiorities. For the Mayas, their animism
was founded on a relationality of exchange that manifested in a renewal-based cosmology.
Renewal-based ritual was therefore prevalent because the cosmological renewal of the sun (i.e.
time, direction, and space) depended on it. This became especially critical during the New Year,
when the cycles of ixiim (“corn”) and the cycles of le q’iij (“the sun”) converge in an annual
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restart. The sun returns to the same noon-time position in the sky that it had 365 days ago, and
the corn’s growing season is ready to begin anew. The 365-day calendar therefore became
extremely important to the Conquest and pre-Conquest highland Mayas. By extension, the New
Year became one of the most important events in society, if not the most important. Colonial
Spanish chroniclers observed a gamut of New Year rituals, which included the priests and nobles
holding feasts and engaging in debauchery, rulers and other K’iche’ Mayas performing in
ritualized dramas (like the Rab’inal Achi), and priests striking a new fire onto xk’ub’ (a set of
three large, flat stones usually used for cooking) (Christenson 2016: 51, 91; Christenson n.d.).
Another critical New Year ritual was the ball game. Athletes would play a ritualized ball game
“not played for simple entertainment” but rather “as a means of regenerating the world” with
players symbolically filling the roles of gods, “thus becoming engaged in a larger conflict
between the Lords of Life and the Lords of Death” (Christenson 2016:90). It is worth noting that
the K’iche’ built more ballcourts than any other Mayas group in the centuries immediately
preceding the Conquest, demonstrating the importance that the game held for the highland Maya
(Christenson 2016:95). A final ritual involved a “spring cleaning” en masse, which entailed the
K’iche’s spending several days sweeping the streets and plazas and cleaning the temples. They
then would decorate the temples with flowers (Christenson 2016:98). That does not mean that
there is a dualism between life and death. Rather, Christenson states that they are complimentary
to a larger whole, stating, “A god cannot be reborn without passing through old age, weakness,
and ultimately death. Both life and death must dance together on the great stage of the world or
the cycles of the seasons would not continue on their endless spiraling rotations” (2016:203).
Rituals perpetuate these cycles of death and rebirth. One of the most central rituals famously
involved blood sacrifice.
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The sacrifices were not exclusive to humans, suggesting an animism that did not privilege
the interiority of humans over non-humans. Pages 25-28 of the Dresden Codex are especially
helpful in visualizing this sacrificial ritual for rebirth. The codex dates to the 13th or 14th century,
making is a genuine glimpse into pre-Columbian Maya thought and society. Pages 25-28 are
called the “New Years” pages, serve as a “yearbearer almanac…concerned with rituals to ensure
adequate rainfall and thereby an abundant crop [which is] suggested by the hieroglyphic captions
to the lower register, which give prognostications for each year” (Vail & Looper 2015:127). The
pages depict four separate years, each represented by a god who presents an offering to a tree.
Taube observes that each god presents a different offering, namely copal (incense), a turkey, a
fish, and a bundled deer haunch (2012:15). Furthermore, Vail and Looper notes that the trees
mark the beginning of a new year, just as in the Chilam Balam new trees grew after the old world
was destroyed (2015:126). Both Carlson and Taube connect these “New Years” pages to page
74, which depicts the end of an epoch by a cataclysmic flood (Carlson 2015:208; Taube
2012:16). Significantly, these do not include depictions of human sacrifice, but of animal
sacrifice. This suggests that the sacrifices are founded on an animist ontology wherein all
animals are valid because they all share the same interiority. As for the copal, Prufer et al. note
that when copal was burned, the offering became sustenance for the gods, in the same way that
corn was sustenance to humans (2003:201). Even plants could be sacrificed to be nourishment to
the gods. Copal, for instance, is a tree resin. Furthermore, Morehart et al. state that pine is the
most common type of wood recovered in lowland Maya sites, adding that the Maya burned pine
torches as a “sacrificial food for the deities” (2005:268). Watanabe documents how this
continues with the highland Mam of Santiago Chimaltenango who feed their saints candles, rum,
and incense, because if they neglected to feed them, then “‘God’ – and by implication, the saints
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– ‘would have no tortillas,’ and they would starve” (1992:75, 76). This explanation for feeding
the saints exactly mirrors the Tupinambá of Brazil, returning us to the Amerindian
cosmopolitical theory of Viveiros. The Amazonianist states that within this Amerindian variety
of animism, there is a “reflexive genre of humanity, given that it is defined by the fact that two
different species that are each necessarily human in their own eyes can never simultaneously be
so in the other’s” (2017:152). This is demonstrated by the Tupinambá, who say that jaguars drink
manioc beer when a jaguar is drinking blood. Or when Hans Staden tells a Tupinambá that “a
senseless animal hardly ever eats its fellow; should one human then eat another?” the Tupinambá
responds by saying that he is a jaguar (2008:91). Viveiros explains this by stating that there is no
“fixed point of view between beings,” but rather every living being sees itself as “human” and
relates to other human beings by “relational multiplicities” (2017:157). From the perspective of
the jaguar, it is a human drinking manioc beer, not a jaguar drinking blood. Or from the
perspective of the Mayan saints, they are humans eating corn tortillas, not saints eating candles
and rum. Fausto cites this as a “common ‘mode of identification’ between humans and
nonhumans across the region but different ‘modes of relation’ subject to regional and historical
variation” (2007:500). Geographically, the highland Maya are nowhere remotely close to the
Amazon basin, and yet they share what appears to be the multinaturalism of the Tupinambá.
From the perspective of the Mam, the gods are eating souls as nourishment; from the perspective
of the gods, they are humans eating corn.
The shamanic ajq’iij (“daykeeper”) played an important role not just in feeding the gods
but in ensuring that the world was renewed every New Year’s day. This shamanic figure is
unique because he is human; there are no jaguar shamans or quetzal shamans or fish shamans.
The reason for this seems to be one based in physicality. In the Popol Wuj, before there were
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humans, the gods created the winaq poy (“wooden people”) (Mondloch and Carmack 2018:38).
The people turn out to be wicked and forgetful of the gods and so are destroyed. But when they
were first made, the god Juraqan says: “Chiqawinaqb’itoj, chiqaqinaqtz’aqoj ta chik tzuqul,
q’o’l. Kojsik’ix taj, kojna’b’ax taj puch” (“Haragmos de nuevo a la gente formada, gagamos a la
gente construida; los alimentadores, los sustentadores”) (Mondloch and Carmack 2018:36, 37).
From the mouths of the gods themselves, the purpose of humanity is to fulfill a unique role as
sustainers. Even before the creation of the world, the gods wonder: “Jupacha’ ta chawaxoq, ta
saqira puch? Apachinaq tzuqul, q’o’l chuxoq?” (“¿Cómo será la creación? ¿Quién llegará a ser
el alimentador y sustentador?”) (Mondloch and Carmack 2018:30, 31). From before the
foundations of the world were laid, the gods had intended humans to serve as sustainers and
providers. The difference between humans and the winaq poy, and the difference between
humans and all other beings, is that humans are made of corn and water. While the flesh is made
of q’ana jal, saqi jal (“yellow corn, white corn”), the kik’el (“blood”) is made from ja’ (“water”).
Thus the Popol Wuj states: “Ja’ k’ut ukik’el, ukik’el winaq xuxik” (“Y el agua fue su sangre;
llegó a ser sangre”). In animism, the interiorities of all living beings are the same, but the
physicalities are different. Animals, birds, fish, and plants can all serve as sacrifices to the gods
because they have a soul that can become sustenance, but only humans have the unique
physicality that gives them the role of worshipper and ritual actualizer. The distinction between
winaq (“humans”) and chikop (“animals”) is explained by the gods after they curse the animals:
“iwecha’, ik’uxu’n, iwarab’al iyakalib’al, x iwech wi, mi xe’uxik siwan, k’eche’laj rumal mawi
xutzin qaq’ijilo’xik, mawi ix sik’iy qe” (“Su comida, su alimentación, su lugar de dormir y
guarida permanente llegarán a ser los barrancos y los bosques. Eso es porque no realizaron
nuestra adoración, ni fuimos invocados por ustedes”) (Mondloch and Carmack 2018:34, 35).
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While all living beings have the same interiority, humans are unique because of their physical
composition of corn and water. This uniqueness distinguishes them as the true “humans” with
the duty to worship the gods.
Evidence suggests that the pre-Columbian rulers themselves served as shamanic figures.
As Scherer notes, these shamanic rituals “are inherently ‘bodycentric’: costumes are worn,
gestures repeated, feasting and fasting occurs, and so forth” (2015:8). Rose echoes the same
observation, stating that “During these rituals there was also the giving of offerings, which
usually included clothing and other adornments, copal incense, and in many cases, the sacrifice
of royal blood to feed the gods” (2017:64). She adds that the role of shamans was to serve as a
mediator between humans and gods and, as their “main responsibility,” “to care for the gods in
ceremonies of renewal”; they accomplished this through “god-conjuring,” or making the gods
present in visions through blood-letting and ingestion of hallucinogenic substances (2017:64, 65,
102, 128). These interpretations are largely based on careful observations of pre-Columbian
Mayan art and their inscriptions. And while art decipherment is often speculative, full of
“possiblies” and “perhapses,” Lintel 25 at the site Yaxchilán serves as a concrete example of a
ritual performed by a ruler. The lintel depicts the female ruler Ix K’ab’al Xook summoning a
deity who emerges from the mouth of a flying centipede with a segmented body and many eyes.
There are two bowls, one in Ix K’ab’al Xook’s hand and one at her feet, filled with bloodsplattered pages; the centipede flies directly over the bowl on the floor. The lintel is accompanied
with glyphs, a portion of which translate as: “Ix K’ab’al Xook makes an offering,” and “she
summoned the spirit of the scepter,” and again “she summoned the scepter, the weapon and
shield of the flaming, smoking Thunderbolt” (Tedlock 2011:102, 103). The glyphs clearly
convey that the ruler summoned the deity through bloodletting ritual. A similar feat is recorded
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at the temple of Wakaj Chan, which is part of the Cross Complex at Palenque. In the temple’s
main sanctuary, the glyphs relate a narrative involving two gods named Cormorant and Corn
Silk. A portion of the glyphs are translated as follows: “And then he [Corn Silk] arrived at
invisibility. On 9 Wind 15 Deer, he touched the earth, he was invisible. Cormorant fasted, she let
blood, 2 times a mother” (Tedlock 2011:71, 72). Tedlock interprets the glyphs to meant that the
goddess Cormorant is conducting bloodletting to make Corn Silk, who is the planet Mars,
reappear in the night sky. And like Ix K’ab’al Xook at Yaxchilán, the glyphs state that
Cormorant also receives the sak huun (“white paper”) for bloodletting ritual: “After she was
born, the white paper was handed to her, to Cormorant, on 9 Wind” (Tedlock 2011:67, 72). Thus
it is the Mayan stone carvers themselves who affirm the role that rulers played in rituals of
renewal.
Such inscriptions are ubiquitous in the lowlands. Zamora confirms as much, stating that
“On the surface, most Maya inscriptions conform themselves to the pattern of…a powerful ruler
erecting a monument and stating the date of his deed. However, we have seen that this vision is
partial. […] The true protagonist of inscription in most cases are the consecration rituals of the
very objects that bear the inscriptions” (2016:79-80). Zamora adds that the common theme in
many of these inscriptions is one of the “divine king, master of ritual relationships” (2016:82).
This role of the Maya shaman is not like the analogic Nahua “sorcerer,” which Descola describes
as “reputed to be able to change themselves into an animal or a ball of fire” and is “incorporated”
into other beings, usually animals (2014:214). 19 Rather, the Mayan ruler is much more closely
aligned to the “shaman” of Viveiros. This shaman is merely an enlightened figure who can
establish relationships with other beings by occupying their subjective point of view. Such a feat
Villa Rojas describes the nagual in similar terms: “In most cases the nagual is thought of as an animal, a dog, a
lizard, or a hawk. […] Other are a ball of fire of three different kinds: red, yellow or green” (1947:583).
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is possible because all beings share the same interiority; they all see themselves as “human.” But
the Mayan rulers have an added role, which is to ensure that ritual exchange occurs so that the
gods and the world can be renewed. Communication with the gods is only the means of
accomplishing this task, not the ultimate purpose of the ritual itself.
While a relationality of obligatory exchange shaped the renewal rituals performed by
Mayan shamanic figures, there was an additional, secondary relationality based in “predation” as
described by Descola (2014). This is not contradictory to Descola, who himself demonstrates
with the Tukano groups of the Amazonian lowlands that predation can function as a secondary
schema within a larger schema of exchange (2013:360). Descola outlines a relationality of
predation as “the obligation to acquire from others the individuals, substances, and principles of
identity that were reputed to be necessary for the perpetuation of the self” (2014:338). Such a
relationality schema can easily foster and support societies based in vendetta warfare. The
Tupinambá of Brazil were such a group. Hans Staden shows how this vendetta-based warfare not
only manifested in ritualized dialogue between captor and captive each swearing vengeance upon
the other, but that their society was so saturated in vengeance that women would pick out the lice
from each other’s hair and eat them as act of revenge against the lice for eating their heads
(2008:54, 91, 121). Moreover, Staden explains that their cannibalism was rooted in the desire for
vengeance (2008:127). Viveiros affirms Staden’s observations and even builds on them, stating
that “the point was to die (preferably in enemy hands) in order to bring vengeance into being,
and thus bring into being the future” (2011:71). Thus vengeance became a self-perpetuating
cycle that, by merit of its own cyclical tug-of-war, shaped Tupian conception of time.
Predation was not the primary type of relationality for the Maya but was instead
secondary to the overarching relationality of exchange. This fostered a system of ritualized slave
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capture and human sacrifice, not to “perpetuate the self,” but to perpetuate time and the sun as a
ritual of renewal. This dynamic became particularly ritualized between the victorious warrior and
his defeated captive. This ritualized relationship is portrayed in the K’iche’an play Rab’inal
Achi, which focuses on the dialogic exchanges between the victorious warrior Rab’inal Achi
(“Man [of] Rab’inal”) and the defeated captive Cawek. Their exchanges include highly
formalized and ceremonial monologues, with Rab’inal Achi repeatedly addressing Cawek as
“Brave man / prisoner / captive” and telling him: “Because this is where we chop clear through /
your root, sir / your trunk, sir / here at the navel of the sky / navel of the earth” (Tedlock
2003:32, 63, 70). This predatory relationship forces the captive Cawek into humiliation. Initially,
Cawek adamantly declares “I am the brave / I am the man,” but by the end of the drama Cawek
says “Then if it comes down to bowing / if it comes down to lowering my face / very well then /
here is my way of being humble / my way of kneeling / well this is how I humble myself / this is
how I get down in the mud” (2003: 35, 91). Not long after his humiliating submission to his
captive, the ruler of the Cawuks and Rab’inals tells Cawek “and truly you are dead, sir / you are
lost” (2003:97). This humiliation of captives is well-attested even in pre-Columbian Mayan art.
At the site Bonampak, for instance, is a structure composed of three rooms; the walls of each
room are painted in murals from floor-to-ceiling. Room 2 depicts a graphic battle scene: one
warrior wears a trophy head, and another warrior drags his defeated opponent by the hair (Miller
1995). The dragging of hair is mentioned by Las Casas, who reports that slaves to be sacrificed
were seized by the hair (Christenson 2016:100). More overtly, the Bonampak’s Room 2 also
depicts bleeding, weeping slaves lying prostrate or sitting in submissive postures before a
victorious ruler (Miller 1995). The relationship between Mayan warriors and their defeated
captives is one based in humiliation. A central component of this humiliation is ritualized
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dialogue. Hans Staden recorded a ritualized dialogue among the Tupinambá, which Viveiros
calls it “the ritual drama of the execution” (Staden 2008:49, 62-64; Viveiros 2011:58-65). Still,
the dialogic content is very different between the two animist groups. The Tupinambá dialogue
of Hans Staden involves both captive and captor swearing revenge to each other, whereas the
K’iche’ dialogue of the Rab’inal Achi involves the victorious warrior coercing the captive to
admit defeat and accept humiliation and a fate of sacrifice.
Yet this was not the only facet of the relationship, at least in the case of the K’iche’ and
other highland Maya. In the Rab’inal Achi, after Cawek submits himself to a sacrificial fate, he
begins making requests. All of his requests are granted, including his request to have “thirteen
score days / thirteen score nights…to say farewell / to the face of my mountain / the face of my
valley / where I walked / where I moved” (2003:118). Moreover, because he submits himself to
be sacrificed, he is granted affinity. Before Cawek submits, Rab’inal Achi tells him: “What a
terrible joke you’re someone I ought to help out. / What a terrible joke you’re my elder brother. /
What a terrible joke you’re my younger brother” (2003:36). But later Rab’inal Achi tells Cawek
that he could become a “father-in-law” or “son-in-law” if he quietly kneels and bows before the
ruler of the Cawuks and Rab’inals and even tells Cawek: “We are elder and younger brother /
one to the other” (2003:70, 87). This ritualized treatment of captives is attested by the
corroborative colonial account of Las Casas. According to Las Casas, when Mayas were
preparing to sacrifice their captives for the New Year, they would release the captives on
temporary leave. Guards escorted the captives, but the captives were nevertheless allowed to
walk wherever they wanted in the town, feast and get drunk, and eat with whomever they
wished, including the ruler himself (Christenson 2016:97). Christenson remarks that “the
temporary release of captives intended for sacrifice and their special treatment with feasting and
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other honors indicates a reversal of societal norms” (2016:98). Like ritualized dialogic
exchanges, this reversal of norms and bestowing of affinity are both attested in the Tupinambá.
For instance, Staden reports being fed, allowed to walk through the village at his leisure, and
even being granted his own hut (2008:92). Fausto and Rodgers describe this process as
“predation-familiarization-predation,” noting that the Tupinambá would “adopt” their captives
into their families and would feed them and protect them (1999:946). Fausto notes that the
Tupinambá would insistently remind their captives that they were kin, not enemies (2007:505,
507). A part of this familiarization process involved the bestowing of affinity, often “brother-inlaw.” Fausto and Rodgers attribute this process of familiarization by adopting the enemy within a
structure of affinity as part “of a wider relational structure that involves the familiarization of
human spirits in warfare and of animal spirits in shamanism” (1999:949). In other words, this
attribution of affinity onto the captive functions within an overall animist ontology that
emphasizes understanding the other. As Viveiros puts it: “There, the other was not merely good
to think – the other was necessary for thinking” (2011:16). In the case of the K’iche’ as depicted
in the Rab’inal Achi, their animist ontology manifested primarily with a relationality based on
obligatory exchange but also in a secondary, subsidiary relationality based in predation. This
predation facilitated a ritualized dynamic between the K’iche’ captor and his captive that
included the process of understanding the other but was founded on a basic, practical method of
acquiring sacrifices to renew the world.
The K’iche’an Gods, Ancestors, and Idols
Essentially, the K’iche’an ontology is an animist one, extremely sophisticated and
incorporating aspects of a corn cult, sun cult, and a war cult. Having established this theory of
K’iche’an animism, it may now be applied to the K’iche’an k’ab’awil (“gods”), ojer winaq
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(“ancestors”), and chee’ ab’aj (“idols”). To European naturalists like Domingo de Vico, idols are
the most different of the three beings, since they are made of “dead” stone and wood. In other
words, they lacked an interiority. Meanwhile, the gods and ancestors seem most similar to each
other, since they are ethereal, invisible beings with agency. Vico conflates the gods with demons,
but even demons have an interiority of reason, unlike the idols which have no interiority
whatsoever. It is for this reason that modern researchers often conflate “gods” and “deified
ancestors” when discussing Mayan rituals (Lorenzen 2006:26; Morehart et al. 2005:265;
Newman 2019:833; Rose 2017:3; Taube 2005:32; Wanyerka 2003:219; Zamora 2016:86). Both
the colonial Spanish and various modern scholars fail to understand the K’iche’an understanding
of “gods,” “ancestors,” and “idols,” because of an ontology grounded in naturalistic assumptions.
There is a clear logic to K’iche’an animism, just not a Western logic.
In animism, all beings share the same interiority while having different physicalities. This
makes distinguishing between living beings extremely easy, since one only needs to observe
their physical appearances to tell the difference (though any of the senses will do). To the
naturalist, these “gods” are ethereal demons, utterly metaphysical and thus lacking any
physicality at all. For the K’iche’s, the gods do in fact have physicality. Here again the animism
of the K’iche’s shares a parallel with the animism of the Tupinambá. In her study of modern
Tupinambá diet, Matos Viegas states that the Tupinambá consider diet a type of physicality. She
states that the Tupinambá “explicitly drew a contrast between the Tupinambá of Olivença and
indigenous people living on the other side of the mountains, based precisely on eating habits”
(2012:548). The importance of diet as a type of physicality cannot be understated. She continues
that those who have a different diet have a different body, concluding: “Those who have a
different body because they ate raw food were, thus, ‘other people,’ meaning enemies (herege)”
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(2012:548). Viveiros concurs that diet can serve as a type of physicality in animism (2017:69,
73). For the K’iche’s, their gods ate blood, something that is well attested in the Popol Wuj,
glyphic inscriptions at the Temple of the Foliated Cross, and by the Spanish chroniclers. Humans
fed them especially to ensure that they would return on New Year’s day after dying. Christenson
affirms as much, stating: “Maya gods are not all powerful or immortal. A god cannot be reborn
without passing through old age, weakness, and ultimately death. Both life and death must dance
together…or the cycles of the seasons would not continue” (2016:203). Thus while the gods
maintained the cosmos throughout the year, their power was finite and required humans to
reinject them with renewed life every year, ultimately fitting Descola’s model of an animist
ontology based in a relationality of obligatory exchange (2014:346). The relationship between
gods and humans is articulated well by Christenson: “With the close of the five dangerous days
at the end of the calendar year, their rulers had successfully vanquished death as proxies for the
gods and the world had been restored with the capacity to nourish and sustain life” (2016:110).
The gods are not immortal tyrants like Zeus, or evil liars like Satan’s demons, or even the allpowerful Mexica god-goddess of duality. The gods are collaborators with humans who each
assist the other to ensure time, the cosmos, and all living beings continue to exist.
The ancestors are not to be conflated with the gods, as so many scholars frequently do,
nor are they to be conflated with humans, as Vico and the missionaries clearly did. Rather,
between ancestors, gods, and idols, the ancestors are perhaps the most complex to understand
from a naturalist perspective. Because the colonial Spanish chroniclers were fixated on the idols
and gods of the K’iche’s, much less is said about the ancestors. Yet ancestors nevertheless held a
central importance to the K’iche’s and other highland Maya, and ethnographic data affirms that
this importance still remains today. First, ancestors are not fully human, at least corporeally. For
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instance, Christenson note that the highland Tz’utujil Maya of Santiago Atitlán offer white
candles to both gods and ancestors (2016:275). This is similar to the offerings made to gods,
Vogt shows that the highland Tzotzil-speaking Maya of Zincantán also offer burning candles to
their deities (1976:3). In this way, the ancestors have at least one difference in physicality from
humans, namely that they eat candles. At the same time, nowhere in my readings did I find an
account of blood sacrifice to ancestors. This includes the present era, when ethnographers still
record blood sacrifices of animals to gods or for cosmic renewal (Christenson 2016:178; Vogt
1976:52, 92, 93). If the colonial Maya had been sacrificing human blood to their ancestors, the
Christian catechisms do not mention it and instead focus their efforts on decrying idolatry and
the pagan worship of demons and false gods. When the Christian manuscripts like the Theologia
Indorum do address ichuch iqaqaw (“your ancestors”), they typically associate them with
original sin rather than sinful worship as false gods. This suggests that Spanish recognized a deep
reverence for ancestors, but nothing pagan. Watanabe notes the tragic effects that this Spanish
portrayal of ancestors had on the Maya, stating how the Mam now wrestle with the “the shadowy
transgressions of their ancestors’ past” and more potently how “the past remains associated with
the sinfulness of unsaved ancestors” (1992:194, 202). This suggests that the ancestors, while not
physically the same as their descendants, share much more in common with them than they do
with the gods. Even on a matter of diet, Tedlock documents how the ajq’ijaab’ (“day keepers”)
of Chichicastenango would pass ija’ (“corn seed for planting”) or jal (“fresh ears of corn”)
through copal smoke as a way to feed their ancestors (1993:114). The ancestors, like their human
descendants, eat corn.
The ancestors more resemble humans than the gods, but the ancestors are nevertheless
still separate from humans. Ultimately, the biggest difference between ancestors and their
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descendants is a plain one: the ancestors lived in the past but are dead now, and their descendants
are still living. This simple distinction between humans and ancestors is best articulated through
a brief passage in Maya Saints and Souls:
A Chimalteco cries beside a grave of a young niece. ‘I’m crying because of the sadness,
not because I’m drunk,’ he insists. ‘I was the one who gave her her name.’ It is hard not
to sense how little separates the living from the dead. (Watanabe 1992:40)
In general, the ancestors are largely considered generally and amorphously as qanaan, qataat or
qati’t, qamam rather than as a list of specific names. Still, Tedlock notes that the K’iche’s
acknowledge “both the good and evil done by the ancestors while they were living,” and she
states that “most clans retain the knowledge of a founding ancestor” (1993:25, 142). Therefore
the ancestors are not stripped of any individuality, but this individuality is less emphasized than
the intricate genealogy trees and genealogical obsessions of the West. Rather than emphasize a
linear list of names, the K’iche’s and other highland Mayas emphasize the corporeality of their
ancestors. Because naturalists like Vico perceive of living beings as unique interiorities
inhabiting more or less the same physicality, an ancestor is perceived as a soul “freed” from the
body, rendering the body meaningless since the person is now “up there,” “in Heaven,” “above,”
or any other euphemism for not being physical anymore. Within an animist ontology, physicality
is the only way to distinguish one being from another. For the K’iche’s, the corporeality still
mattered because it was the body, not the “soul,” that endowed the ancestors with identity, which
is why gravesites are much more revered among them than among Westerners, who often
describe them as eerie and avoid them.
The ancestor’s corporeality (i.e. their physicalities) separates them from gods and
humans. They are “dead,” but still alive and able to be communicated with by trained ajq’ijaab’
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(“day keepers”) (Tedlock 1993:160). They are living beings, just as alive as humans and gods,
only with a unique set of physicalities that distinguish them as the ojer winaq (“ancestors”). This
physicality is twofold: part involves the physical body itself and part involves the body’s burial
into the earth. Regarding the body itself, its importance is clearly stated in the K’iche’ drama
Rab’inal Achi. Cawek knows he is going to be executed by his captors, and so he says:
Then won’t this also [referring to his skull] become a work of some kind / an artifact /
this bone of my crown / bone of my head / carved in back / and carved in front? / Then
it’ll be sent down there / to my mountain / my valley / ending up as an even trade for /
five score seeds of pataxte / five score seeds of cacao / paid for by my children / my sons
/ at my mountain / my valley. / My descendants will hear / my grandsons will hear: /
“This is the skull of our own grandfather / our own father.” My descendants will hear /
this resemblance of me / by my children / by my sons / as long as there are days / as long
as there is light. (Tedlock 2003:105)
The physical remains of Cawek are so critical to his being that his descendants will treasure his
skull “as long as there are days” and continually pass the skull down from generation to
generation in memory of him.
Yet this is not the only physicality of an ancestor; the other is their burial in earth. The
importance of burials is extremely evident in the ethnographic record. According to Christenson,
both colonial and modern churches contain a number of burials in a space beneath the church
(2016:169, 170). Tedlock documents how the ajq’ijaab’ (“day keepers”) would enter a pew near
the center of the church’s nave, “where the ancestors are buried beneath the flood,” and would
formally communicate with them (1993:69). She adds that in 1954, one Catholic priest “felt
confident he had converted enough ‘pagans,’ [and] he dared to lock the doors of the church on 8
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Batz, the initation day for new…daykeepers (ajkij*),” which spurred a delegation “primarily of
patrilineage heads” to threaten to kill the priest (1993:41). It is therefore clearly evident that in
K’iche’an ontology, one of the physical characters of ancestors was conceived in terms of space.
This connection of ancestors to burial space beneath the earth led to a further association of
ancestors with mountains and Xib’alb’a (“place of fear,” the underworld beneath the earth). In
the case of mountains, Christenson states that one Maya told him at a ceremony that “the most
powerful” ancestors live in the center of the mountain of Paq’alib’al, and the portal into it is a
cave there (2016:250). Additionally, Tedlock mentions Socop, which is “the sacred western
mountain of the [K’iche’an] ancestors” (1993:124). And in a similar vein, Watanabe mentions
the taajwa witz (“owner or master of the mountain”) of the Mam, which were formerly “actual
personages” but now “personify the land and all that it produces…with the peaks themselves
suggest[ing] an impassive, brooding presence” (1992:67). In addition to mountains, the ancestors
are also associated with Xib’alb’a. According to Christenson, because ancestors were buried in
churches beginning in colonial times, the church became associated with the entrance to the
underworld. He adds: “The most sacred opening into the world of the dead within the church is a
small hole called pa ruchi’ jay xib’alb’a (at the doorway of the underworld) or rumuxux
ruchuliw (navel of the face of the earth)” (2016:170). This was not merely metaphoric or poetic,
as one Maya named Nicolás purports to Christenson, “the underworld below [is] where the
ancestors live” (2016:286). This connection between death and Xib’alb’a is demonstrated in the
Popol Wuj, which describes Jun Kame (“One Death”) and Wuqub’ Kame (“Seven Death”) as its
rulers, and which also relates how at Xib’alb’a’s entrance Jun Ajpu and Xb’alanke “Xe’ik’ow chi
j’ut pa Pujiya’, pa Kik’iya’” (“Y después pasaron por un río de pus y por un río de sangre”)
(Mondloch and Carmack 2018:72, 71, 116, 117). Not only is Xib’alb’a a place of death, but it
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emphasizes the corporeal aspect of death with its two rivers of blood and pus. Xib’alb’a is a
place of death and bodily fluids because the earth is where the ancestors’ bodies are placed when
they die.
Ancestors play a different role than their descendants. Virtually all ethnographers have
observed that humans have a role to honor their ancestors by continuing to enact their practices
(Christenson 2016:310, 335; Krogstad 2014:93; Tedlock 1993:110; Watanabe 1992:96; Vogt
1976:9). Tedlock adds that in Chichicastenango the day K’at “is the day for paying one’s debts
(casaj)…to Nantat (ancestors),” and that if anyone neglects their obligatory duties to the
ancestors, they must provide “great stacks of offerings” on 1, 6, 8, and 9 K’at (1993:110). At the
same time, the ancestors have an important role of sustaining and providing for their
descendants. According to Christenson, the role of ancestors includes protecting and watching
over their descendants as well as revealing their will on how to properly live life (2016:134,192,
193, 269, 270). Tedlock echoes the same, mentioning that the ancestors reveal their will through
the ajq’iij (“day keeper”) on how to navigate important life decisions and for general protection,
blessings, and approval for critical life decisions like marriage (1993:124, 163-168). This is
similar to the role of the gods, as Las Casas reported how the colonial Maya would petition the
gods for similar blessings (Christenson 2016:176). But unlike the gods, ancestors are not bound
to the cycles of the year. Rather, they are bound to the cycles of tradition. Thus a day keeper-intraining named Xuan tells Christenson: “My daughter is a flower. Flowers die, but they leave
their seed. Each of us has our time on earth and then we pass away, but our seed remains to
create other flowers. Each flower is different, but they are also all the same. We must remember
this. If we do, we will never die” (2016:335). This is why respect and dutiful fulfillment of
obligation towards the ancestors are so critical.
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Ancestors are made alive and present when their descendants honor them and continue
life in the same way they did. Thus Watanabe states: “Parents and grandparents, in particular,
authenticate the generational continuity – if not absolute constancy – of practices that extend
back to the ancestors” (1992:96). On the other hand, children in particular emphasized the
beginning of a new cycle. Thus Pankey states that corn was used during child birth ceremonies
of the Pokoman Maya. She adds that the Tzotzil Maya had a similar corn ceremony in which a
corn seed, called the “child’s blood,” was planted in a field, and the crop that grew was called the
“blood crop” (2013:9). She concludes: “Newborn infants were a manifestation of a new life
cycle,” which was enacted when the child’s family ate the “blood crop” (2013:9). This cycle of
ancestors passing on their lives to their descendants is expressed in the Popol Wuj. When Jun
Ajpu spits into the hand of Xk’ik, daughter of Kuchuma Kik’ of Xib’alb’a, he tells her in one of
the most beautiful passages in the Popol Wuj:
Xa retal mi xnuya’ chawe, ri nuchub’ nuk’axaj. […] Keje’ ri uchub’ uk’axaj uk’oje’ik we
uk’ajol awjaw, we puch uk’ajol, we puch uk’ajol na’ol ajuchan. X ma chisach wi chib’ek;
chitz’aqatajik. Ma wi chupel, ma pu mayixel uwach ajaw, achij, na’ol, ajuchan. Xa
xichikanajik[x chikanajik] umi’al, uk’ajol.
Mi saliva y mi baba son una señal que te di. […] Como si sólo su saliva y su baba fueran
su esencia, ya sean hijos de un sabio o hijos de un orador. Nunca desaparecerán al irse;
serán (seres) completes. Nunca se extinguirán, tampoco se perderá la memoria del
Señor, del magnánimo, del sabio o del orador, pues quedarán sus hijas e hijos.
(Mondloch and Carmack 2018:86, 87).
Descendants are the essence of their ancestors, which is enacted through perpetuating the ways
of those ancestors. Yet this connection extends beyond daily and ceremonial activity, and is
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something alluded to by both Jun Ajpu in the Popol Wuj and by Xuan in Christenson’s
ethnography. Namely: the ija’ (“corn seed”) is once part of the great multiplicity of physicalities
of one crop. The ija’ is harvested and later planted, and the physicality of the original crop is
transferred to another crop. In the same way, the ancestors did not just endow their descendants
with their traditions but also with their appearance; the child resembles their parents who in turn
resemble their parents. Therefore the ancestors have also passed on a physicality to their
descendants, and when they die, their interiority goes beneath the earth, to Xib’alb’a or to the
mountains, and much of their multiplicity of physicalities is buried in the earth, but some of
those physicalities are also in their descendants. The ancestors are always present and always
alive. When Jun Ajpu spits into the hand of Xk’ik, he is literally passing some of his
physicalities (though not all) to his future children.
As for the last “category” of living beings, there are the chee’ ab’aj (“idols”) that were so
despised by the Spanish and became emblematic of the Maya during the Conquest. However, the
K’iche’s did not refer to their idols as chee’ ab’aj. According to Sparks, the K’iche’s used
k’ab’awil to refer not just to their gods but also to their idols (2019:164). The couplet chee’ ab’aj
was created by Spanish missionaries like Vico, who viewed the idols as lifeless statues of wood
and stone and who sought to create a lengua reducida that was better suited to understand
Christian doctrine. That is to say, chee’ ab’aj is a false category created by Westerners.
Christenson shows that in 1562 at least one Spaniard, Francisco Camal, acknowledged that the
Maya did not perceive a distinction, stating how the Maya offered sacrificial hearts to both their
idols and their gods and referred to the idols as gods (2016:64, 65). In Mayan thought, the idols
are living gods with an interiority just as valid as that of any other living being. And like gods,
the idols eat sacrificial blood and depend on humans to provide it. Christenson notes that both
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Diego de Landa and Las Casas observed the Mayas soaking the mouths of the idols with blood
and wine (2016:58, 108, 109). He adds that the Maya would take the blood of birds, deer, and
themselves and rub the blood into the mouths of the idols (2016:102). The idols share the same
diet as the gods, giving them a shared physicality. Moreover, according to Christenson, Las
Casas observed human sacrificial hearts taken to both the altars of the gods and to the idols
(2016:102). And like the gods, the idols had limited power that was tethered to the cycles of
time. Thus Christenson cites the Spanish chronicler Diego López de Cogolludo, who reports that
during the Wayeb’ (the final five days before New Year), certain idols would be revered with
great enthusiasm, but on New Year, they would be discarded (2016:51). Like the gods, the idols
also died on New Year, making the stone or wooden material a corpse with no interiority inside
it anymore.
The gods and idols therefore were the same to the K’iche’; both were k’ab’awil. Yet their
physicalities are different. One is ethereal and eats blood from altars, and one is visible and can
be handfed. This distinction can be likened to the perception of the color “blue” in certain
languages. Specifically, both K’iche’ and Classical Greek languages lack a word for “blue.”
Instead, K’iche’ uses the word rax (“green”) to signify “blue,” and Classical Greek has γλαυκός
(“gray”) or κῠ́ᾰνος (“dark, dark-blue”). In Greek’s case, the lack of the word led to Homer’s
famous reference to the ocean as οἶνοψ πόντος (traditionally translated “wine-dark sea”).
Obviously, both the K’iche’s and the ancient Greeks were not colorblind, unable to tell the color
of the sky apart from the color of grass and trees. Or in another example, English distinguishes
spatial containment as either on or in, whereas Spanish only uses en. This does not mean the
Spanish cannot distinguish whether a cup in on top of a table or infused into the table. The same
is true for the k’ab’awil. Even though there is a clear difference between the physicalities of the
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visible idols and the invisible gods, there is still only one category of k’ab’awil, not “idols” and
“gods.” Lopéz Ixcoy is therefore correct when she states that k’ab’awil in its original meaning
signified “divino, puro” as opposed to “dios” (2017:xxii; 2011:4). For the K’iche’, “gods” and
“idols” are not categories. They are European constructs forcefully superimposed onto the
k’ab’awil by the Spanish. While there is clearly no exact equivalent of k’ab’awil in English,
“divinities” is the most accurate analog.
Ultimately, the ojer winaq (“ancestors”) and k’ab’awil (“divinities”) are physically
distinct from humans, but there interiorities are not. The ancestors have a fractured physicality
existing in the earth and in their descendants, and the divinities have a physicality based on the
subsistence of ritually provided blood. But, in the animist ontology, they have the same
interiority as humans and therefore are also both fully human. For a final time, we return to the
Tupinambá. For animist societies like them, all living beings require categories to make sense of
reality. Moreover, they require the same categories: winaq (“human”), chee’ (“trees”), chikop
(“animal”), ojer winaq (“ancestors”), k’ab’awil (“divinities”). This is because, as Viveiros points
out, “humanity is reciprocally reflexive,” and more to the point, “there is no fixed point of view
between beings” (2017:69, 157). This leads to a “self-reflexive apparatus for the production of
concepts, of ‘symbols that represent themselves’” (2017:195). Here Descola must be headed,
who warns of “the misleading analyses of dualism, and [its application], without distinction” to
relational schemas in animist ontology (2014:343). The human experience is relative to all living
things in an all-encompassing cosmological webbing of relationality. For the Tupinambá, the
jaguar sees blood as manioc beer, the peccary sees a mud puddle as a grand ceremonial house,
and the souls of the dead see a rotten corpse as fermented manioc (2017:71). The “human”
experience of each living being begins with their individual interiority, which is the same as all
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other living beings. The various parts that make their physicality are the lens through which that
interiority sees the world. When Viverios says “A perspective is not a representation because
representations are properties of the mind, whereas a point of view is in the body,” he is
describing exactly this (2017:72). All living beings are human in mind and soul; their
experiences are just filtered through a different set of bodily tools ranging from appearance to
instincts to diet.
The same is the case for the K’iche’ and other highland Mayan groups. For instance,
Watanabe documents how the Mam feed their saints candles, rum, and incense. The Mam say
that if they do not feed the saints, then “‘God’ – and by implication, the saints – ‘would have no
tortillas,’ and they would starve” (1992:75, 76). The case is the same for the Tzotzil in a number
of rituals recorded by Vogt in Tortillas for the Gods. When the Tzotzil adorn their crosses with
red geranium flowers, they are giving the crosses their “clothing.” When the crosses are dressed,
they are “waiting” for their “food.” When the shaman waves a flower-carrier over burning
candles, he is giving the gods their “cigarette.” And lastly, when the shaman lights white tallow
candles, he is giving the gods their “chicken,” “beef,” and “tortillas” (Vogt 1976:49, 50). This
reflects what Viveiros calls “an essential ontological incompleteness: the incompleteness of
sociality, and, in general, of humanity” (2011:47). The universe is an objective reality, but each
being’s experience of that universe is subjectively human. Thus when the k’ab’awil (“divinities”)
are eating blood, in their perspectives, they are humans depending on the nourishment of their
creations, their tzuqul, q’o’l (“nourishers, sustainers”) according to the Popol Wuuj, to provide
them their ixiim (“corn”), their ak’ (“chicken”), and their masaat (“deer”). This is also
demonstrated in the lowland glyphs. For instance, in the Cross Group temples at Palenque in the
lowlands, inscriptions inside the temple inner sanctuaries mention “u-pi-bi-na-li” (transliterated
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upib’na’il). The word upib’na’il is related to the Yukatekan word pib’ (“subterranean oven” or
“sweat bath”) and also includes the word na (“house”), suggesting the word upib’na’il references
a “sweatlodge” (Houston 1996:136, 137). The glyphs also mention the “u-k’u-li,” which
references the Yukatekan k’u (“divinities”), and continue “pu-lu-yi u-chi-ti-ni-il (transliterated
“puluy uchitinil”) (Houston 1996:137). Puluy relates to pul (“burn”), and uchitinil relates to
chitin, a cognate form of kitin or kitim, which is a synonym for pib’ (“subterranean oven” or
“sweat bath”). Ultimately, the glyphs relate how before the three sanctuaries of the Cross Group
were dedicated, the gods prepared a sweat bath. In fact, in the sanctuary of Wakaj Chan (now
referred to as the Temple of the Cross), the sanctuary is called “ku-nu-il” (transliterated “kunil”),
with kun meaning “oven in which ink is made from smoke” (Houston 1996:137, 138). Houston
states that the inscriptions of the Cross Group associate both the images of the furnace and the
sweat lodge with divine birth, concluding that they are only metaphors (1996:138, 146). But his
interpretation is incorrect. From the perspective of humans, the divinities are made from ovens.
Simultaneously, from the perspective of the divinities, they are humans born in sweat lodges. It
not a matter of poetic metaphor but a matter of reality based on the ability to assume the
perspectives of other living beings.
When the Maya made the k’ab’awil, they were creating living beings. Christenson relates
how, according to Diego de Landa, the process of “birthing the gods” was an extremely serious
one that involved fasting, sexual abstinence, and their own blood (2016:35). Descola notes this
as a commonly shared trait among animistic hunters, who have the responsibility to “compensate
for the losses” when taking the life of nonhumans, and states: “The most common means to
[compensate] is sexual abstinence. By checking one’s carnal desires, a hunter effects a retention
and accumulation of sexual energy that can rejoin the general stock of fertilizing power that is in
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circulation in the universe” (2014:346, 347). While the creation of k’ab’awil is different than
taking the life of an animal, the same concept applies. In order to create new life in the form of a
k’ab’awil, energy is required. This includes the giving of blood as well as accumulating lifegiving energy through fasting and abstinence. The Mayan sculptors themselves claimed the
process was extremely dangerous, and they feared that either they or someone in their family
would die or become infected with the “fainting sickness” (2016:35). But the work was
necessary, because the k’ab’awil were necessary to sustain them and the cosmos from year to
year. Therefore, just as the k’ab’awil created the winaq (“humans”) to be their tzuqul, q’o’l
(“nourishers, sustainers”), the winaq created the k’ab’awil to be their own tzuqul, q’o’l that
would provide them with q’iij (“day, the sun”), which is the source of time. In this sense, the
relationship between winaq and k’ab’awil is unique because it necessitates not just a reflexive
humanity but also a reflexive divinity wherein each sustain the other according to the cyclical
patterns of the calendar.
Conclusion
I have made the argument that the K’iche’s and other Mayan groups were ontologically
animist. Historically and near universally, the Mayas have been considered analogists like the
Nahauas, only with superficial differences. But this is not the case. Rather, I have argued that the
K’iche’s were animists, with a major schema of relationality based in obligatory exchange, and
with a minor schema of relationality based in predation. This ontology was highly specified to
the Mayan region. Within this ontological lens, there are no “gods” and “idols.” There is only the
k’ab’awil (“divinities”). Furthermore, the ojer winaq (“ancestors”) are neither k’ab’awil nor
winaq (“human”), but are former humans whose interiority is separated from their physicalities,
and whose physicalities are fragmented and dispersed between the earth and their descendants.
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And finally, both the ojer winaq and the k’ab’awil are fully human from their own subjective
points of view, yet exist in the same objective reality with all other living beings. The cosmos is
a web of interwoven relationships between humans, gods, ancestors, animals, trees, and rocks, all
of which see themselves as human and see others through physical differences and relational
equivocations of actions.
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Chapter 6:
Conclusions
The argument of this paper, while ambitious in scope, is simple is argument. In this
paper, I address two questions: (1) How does Domingo de Vico perceive K’iche’an gods,
ancestors, and idols? and (2) How do the K’iche’s view them? To answer these two questions, I
review the ontological schematization of being that informs both the K’iche’s and Vico. I then
carefully analyze the Theologia Indorum to interpret Vico’s understanding of idols, gods and
ancestors. After that, I analyze indigenous writings, especially the Popol Wuuj and Rab’inal
Achi, to attempt an understanding of the K’iche’an perspective. The two perspectives of Vico
and the K’iche’s are wildly different. Vico sees the gods as demons, the ancestors as souls sent to
Hell, and idols as dead rock and wood. The K’iche’an perspective, on the other hand, sees the
gods and idols as the same type of divine being, a k’ab’awil, and they view their ancestors as
more than disembodied spirits who have departed to the unreachable metaphysical dimension.
Both perspectives are different from those of modern scholars, many of whom conflate
gods and “deified ancestors” as the same thing, while also viewing idols as representative
depictions of either gods or deified ancestors. Vico and modern scholars therefore fall on two
extremes, and therefore both are in error. Vico perceived gods, ancestors, and idols as three
completely separate categories. Meanwhile modern scholars tend to view gods, ancestors, and
gods as conflated and interrelated aspects of the same fiction: the Mayas worshipped all three,
and there really isn’t much difference between them. Thus archaeologists tend to view stone or
wooden idols as possibly representing a god or a deified ancestor, just as art historians tend to
interpret paintings or stone relief depictions of divinities as either gods or deified ancestors. In
either case, the distinction between gods and ancestors is never important.
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I have argued that Domingo de Vico was ontologically a naturalist. During the 16th
century in Spain, Vico studied at the Dominican university at Salamanca. There, he received
training and education in Scripture, the Western Canon, as well as in Latin (and possibly Greek).
From there, he was recruited to serve as a missionary in Guatemala’s highlands. When he arrived
to the shores of the New World, he brought with him all of the ideas of the Old. He then wrote
the Theologia Indorum to teach the indigenous his ideas. Ultimately, his manuscript became part
of an unforgiving and relentless machine of colonization that enslaved the Mayas and forced
them to not just talk like but think like the European invaders. New ideas were not welcome to
Vico and the Universal Church that he represented.
Vico, like the average European of this time, was a naturalist. As such, he perceived
being as a matter of interiority only. That is to say, a person was purely a soul inhabiting a
temporary, physical body. The body was not person. Moreover, the body was, in essence, the
same as the physical bodies of animals. Therefore the human body, with all of its animal instincts
and tendencies, was constantly at war with the soul, which strived to attain perfection through
reason and the attainment of Truth. Attaining such Truth was the sole purpose of humankind.
This naturalism was coupled with the European obsession of categorization. The
Theologia Indorum is replete with examples of categories, along with groupings and
subgroupings of those categories. These categories informed how Vico perceived the cosmos.
Vico perceived the gods, ancestors, and idols of the Mayas as distinct things. First,
because Vico perceived the soul as the only true way to distinguish between living beings, he
believed that the gods were purely spirit. He believed that they were real, only that they were
demons that had deceived the Mayas into giving them names and worshipping them. Second,
because the body is physical and the same as that of an animal, the ancestor is a soul who has left
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the body. In the case of the Mayas, because their ancestors had not received the Word of God
from the Spanish, their souls were sent to Hell, while their bodies rotted in the earth and no
longer mattered or had meaning. That is to say, the ancestor’s body was just an empty shell,
devoid of the soul that once animated it. Finally, the idols did not have souls or even the ability
to think or feel, and so they were purely physical objects, dead and inanimate.
The K’iche’s on the other hand had a much more nuanced perception than what modern
scholars often credit to them. The K’iche’s did not perceive gods, ancestors, and idols as three
separate categories in the same way that Vico did. But they did not perceive of a single, vague,
mystic category of gods and deified ancestors. The problem with the approach of many modern
scholars is that, in trying to avoid Western conceptions of gods, they fail to replace those
Western conceptions with Mayan ones. As a consequence, they fail to render any logic to the
Mayas, instead treating their gods and ancestors as the same thing, more or less, perhaps with
some distinctions, perhaps not. But there is a distinct logic to Mayan perception of divinities and
ancestors, and to ignore this risk completely misunderstanding them just as Vico did.
In a very limited space, I have attempted to understand K’iche’an ontology and argued
that it was animist. While many scholars tend to ignore Mayan ontology, many of the ones who
address it tend to consider the Mayas an analogist. This reasoning is based in the grave and tired
misconception that the Mayas were very similar to the Mexica (more commonly called the
Aztecs). That is to say, this assumption of a Mayan analogism is rooted in the perception of a
generalized pan-Mesoamerican ontology, distinguishable only by geography and some other
superficial aspects. I argue against this notion, instead favoring an ontology that is uniquely and
distinctly Mayan, not “Mesoamerican.”
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In an animist ontology, living beings are not distinguished by their interiorities. Rather,
animism is the exact opposite of naturalism, since it perceives an unmarked interiority that
inhabits a unique physicality. All “souls” are the same, that is to say, they are all human in their
own subjective perspective. Rather, the only way to distinguish between living beings who all
think like and believe they are humans is through the physicalities. A human and a jaguar are
both human from their point of view, but a human walks on two legs, and a jaguar has a pelt
covered in dark rosettes.
This animist ontology is founded in a relational schema of obligatory exchange. In this
schema, it is the obligation of the gods to sustain the sun and the cosmos. But the energy of the
gods is limited, and so they die at the end of every solar year. In order to revive the gods, humans
must return energy for energy. This takes the form of a various number of rituals that include
cleaning the streets, homes, and temples, as well as playing a ball game and conducting
bloodletting rituals and human sacrifices. By successfully completing and fulfilling these
obligations, the gods are revived and can once again sustain the sun and the cosmos for another
year. This obligatory exchange includes a sub-schema based in predation. Within this schema,
the K’iche’s actively seek out human captives to sacrifice to the gods. This predation serves a
method for assisting in the overall schema of obligatory exchange. That is to say, predation
serves a means of accruing the resource of human blood.
Within this animist ontology, the K’iche’s do not perceive of three separate categories of
“gods,” “ancestors,” and “idols,” nor do they have a vague generalization of them as a single and
interrelated divineness. Rather, they perceive two separate categories: k’ab’awil (“divinities,”
including both gods and idols), and ojer winaq (“ancestors”). For the K’iche’s, their k’ab’awil
(“divinities”) are a single category of living beings who sustain the sun, die at the end of each
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solar year, and are revived through bloodletting and other New Year rituals. Additionally, they
believe that the being of the ojer winaq is found in both the interiority and the physicalities. The
interiority exists in the underworld Xib’alb’a, while the physicalities exist in the corporeal
remains of the body, the space where the body is buried, and finally in the descendants
themselves who have received a portion of their parents’ physicality in them.
These perceptions of k’ab’awil and ojer winaq are radically alien to the Western
perspective. While I have endeavored to understand K’iche’an ontology, I have only scratched
the surface of this topic. This study is not comprehensive in any sense, but I have tried to be as
intellectually honest as possible and have based my conclusions largely on the words of the
Mayas themselves, whether it be in the Popol Wuuj or in Rab’inal Achi or even in their glyphic
inscriptions. K’iche’an ontology is not Mexican or European ontology. It is unique and highly
sophisticated and logical. But Domingo de Vico did not sense this, nor did he try to truly
understand the K’iche’s. Instead, he simply deemed the K’iche’s as pagans in need of Christ and
Western wisdom. Through education and mass, he would reform the indigenous and make them
truly human, which to him meant Christian. Even if he had to enslave the indigenous, it would be
worth it to save their souls. The Theologia Indorum was a tool for this project, and its words
would be used against the Mayas for centuries.
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